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Abstract 
 
This thesis is an exploration of the legal process for rape in Rwanda, aimed at examining 
whether this process is influenced by rape myths, as revealed in many Western 
jurisdictions. To achieve this, the study adopted a socio-legal approach to empirical 
research, triangulating three methods: interviews, observations and document analysis. 
Fifty interviews were carried out with forty participants including judges, prosecutors, 
defence lawyers and rape victim-survivors. Ten court observations were conducted across 
the country and 276 prosecution and court files were analysed in this research. The results 
revealed that the legal process for rape in Rwanda is profoundly influenced by rape myths. 
This finding is evidence that similar rape myths may exist in very different socio-cultural 
contexts and legal systems. Some of the myths revealed are the belief that a “genuine” 
rape victim is someone who is chaste, who physically resists the assault and promptly 
reports the incident to the authorities; as well as the conviction that women tend to make 
false allegations of rape.  
These misconceptions extensively influence prosecutors’ and judges’ decision-making in 
rape cases. Their conclusions are typically characterised by misapprehensions about rape 
and rape victims, which results in many defendants being discharged on erroneous 
grounds. The cases that go through the legal process and which secure conviction are 
overwhelmingly those that conform to the “real rape” myth. Other complaints of rape are 
systematically dismissed regardless of their contents. These effects of rape myths on the 
legal process are undermining in an invisible way the campaign against sexual violence in 
Rwanda. The thesis exposes this hidden problem in order to contribute to improving the 
Rwandan criminal justice system’s response to sexual violence.  
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Chapter 1 
 INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is intended to contribute to academic knowledge on the gendered nature of 
rape trials in Rwanda, and aims to provide empirical evidence that can be used to help 
eradicate sexual violence and empower women. In the early 2000s, Rwanda embarked on 
a journey towards gender equality in order to ensure that women and men enjoy the 
same rights.1 This has been a major social shift as it involves correcting traditional gender 
imbalances that have characterised Rwandan society for centuries.2 To date considerable 
efforts, mainly driven by political leadership, have been made and remarkable 
achievements have been reached.3 For example, Rwanda has dramatically improved 
women’s involvement in politics and public administration.4 It now ranks third globally in 
female political empowerment.5 It also ranks first in the world in terms of women’s 
participation in parliament.6  
These attainments are significant, but much more effort by both the government and 
citizens is needed to achieve gender equality. The government has acknowledged that the 
political will to empower women needs to be translated into more effective actions, 
policies and strategies.7 There are still fundamental issues of gender inequality that need 
to be addressed in different areas of society.8  Some of the most acute problems 
                                                          
1
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2017), From Victims to Leading Actors. Rwanda’s Gender Dividend, available 
from http://www.migeprof.gov.rw , [accessed 2 August 2018]; Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2011), 
National Policy Against Gender-based Violence, Available from http://www.migeprof.gov.rw , [accessed 2 August 2018]. 
2
 HAGURUKA (2001), La Femme Rwandaise et l’ Accès à la Justice, available from https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu, 
[accessed 2 August 2018]. 
3
 Hunt, S. (2017), Rwandan Women Rising, Durham, Duke University Press; Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion 
(2017). 
4
 Historically, women were marginalised from politics and public administration. Presently, they are sixty-four per cent in 
Parliament, forty per cent in cabinet, fifty per cent in the judiciary, fifty per cent among provincial governors. They are 
also significantly represented in local administration; HAGURUKA (2001);  Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion 
(2017). 
5
 World Economic Forum (2017), The Global Gender Gap Report, available from http://www3.weforum.org, [accessed 2 
August 2018]. 
6
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2017); World Economic Forum, ibid. 
7
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2010), Strategic Plan for the Implementation of the National Gender Policy, 
available from https://www.ilo.org, [accessed 2 August 2018] 
8
 RWAMREC (2010), Masculinity and Gender-based Violence: Experiences and Perceptions of Men and Women, available 
at https://promundoglobal.org, [accessed 16 July 2018]; Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2010). 
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highlighted are the burden of poverty on women and the problem of gender-based 
violence.9  
Gender, and sexual violence in particular, is a major obstacle to gender equality in 
Rwanda.10 Gender-based violence is defined in Rwanda as “any act that results in a bodily, 
psychological, sexual and economic harm to somebody because they are female or 
male.”11 The World Health Organisation defines sexual violence as “any sexual act or 
attempt to obtain a sexual act using coercion”.12 It is a broad concept that includes many 
sexual offences such as sexual harassment, sexual abuse of children and rape.13 Rape is 
defined in Rwandan law as non-consensual sexual intercourse by use of force, threat or 
fraud.14   
Many public and private institutions, for example parliament, the prosecution service and 
NGOs have denounced the widespread character of gender and sexual violence in 
Rwanda.15 The pervasiveness of sexual violence has been confirmed by a major survey 
conducted in 2010, which revealed that 22.3 per cent of women between the age of 
fifteen and forty-nine have experienced sexual violence in their lifetime.16 This prevalence 
has been attributed, at least partly, to a “culture of violence against women” promulgated 
by patriarchy.17   
Patriarchal norms are also blamed for contributing to a “culture of silence” surrounding 
gender and sexual violence, which contributes to impunity for sexual violence in 
Rwanda.18 Indeed, these offences are severely under-reported and unpunished. National 
statistics reveal that only 7.7 per cent of women who experience sexual violence choose to 
                                                          
9
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion, ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Article 1, 1° of the GBV Law. 
12
 World Health Organisation (2002), World Report on Violence and Health, Chapter 6, p.149. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Article 196 of the Penal Code (2012). 
15
 Forum of Rwandan Women Members of Parliament (2005), Recommendations and Summary of the National 
Conference on the Bill of the Law on Prevention and Eradication of all Forms of Gender-based Violence in Particular 
Violence against Women and Children, 3-4 October 2005. (Unpublished). 
16
 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (2012), Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey 2010. Final Report, available 
from: https://dhsprogram.com, [accessed 2 August 2018].  
17
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2011); RWAMREC (2013), Sexual and Gender-based Violence. Base-line 
Study in 13 Districts. Final report, available at http://www.rwamrec, [accessed 2 August 2018]. 
18
 Forum of Rwandan Women Members of Parliament (2005); Umubyeyi et al. (2016), “Gender inequality prevents 
abused women from seeking care despite protection given in gender-based violence legislation: A qualitative study from 
Rwanda”, Plos ONE, 11(5). 
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report to the police.19 Further, an average of only ninety-one convictions for adult rape 
per year was secured between 2012 and 201620  in a country of 12 million, where acts of 
sexual violence are recognised to be widespread.  Only ten cases of marital rape have 
been prosecuted in ten years, from 2008 to 2018, of which six convictions were secured.21 
This situation supports the Ministry of Gender’s concern that sexual violence is “a very 
critical issue of justice” in the country.22  
The need to address gender and sexual violence has prompted the country to undertake 
strategies to prevent it since the last decade. These measures include: adoption of new 
legislation on prevention of gender-based violence;23 systematic sensitisation campaigns 
against gender-based and sexual violence across the country;24 establishment of ISANGE 
centres equipped to provide immediate support to victims of sexual violence;25 and 
creation of gender desks within police stations to facilitate victims’ access to police.26 Yet 
despite these new measures, there is no indication that the problem of sexual violence is 
reducing in the country.  
 
It is important to note that the issue of gender and sexual violence is critical not only in 
Rwanda but continues to disproportionately affect women globally. As such, this thesis 
will draw comparatively on other countries’ approaches to tackling the problem. The 
World Health Organisation has revealed that sexual violence is a worldwide threat 
affecting millions of people every year.27 Statistics on sexual violence in many countries 
illustrate this issue. For example, in England and Wales, twenty per cent of women aged 
sixteen to fifty nine have experienced sexual violence.28 In the US, 17.6 per cent of women 
aged 17 and above have experienced rape or attempted rape.29 Further, 20.4 per cent of 
                                                          
19
 National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (2012), p.252. 
20
 Statistics on cases of rape especially provided by prosecution authorities for the study, May 2016. 
21
 Statistics on cases of marital rape especially provided by prosecution authorities for the study, August 2018. 
22
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2010). 
23
 Law No 59/2008 of 10/09/2008 on Prevention and Punishment of Gender-based Violence. 
24
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2010). 
25
 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2011). 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 World Health Organisation (2002). 
28
 Ministry of Justice (2013), An Overview of Sexual Offending in England and Wales, available at www.justice.gov.uk 
[accessed 26 November 2018]. 
29
 World Health Organisation (2002). 
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men in Cambodia acknowledged having committed rape in their lives.30 These figures 
show that the scale of sexual violence is considerable in many countries across the world. 
 
In addition to the magnitude of sexual violence, reduction of this crime has been reported 
to be lamentably inadequate in many jurisdictions. Research conducted by feminist 
scholars since the 1970s in a number of Western countries has revealed fundamental 
issues in preventing rape. First, unreported rapes remain common, resulting in many 
rapists not being brought to justice. For example, in England and Wales it has been 
estimated that only fifteen per cent of victims of sexual violence report their victimisation 
to the police.31 Second, attrition rates for rape cases are high in many jurisdictions. 
Complaints of rape are systematically dropped at all the stages of the criminal justice 
process, from police, to prosecution to courts; resulting in low conviction rates. For 
example, recent statistics show that only 5.7 per cent of reported rapes lead to a 
conviction in England and Wales.32 Third, rape complainants have been subjected to 
humiliation by the criminal justice system during the legal process in many countries.33 
The negative experiences of many complainants during both investigation and trial 
processes has been described by some feminists as a “judicial rape”, due particularly to 
mistreatment of victim-witnesses during cross-examination.34 These issues demonstrate a 
“justice gap” with respect to the successful prosecution of sexual violence though it should 
be noted that improvements have been made in some jurisdictions.35 
Feminist research has revealed that the “justice gap” for rape cases is at least partly due to 
the influence of rape myths.36 These pervasive myths (detailed below), it is argued, have 
created an unconscious bias against rape complainants among many criminal justice 
                                                          
30
 Fulu et al. (2013), Why Some Men Use Violence Against Women and How Can We Prevent It? Quantitative Findings 
from the United Nations Multi-Country Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific, available at 
http://www.undp.org, [accessed 16 July 2018]. 
31
  Ministry of Justice (2013), An Overview of Sexual Offending in England and Wales.  
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Temkin, J. (2010), "And always keep a-hold of nurse, for fear of finding something worse: Challenging rape myths in 
the courtroom”, New Criminal Law Review, 13(4), pp. 710-734;  Lees, S. (1996). Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial. London, 
Hamish Hamilton. p31; Gregory, J. and Lees, S. (1994). “In Search of Gender Justice. Sexual Assault and the Criminal 
Justice System”. Feminist Review. Vol 48(1);  
34
 Lees, S. (1993), “Judicial rape”, Women’s Studies International Forum, 16(1): 11-36. 
35
  Smith,O. and Skinner, T. (2017), “How rape myths are used and challenged in rape and sexual assault trials”, Social 
and Legal Studies, 26(4);  Temkin, J. (2002), Rape and the Legal Process, 2
nd
 ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
36
 See for example Temkin, J. et al. (2018), “Different functions of rape myths use in court: Findings from a trial 
observation study”, Feminist Criminology, 13(2):205-226; Eyssel, F. and Bohner, G. (2011), “Schema effects of rape myth 
acceptance on judgments of guilt and blame in rape cases: The role of perceived entitlement to judge”, Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence, 26(8); Temkin (2002); Estrich, S. (1987), Real Rape, Harvard University Press; Lees (1996). 
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professionals, which has been evidenced to influence their decision-making in cases of 
rape.37 Due to these prejudices, many legal professionals have tended to unfairly favour 
the defendants of rape within justice processes to the detriment of the complainants, 
resulting in high levels of unwarranted discharge of defendants.38 Many studies have 
therefore suggested that legal reform is necessary to challenge rape myths that affect 
both the public and the justice system. Such a strategy must also inform Rwanda’s 
campaign against gender inequality and sexual violence.  
The following section provides a brief overview of rape myths as informing the basis for 
the thesis’ objectives and the research questions as presented below. The theoretical 
framework guiding the thesis’ empirical research is then outlined. 
1. An overview of rape myths                          
A myth is “a commonly believed but false idea.”39 Rape myths are defined as “prejudicial, 
stereotyped and false beliefs about rape, rape victims and rapists.”40 They are “attitudes 
and beliefs that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to 
deny and justify male sexual aggression against women.”41 They tend to place blame on 
the victim and excuse the perpetrator.42 At the core of rape myths is the denial of rape 
among the public and criminal justice practitioners.43 Lonsway and Fitzgerald have argued 
that rape myths fulfil a specific function in society designed to justify sexual violence 
against women and sustain social norms based on gender inequality.44  
An example of a rape myth is the “real rape” myth. This refers to a narrow understanding 
of rape, which conceptualises a real rape victim as a respectable woman who is attacked 
by a stranger in an isolated location, who resists the assault, and who presents significant 
injuries after the abuse and promptly reports the incident to the police, expressing 
distress.45 Due to this belief, other forms of rapes not conforming to this stereotype may 
                                                          
37
 Idem. 
38
 Temkin (2010). 
39
 Cambridge Dictionary available at https://dictionary.cambridge.org, [accessed 25 January 2018]. 
40
 Temkin (2010), p.714. 
41
 Lonsway, K.A. and Fitzgerald, L.F. (1994), “Rape myths”, Psychology of Women Quarterly, 18, p.134. 
42
 Eyssel, F. and Bohner, G. (2011), “Schema effects of rape myth acceptance on judgments of guilt and blame in rape 
cases: The role of perceived entitlement to judge”, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 26(8), p.1580. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994). 
45
 Maier (2008); Williams (1984) cited in Hockett, J.M. et al. (2016), “Rape myth consistency and gender differences in 
perceiving rape victims: A meta-analysis” Violence Against Women, 22(2), p.140; Estrich (1987). 
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not be considered “real” and can be viewed as being caused by victim characteristics or 
behaviours, such as dress, speech or other situational conduct.46 As a result, such beliefs 
can result in the victim being (partly) blamed for their own victimisation instead of the 
offender. 47  Examples of rapes often discarded for not being “real” are rapes not resulting 
in remarkable physical injuries and rapes committed by a person known to the victim.48 
 
Apart from the “real rape” myth, the literature reveals many other types of rape myths 
which are sometimes inter-connected. They include the following:  
 
(1) Rape does not exist except in very exceptional circumstances, because a woman is 
capable of preventing rape by fighting off her attacker if she really does not want sexual 
intercourse;49 
(2) Women enjoy rape;50                     
(3) Only some types of women are raped;51             
(4)  Women who invite men for a drink are signalling their desire to have sex, so any 
ensuing sexual intercourse must have been consensual;52                                                           
(5) Husbands cannot rape their wives;53 
(6) False allegations of rape are very common;54 
(7) Prostitutes cannot be raped;55 
(8) Rape results from a man’s uncontrollable sex drive;56 
(9) Women provoke rape by the way they behave and dress;57 
(10) A woman who accepts gifts from a man is expected to consent to sex with him;58 
                                                          
46
 Hockett et al. (2016), p.140. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
  Temkin (2010), p.715.  
50
 Smart, C. (1977). 
51
 Eyssel and Bohner (2011) give the example of women who hang out in pubs and sleep around (p.1580). 
52
 Smith and Skinner (2017). 
53
  Edwards, K.M. et al. (2011), “Rape myths: History, individual and institutional-level presence, and implications for 
change”, Sex Roles, p.765. 
54
 Eyssel and Bohner (2011), p.1580. 
55
 Smith and Skinner (2017), p.443. 
56
 Ibid.  
57
 Temkin (2010), p.715. 
58
  This is a rape myth that Tavrow et al. named “she owed him.” Tavrow et al. (2013), “Rape Myth Attitudes in Rural 
Kenya: Toward the development of a culturally relevant attitude scale and “blame index””, Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence, 28(10):2156–2178. 
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(11) Women who have previous sexual experience with a defendant (or with multiple 
partners) are not credible witnesses;59 
(12) A lack of prompt reporting to the police is an indication that rape did not happen;60 
(13) A withdrawal of a rape complaint suggests that the accusation was false.61  
 
Research conducted over the last four decades in the fields of medicine, criminology, 
psychology, history and other social sciences has revealed that these beliefs are not 
supported by evidence and that they are mostly false. Many of these study findings will be 
discussed extensively throughout this thesis, but it is helpful at this stage to provide some 
brief examples as to the research that has underpinned the aims of this thesis. First, 
medical science has revealed that the majority of rapes do not result in genital or other 
bodily injury, contradicting the idea that a rape victim must present with significant 
injury.62 Second, psychologists have shown that the emotional effects of rape may affect 
the victim’s behaviour in the aftermath of the assault and cause delay in reporting the 
incident.63 Third, research has revealed that rape is a “pseudo-sexual” act frequently 
motivated by anger, punishment, control and domination.64 It has also demonstrated that 
rape has historically been used as a weapon of war and genocide.65 Fourth, many rape 
victims suffer long lasting emotional trauma, which in some cases prompts suicide or 
attempted suicide.66  Fifth, men are generally physically stronger than women: this 
contradicts the idea that if a woman does not really want sex she can simply prevent it by 
physical resistance.67  
 
                                                          
59
 Temkin (2002), p.197. 
60
 Orenstein, A. (1997), “‘My God!’ A feminist critique of the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule”, California 
Law Review, 85. 
61
 Saunders, C.L. (2012), “The truth, the half-truth, and nothing like the truth. Reconceptualizing false allegations of rape”, 
British Journal of Criminology, p.1166. 
62
 Sugar, N.F. et al. (2004), “Physical injury after sexual assault: Findings of a large case series”, American Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology, 190:71-6. 
63
 Block, A.P. (1990), “Rape trauma syndrome as scientific expert testimony”, Archives of Sexual Behavior, 19(4), p.318. 
64
 Groth, A.N. (1979), Men who Rape. The Psychology of the Offender, Perseus, New York ; Le Goaziou, V. (2011), Le viol, 
Aspects Sociologiques d’un Crime, La documentation Française, Paris.  
65
 Brownmiller (1976); See also the jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, for example: The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayezu 
(1998).  
66
 Stephens, S.G. (2016), Relationship of Sexual Violence and High-Risk Behaviours among Male and Female U.S. College 
students, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses. 
67
 Temkin (2010), p.716.  
16 
 
Despite the lack of supporting evidence, rape myths have historically had a powerful 
influence on the public and the criminal justice systems across the world.68 Research 
conducted in many countries since the 1970s has shown that the police, prosecutors, 
judges and jurors have tended to adjust their decisions to these pre-conceived stereotypes 
of rape. 69  Rape complainants have been humiliated in courts and seem to be on trial 
rather than the defendants, due at least partly to the pervasive acceptance of rape myths 
that has historically shaped the legal profession’s response to rape.70 And though legal 
reform and changes in social attitudes have begun to shift the negative effects of some 
rape myths on criminal justice systems, recent works, including Temkin et al. (2018) and 
Hohl and Stanko (2015), have indicated that many of these invidious myths persist.71  
All of this suggests that the harmful effects of rape myths on the criminal justice system 
must be considered seriously in any effort to fight sexual violence. However, the extent to 
which such myths are present within the criminal justice system in Rwanda remains 
unclear. This thesis seeks to address this lacuna based on the following research objectives 
and research questions.  
2. Thesis objectives and research questions 
Similar rape myths identified in Western jurisdictions are likely to be present in the 
criminal justice system in Rwanda, despite cultural differences, based on the premise that 
societies in both jurisdictions are characterised by long histories of patriarchy. This 
premise is reinforced by the following considerations: First, there are indications of similar 
rape myths in many other non-Western patriarchal societies in spite of cultural differences. 
For instance, previous studies have revealed the presence of some rape myths in India, 
Japan, Brasil, China, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Jamaica and in sub-Sahara African countries 
including Kenya and South Africa.72 Second, in Rwanda herself, there is non-scientific 
evidence of rape myths in the legal system prior to this study.  
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Such evidence is found in parliament during debates on the bill of law preventing gender 
violence in 2007.73 Despite the Rwandan parliament’s efforts to introduce legislation 
ensuring gender equality since the beginning of the last decade, many members of 
parliament (MPs) betrayed ideas supporting the “culture of violence against women” 
denounced above. During the debates, many MPs opposed criminalisation of marital rape, 
making declarations openly showing acceptance of rape myths. For instance, MPs Nkusi 
Juvenal and Mukama Abbas argued that “no negotiations” for sexual relations between 
spouses should be required because permanent consent is given at marriage.74 MP 
Mugabowindekwe Emmanuel went as far as to state that some women have sexual 
perversions and like to be beaten and violated by their husbands. 75  MP Makuba 
additionally stated that men have “permanent” sexual needs, which it was asserted is not 
the case for women; and therefore, they should not have the same sexual rights.76 MP 
Nyandwi Joseph Désiré simply believed that gender equality is “unimaginable” and that 
criminalisation of marital rape was not appropriate.77 Nevertheless, the majority of the 
MPs repudiated these ideas and managed to pass the bill. 
The high probability of the presence of rape myths in the criminal justice system suggests 
a necessity to explore a new strategy for fighting sexual violence in Rwanda. As noted 
earlier, rape myths have considerable potential for undermining justice in rape cases. If 
such myths are present in the criminal justice system in Rwanda, they are likely to be a 
major obstacle to the campaign against sexual violence the country has embarked on. 
Therefore, countering rape myths should be a priority. 
The objective of this study is consequently to investigate, identify and reveal the influence 
of rape myths on the legal process for rape in Rwanda, with a view to providing knowledge 
that can serve to improve the system’s response to rape. 
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The research main question arising from the above considerations is the following: “Is the 
legal process for rape in Rwanda influenced by rape myths?”  
This question can be broken down into the following sub-questions: 
a. Are rape myths, as identified in other jurisdictions, present in the legal process 
for rape in Rwanda?  
b. Are prosecutors and judges influenced by myths about rape when handling rape 
cases? If so, in which ways? 
c. Are there special procedures that may limit the effects of rape myths in the 
prosecution of rape in Rwanda? 
In this thesis, the concept of the “legal process” will refer to the proceedings in the 
prosecution and trial of rape defendants. 
3. Theoretical framework  
This thesis is a socio-legal study which drew on work that had been informed by feminist 
theory. Feminist theory seeks to address imbalances between men and women resulting 
from patriarchy.78 Feminist approaches to sexual violence research have substantially 
contributed to revealing gender inequalities surrounding rape myths, which have gone on 
to influence legal reforms and changes to policies in many countries across the world since 
the 1970s.79  
The literature used is predominantly Western because most research on feminism and on 
rape myths has been conducted in the Western world. This literature is specifically from 
traditional common law countries, especially England and the United States. These 
jurisdictions are adversarial while Rwanda’s legal system is traditionally inquisitorial.80 This 
difference presents implications that will be examined later in the thesis.  
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There remains scant Rwandan literature relevant to this topic, though some of the 
research on the Rwandan genocide has informed this study.81 As such, Western literature 
has been useful to the background analyses conducted for this study, while the author has 
been conscious of cultural differences between the two contexts. The broader literature 
on rape myths is therefore used to inform the research study in identifying common issues 
and understanding of rape myth phenomena as it might apply in the context of Rwanda. 
However, the study avoids generalisations of foreign realities or transplanting of solutions 
to Rwanda.  
Given that the focus of this research is on rape myths, the centre of attention in this study 
has been the victims of rape.  This is not to disregard defendants’ rights. These are equally 
important and they are also examined where appropriate. Within the study rape victims 
are generally referred to as women and the perpetrators as men. The intention is not to 
reinforce the gender roles of male violence and female victimisation. It is rather to reflect 
the reality of sexual violence based on the data where the most common victims of rape 
were women and where men were overwhelmingly rape perpetrators. The term “victim” 
is generally used throughout this thesis simply to mean a person who has made a 
complaint of being raped. No other connotation or assumption was attached to this 
concept in the study.82 Sometimes the word is interchanged with the terms complainant, 
survivor or victim-witness, according to the position of the victim in the specific context. 
1.2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
Answering the question whether the criminal justice system is influenced by rape myths in 
Rwanda requires an approach that transcends doctrinal legal research because the issue is 
beyond simple analysis of the relevant laws. It entails exploration of the beliefs, practices 
and decisions of the key players of the criminal justice process. This requires a socio-legal 
qualitative methodology, which enables the researcher to reach the persons concerned in 
the field and explore their attitudes and actions.83  
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This section provides a transparent and detailed account of the methods used in data 
gathering and the method employed in data analysis. It also discusses other research 
aspects relating to result generalisation and research limitations and presents the 
structure of the thesis. 
1. Methods used in data collection  
Socio-legal qualitative approaches may use different methods such as focus group 
discussions, interviews and observations.84 Instead of choosing one of them, I used 
multiple methods in order to maximise validity of the research findings. This approach is 
termed “methods triangulation.”85 It is a combination of different methods in exploring 
the same subject with the view to enhancing credibility. 86 It is “simple but powerful”87  
and has the advantage of producing the best of each method while limiting specific 
insufficiencies, as the weaknesses of one method are often the strengths of another.88 
Three methods were triangulated in this research. These are: interviews, observations and 
document analysis.  
 a. Interviews 
 In order to answer the thesis’ main research question it was necessary to explore the 
experiences, attitudes and motives of the legal professionals as well as the victims’ 
experiences and emotions. The most effective way to reveal these experiences and 
emotions is to provide opportunities for individuals to discuss them, as Allport poignantly 
notes:  
If we want to know how people feel, what they experience and what they 
remember, what their emotions and motives are like, and the reasons for 
acting as they do - why not ask them?89 
Two further reasons explain the pertinence of interviewing for this thesis. The first is that 
emotions, experiences and feelings need to be explored in depth, in order to understand 
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their depth and impact on the legal process. 90  This requires sufficient room for 
participants to express their opinions via two-way dialogue.91 Second, interviewing is 
particularly suitable to research issues that are sensitive, personal and complex as these 
require cautious treatment of the subject topics and carefully crafted questions.92 The 
topic of sexual violence explored in this research is indeed highly sensitive and personal, 
particularly when discussed with the victims, and it was therefore important that safe and 
secure environments were fostered to enable participants to speak openly.93  
The following is a description of the interviews subsequently conducted during an 
intensive fieldwork personally carried out from 5 May to 17 July 2016 in Rwanda.  
(1) Participant sampling and recruitment  
 
Having chosen interviewing as one of the data collection methods, it was crucial to select 
the right people able to provide data needed to answer the research questions.94 The 
most relevant persons were among the key players of the criminal justice system, as it is 
they who have direct experience of the legal process: judges, prosecutors, defence 
lawyers, as well as the defendants and the victims of crime. However, these categories 
have different roles in the process and some of them have conflicting interests. They are 
consequently likely to have different perspectives. Therefore, the best sampling strategy 
to obtain most reliable data from the interviews was to triangulate these divergent 
groups.95 The groups selected to be triangulated were judges, prosecutors, defence 
lawyers and victims. Defendants were not included in the study because their role is 
largely assumed by their lawyers within the legal process.  
Each of the selected categories had a specific ability to provide data relevant to the 
research questions. Judges have final decision-making powers in the criminal justice 
process in Rwanda. If there is any influence of rape myths on the legal process, they will 
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have direct or indirect responsibility for these because it is they who direct the trials and 
decide about the outcome. Prosecutors are key professionals in the criminal justice 
process as they decide the cases to prosecute and those to drop. In other jurisdictions 
they have been criticised for the high levels of attrition for rape, due at least partly to the 
influence of rape myths as outlined above.96 Defence lawyers have been blamed for 
cultivating rape myths in court proceedings in other jurisdictions based on their treatment 
of victims and other witnesses.97 Victims are the very persons whom have been reported 
to be subjected to the prejudicial effects of rape myths during the legal process in other 
countries.98  
From the four categories above, forty people were interviewed in total, including eleven 
judges, ten prosecutors, eight defence lawyers and eleven rape victim-survivors. In this 
thesis, they will be referred to as follows, in order to preserve their anonymity: 
JUDGE[number] for the eleven judges, PROSEC[number] for the ten prosecutors, 
LAWYER[number] for the eight defence lawyers and SURVIVOR[number] for the eleven 
survivors. Fifty interviews were conducted in total as some of the participants were 
interviewed twice.  
Sampling of prosecutors and judges needed to take into account representation of the 
different structures and departments that compose the prosecution service and the 
judiciary. In fact, jurisdiction over criminal offences is shared between ordinary (civilian) 
courts and (specialised) military courts.99 Within ordinary courts, there are two levels of 
courts that handle rape cases: First instance courts and the High Court. There are also two 
levels of prosecution: First instance and national prosecution. In the military, there is one 
prosecution department, one military tribunal and one Military High court. Participants 
were selected from these departments as shown in the table below. This representation 
was essential in case of diverse practices in the different departments. 
Gender representation was also achieved. This was not a primary target of the sampling 
plan, as the main aim was to interview a spread of respondents across the different 
categories, even if some of those categories skewed male or female. Women were 
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therefore selected only where possible. Nevertheless, a fairly even gender balance was 
achieved across the interviewees as a whole. The ratio of female participants interviewed 
is as shown in the table below. In sum, eleven out of twenty-nine elite interviewees were 
women and in total the majority of the participants were women: twenty-two out of forty.  
CATEGORY SUBCATEGORY WOMEN MEN TOTAL 
  Defence lawyers    Defence Lawyers 04 04 08 
  Prosecutors    First instance prosecutors 03 01 04 
   National Prosecutors  01 03 04 
   Military prosecutors 00 02 02 
  Judges    First instance judges 00 05 05 
   High Court judges 03 01 04 
   Military judges 00 02 02 
  Rape survivors    Rape survivors  11 00 11 
 TOTAL 22 18 40 
 
The mode of participant recruitment varied according to categories. Prosecutors and 
judges were accessed through their respective authorities because they work in organised 
government and judicial bodies.100 Having worked in the justice system for a relatively 
long time, I had pre-existing connections among prosecutors and judges, which I used in 
this research. I had contacted the relevant authorities ahead of the fieldwork, and they 
had agreed to select a number of legal professionals who had experience of rape cases, 
including women, where possible. They provided me with potential participant contact 
lists and allowed me to negotiate with them individually. This negotiation was conducted 
by phone at the beginning of the fieldwork. Each potential interviewee was sent a copy of 
the information sheet by email (see appendix 1). All those contacted agreed to participate 
in the study. They signed the consent form on the day of the interviews.  
Defence lawyers were recruited directly as they are independent professionals. Two 
lawyers had been contacted before the fieldwork and had agreed to participate in the 
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research. They helped to identify three of their colleagues who had experience of rape 
trials whom I also contacted directly. These in turn directed me to three other lawyers. I 
provided all of them with the information sheet and obtained their consent as with the 
prosecutors and judges.  
Rape survivors were recruited via the prosecution office and two organisations supporting 
vulnerable victims.101 I ensured that all rape survivors participated voluntarily in the study. 
Each of them was provided with the information sheet before they agreed to be 
interviewed. In addition to this, they were given further verbal explanation about the 
research. Some were given details during meetings facilitated by the intermediaries and 
others over the phone. However, a number of survivors showed scepticism at first about 
the intended interviews.  For example, two conducted their own investigation on my 
personal background before they agreed to be interviewed. One of these agreed only after 
my period of work in the field ended and the interview did not take place. Nevertheless, 
despite some scepticism, the vast majority of survivors contacted agreed to be 
interviewed, with only one individual refusing outright. 
(2) Interview conduct  
The interviews guides were semi-structured. The questions prepared were open-ended 
(see appendix 3), which allowed the interviewees to make detailed comments and to 
express their views in a free way.102 To facilitate this further, the interviews were 
conducted in a language chosen by the interviewees. Most preferred to speak in 
Ikinyarwanda (the national language of the country) though some mixed with French or 
English. A few interviewees used some Swahili words sporadically (Swahili is a regional 
language spoken especially in East Africa). One interviewee spoke exclusively in English. 
Despite this mixture of languages, the communication was good as I am fluent in each of 
these languages. Most interviewees preferred not to be audio taped so I took hand 
written notes during the conversations.  
Preparations and conduct of the interviews differed according to the categories of 
participants. The interviews with the legal professionals were mostly conducted in their 
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offices as per their preferences. They generally lasted about an hour and took place in a 
cordial atmosphere. The interviews with the rape victim-survivors required special 
attention due to specific ethical considerations involved.  
All necessary preparations were made to address ethical issues that can arise during 
interviews with rape survivors.103 Three possible problems had been identified in this 
regard. The first was the risk of safety for the survivors.104  This risk was minimised by 
selecting a safe place for the meetings. The participants were asked to choose a 
convenient venue but most of them left me the freedom to find an appropriate place. The 
best choice was the Centre Christus, a convent run by catholic sisters in the city of Kigali. 
This location had multiple advantages. Firstly, it was likely to give the victims confidence 
because such convents are usually considered safe spaces. Secondly, it was fenced and 
secured by professional private guards. It was also calm and clean. Thirdly, the compound 
had a very large garden with a number of bungalows serving as meeting places. The Centre 
Christus proved to be a good choice as the survivors were reassured when they were 
proposed this venue. Moreover, most showed appreciation and expressed confidence 
upon arrival. However, some survivors preferred other venues in Kigali city or in the 
countryside. I accepted to move there but I prepared some contingency planning because 
of possible (though less likely) risks for myself. As a precautionary measure, I always 
informed the local police commanders of my whereabouts prior to the meetings. I also 
ensured that the locations raised no apparent suspicion before accessing them. No safety 
incident occurred during all these interviews.  
The second problem that had to be avoided or addressed during the interviews with rape 
survivors was possible distress caused by a likely reliving of the traumatic experience.105 
This possibility was lessened by the fact that the focus of the interviews with rape 
survivors was not the assault itself but their experience of the criminal justice process. 
However, it was still crucial to be prepared in case any problem arose. Thus, I took 
precautionary measures prior to the interviews. I was informed that the witness 
protection unit had an auxiliary service available on call, which intervenes rapidly when 
trauma occurs during interrogations with vulnerable witnesses. I therefore gave them 
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advance warning about the likelihood of requesting their support. In addition to this, I 
prepared some water and tissues in the meeting venues for use in case of need. I also 
informed the interviewees in advance that they could stop the interview if they wanted to. 
Fortunately, in the event, none of the interviewees experienced an extreme emotional 
response or asked to stop the interview. 
The third issue was the possibility of unintentionally shocking the interviewees through 
questioning or inappropriate language.106 To avoid this, extra-care was taken in preparing 
the questions and choosing the words used during the interviews. The questions were 
carefully drafted (see appendix 3) and the words used during the interviews were also 
cautiously chosen. Given that the medium of the interviews was primarily Ikinyarwanda, 
which is my first language, I could easily find the appropriate words to express my ideas 
but I still needed to know the right terms to use with rape survivors. To this end, I 
approached one professional in the victim protection unit who gave some advice. For 
example, instead of speaking of “rape”, it was advised that the word “ikibazo”, meaning 
“the problem”, was sufficient to refer to rape despite its imprecision, given the context of 
the conversation.  Some survivors used other more precise terms such as “guhohoterwa” 
(victimisation), so I borrowed them to facilitate communication. As noted above, it was 
not my plan to speak about the assault, but this happened as the interviewees themselves 
introduced the subject.  
Many survivors surprisingly wanted to talk about the rape itself and its effects on their 
lives. I carefully avoided initiating this subject for the reasons given above but it was 
noticeable that many were eager to tell their stories fully. Considering their urge to speak, 
it was important to give them room to talk. I listened to them very carefully and never 
stopped them. I also intervened sometimes to keep up the conversations.  
It is worth noting that although these conversations were not planned, they were useful to 
the research. Initial findings made at that stage had revealed that these comments could 
also be of use in the study. This was an additional reason for listening to the survivors’ 
stories. I therefore asked them if I could add these comments on their formal data and 
they agreed. These stories proved valuable as they helped to elucidate important issues 
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related to victims’ vulnerabilities in the aftermath of rape. Although recruitment of rape 
survivors was challenging, their participation was particularly rewarding due to their 
enthusiasm during the interviews. 
This enthusiasm is evidence that the scepticism expressed at recruitment dissipated 
during the interviews, as claimed above. Several survivors openly stated that they were 
reassured. I also perceived through the body language of many of them that they were 
relieved. One of the survivors had been escorted by her relatives to the first interview, but 
she came alone at a second meeting; which is an indication that her doubts had dissipated 
at the first encounter. With regards to my gender, there was no detection of any negative 
influence of my gender on the interviews, contrary to some concerns expressed in the 
literature. 107 However, this does of course, remain a possibility. 
All the interviews with the eleven rape survivors and the twenty-nine legal professionals 
were fruitful and ended without any apparent incident. 
(3) Post interviews  
After the interviews, many interviewees expressed interest in the study.  Most of the elite 
interviewees wished to be informed about the research findings. I promised to share with 
them the results. This will be a good opportunity to sensitise them about the issues 
revealed by the study. A few rape survivors made a similar request and were given the 
same promise. Most survivors expressed the hope that the study will contribute to some 
improvement in the processing of rape cases. Generally, the interviewees were satisfied 
with their participation. 
However, there were some expectations that were raised by the survivors. Regrettably, 
some of them could not be addressed. For example, one survivor wished to appeal against 
the judgment in her case. I could not do much about it as the period of appeal had expired, 
and this would have also fallen outside of my role as a researcher. A number of other 
survivors expressed continued fear of their rapists. As I had previously been guaranteed 
support by the police and the witness protection unit in case of need during the fieldwork, 
I wanted to introduce the survivors to these services for reassurance and protection. 
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However, they declined this offer, as well as the idea of seeking support from HAGURUKA. 
Sadly, I had no other option to help them.  
There are nevertheless concerns that I was able to address. I provided information to 
some survivors and directed them for further follow up relating to legal assistance.108 In 
one case the interviewee expressed concern that she could still be in immediate danger. In 
this case, the accused had been convicted in absence, but was not yet arrested and was 
hiding in the countryside. The interviewee was very afraid that he would re-victimise her. 
In this unique situation, I determined that I had to speak to the authorities of the Criminal 
Investigation Department at national level who immediately organised an intensive 
operation to find him. He was arrested about one week later. The victim-survivor informed 
me that she was relieved. 
Before moving on to the next method used in data collection, it may be noted that the 
interviews were generally satisfactory.  Despite the challenges faced in recruiting rape 
survivors, and the failure to address some of their issues, the process of recruitment and 
the conduct of the interviews were smooth. Moreover, extensive data was gathered from 
these interviews. 
b. Court observations  
 
Court observations were conducted in addition to interviewing in order to increase 
credibility of the research findings. Observation as a method of data collection has the 
advantage that:  
[i]t does not rely on what people say they do, or what they say they think. 
It is more than that. Instead, it draws on the direct evidence of the eye to 
witness events first hand.109  
Some scholars have emphasised that “[n]o other method can provide the depth of 
understanding that comes from directly observing people and listening to what they have 
to say at the scene.”110 In this study, it was important to include court observation 
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because this was the only approach that could allow me to see first-hand the attitudes of 
the criminal justice players and to directly scrutinise court practices. It was specifically the 
best approach to verify the presence or absence of what has been termed “judicial rape” 
by some feminists.111  
Prior to the observations, it was important to plan sampling of cases to observe and to 
consider any ethical issues involved. Sampling of the courts to be observed was based on 
the levels of the courts that have jurisdiction over rape as explained above, as well as their 
geographic distribution. Taking advantage of the small size of the country,112 ten trial 
hearings were attended in four of the five provinces of the country and at the two levels of 
courts: first instance courts and the High Court. However, it was not possible to attend 
military trials because during the period of the fieldwork none were scheduled in these 
courts. Despite the limited number of the trial sessions attended, the ten court 
observations were particularly productive because they covered nine full rape trials. This 
was facilitated by the unexpected short time the trials lasted.  
Regarding ethical considerations, observation normally implies obligations such as 
obtaining participants’ consent, avoiding risks to participants’ safety and protecting their 
confidentiality.113 However, participants’ consent and permission to observe the trials 
were not sought for the following reasons. First, it was not feasible to contact the 
participants as most of these details were not available until the day of the trial, except for 
the defendants. Second, the public are free to observe court proceedings, therefore I was 
entitled as any other member of the public to enter the courtrooms and watch the trials. 
Third, it was important for the research not to alert the participants. If they knew they 
were observed they could possibly become self-conscious, thereby potentially skewing the 
data. However, in two instances the judges were aware of the observations. In one case, 
the officials who provided the trial schedules contacted the court to confirm the timetable 
and informed them of my intentions. The presiding judge was aware of the observation 
during this hearing. In another trial the judge was coincidentally one of the participants 
earlier interviewed and could therefore guess the aim of my presence in the courtroom. 
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However, there is no indication that this awareness influenced the judges’ behaviour in 
these two cases. 
The next obligation to avoid safety implications for the participants was not a big concern 
during the observations because of the nature of criminal trials and the place where they 
are conducted. Trials are normally very organised and courtrooms are usually very safe 
places; so no particular issue regarding safety was expected. Moreover, the observations 
were not intrusive and could not pose any risk to the participants. I simply sat in the 
courtrooms as any other member of the public, took notes discretely and did not do 
anything unusual or likely to draw attention.  
Finally, the obligation to preserve participants’ confidentiality was fulfilled. No names 
stated during the trials were noted, especially as they were irrelevant to the study, except 
for the defendants’ names. These were noted and disclosed only for the purpose of 
referencing. Their disclosure was considered unproblematic because they were already 
published in the halls of the courts. Moreover, it is generally acceptable to reveal 
defendants’ names in public hearings.  
c. Collection of prosecution and court documents  
 
The previous two methods provided extensive data to assess the legal process for rape, 
but one important aspect would have remained missing in the research without studying 
court documents. Having heard what was said by the legal professionals and seen how 
they did it, this could not provide all necessary data about the decisions they take in 
practice and the outcome of the processes. This aspect was crucial for the study because it 
was essential to scrutinise prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions in order to discern whether 
they are influenced by rape myths. These decisions are most fully articulated in the case 
files. Therefore, I collected a total of 276 files, including 101 cases dropped by prosecutors 
and 175 that went through the legal process to judgment.  
Collecting the files with all their contents rather than the final decisions alone was 
deliberate. This allowed for these decisions to be critically evaluated in terms of whether 
they reflected the evidence that had been available to the decision-maker. The files were 
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consequently copied page by page although the task was laborious.114 However, due to 
this difficulty, not every file was copied in totality because some were very large. 
Throughout the data analysis, a list of needed but missing documents in specific files was 
progressively made. They were later found during informal trips to Rwanda made after the 
main fieldwork period. 
Collection of prosecution and court documents involved sampling and observation of 
relevant ethical obligations, as for the previous approaches. Proper sampling of these files 
needed to take into account the different structures of the institutions concerned and 
their geographic distribution.115 The files were therefore gathered from the five different 
provinces of the country and from the two levels of civilian courts (First instance courts 
and the High Court) as well as the military prosecution and courts. Within these 
departments, the files were collected randomly as their contents were not verified. 
However, only cases handled between 2012 and 2016 were gathered. This was aimed to 
facilitate uniformity in their interpretation, given that a new Penal Code had been adopted 
in 2012.  
The nature of the files and the way they were obtained raised certain ethical obligations. 
The files were on restricted access but my prior relationship with prosecution and court 
authorities meant that my request to read the documents was obtained relatively easy, 
providing me access to them and allowing me to make copies. The authorities trusted that 
the documents would be used responsibly for research purposes. This trust created moral 
obligations on my part. The resulting ethical duty was at least to ensure confidentiality of a 
multitude of people mentioned in the files. 116  This was observed as the persons 
mentioned in the files were systematically anonymised throughout the study. They were 
referred to by their initials, except for the defendants, for the reasons explained above 
(see observation). Unlike the defendants, the accused whose criminal cases were dropped 
were also kept anonymous in the same way. Moreover, no information that could 
reasonably facilitate identification of the persons anonymised was mentioned in the thesis.  
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Apart from the criminal case files, some subsidiary documentary sources relevant to the 
research were also searched and collected. These are files provided by HAGURUKA, the 
non-governmental organisation aimed at defending women’s and children’s rights 
mentioned above. Aware that there were women who sought support from this NGO, it 
was useful to explore the reasons that prompted them to seek assistance from this private 
organisation instead of the criminal justice system. HAGURUKA made available for the 
research eight (smaller) files that were copied the same way as noted above. Ethical 
obligations arising from these documents are similar to those mentioned about the 
criminal case files and were similarly assumed.  
To summarise, the fieldwork permitted for the collection of a very large amount of data 
derived from four different sources: fifty interviews, ten court observations, 276 criminal 
case files and eight HAGURUKA files. 
2. Data analysis 
The considerable quantity of data was an advantage but also a challenge for analysis 
because of the risk of being overwhelmed by the mass of data for one researcher, 
including spending too much time in analysis for a three year PhD programme. An efficient 
exploration of the data required a systematic approach and an effective method of 
analysis.  
There were slightly different approaches to analysing the three data sources. The 
documents were accessed in three phases. The first was familiarisation with the unknown 
data to gain an overview of the contents of the files and how to approach them. This 
involved a reading of about ten out of the 276 case files. The second phase consisted of 
methodically reading all the case files. It comprised careful and critical reading of the main 
documents of the files (police and prosecution reports, indictments, judgments) and a 
number of other most relevant documents such as complainant statements, some witness 
statements, medical reports or other manifestly essential material. During this phase, the 
issues relevant to the research questions were identified and recorded (discussed further 
below). The third phase involved deep and extensive exploration of specific files selected 
for use in the thesis.  
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The interviews and observations notes were approached as follows. A first reading was 
made for more familiarisation with the data already known. During this phase, possible 
coding of the data became clearer. On the second read through the data was coded 
(discussed further below).  
At the beginning of data analysis, it was essential to organise the data in a way that would 
permanently ensure efficient and fast access to them during the whole process of analysis 
and writing up. To allow easy access throughout the process, two electronic folders 
capable of being instantly linked were created. The first comprised the data bank, which 
contained the raw data gathered from fieldwork including the interview notes, 
observation notes and judicial files.117 The second contained word documents with tables 
in which the information and excerpts extracted from the raw data were recorded.118 Each 
table contained all the information needed for analysis, including bibliographical or source 
references, excerpts, remarks, the codes, and crucially, a link to the data bank. This link 
was a reference number which identified each individual document or file consulted in the 
data bank. It was noted in the table next to the relevant information. The link facilitated 
the instant retrieval of the source of the information in the data bank. The codes recorded 
in the tables were also instantly accessible within different tables using the “find” tool in 
the word processor. Other essential information contained in the tables was also accessed 
in the same way. Further, it was easy to cross-check information from different sets in the 
tables. The two folders mentioned above were the main source of data for analysis. As the 
analysis progressed, other folders were created in order to record processed data in an 
orderly manner. This organisation considerably facilitated analysis.  
The method used to analyse data from the different sets is qualitative. Specifically, I used 
thematic analysis to interpret the interview data. Thematic analysis is “a method for 
identifying, analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data.” 119  This method 
involves coding the data to reduce them into analytic categories.120 Using this approach, I 
identified within the data recurrent concepts, ideas and issues relevant to the research 
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questions and coded them.121 The codes represented specific issues identified in the data, 
based on the theoretical framework. They were in the form of single words or a group of 
words and were noted in the tables previously mentioned. These codes were combined 
based on logical connection between them to make broader themes. With respect to the 
documents and observation notes, their content analysis was made in a similar way, by 
identifying basic themes in the materials.122 These themes were generally similar to the 
codes used regarding the interviews.123  
Data analysis was guided by the theoretical framework chosen for the research and 
inspired by the broader literature, as noted in the introduction. The permanent concern 
during analysis was identification and understanding of issues relating to gender inequality 
and prejudices against rape victims. Informed by the broader literature on rape myths, I 
drew on this knowledge to identify in my data similar issues revealed in the literature. 
Based on the theoretical framework adopted, I went beyond the problems revealed in the 
literature and raised other concerns specific to the local context, which did not necessarily 
exist in other jurisdictions. This allowed me to reveal original findings that will contribute 
to the understanding of rape myths and legal processes beyond Western jurisdictions.  
3. Other research aspects: generalisability and research limitations  
Despite the difficulty of generalising qualitative research findings, “rough generalisation” 
is possible in this type of study.124 This research has the potential for generalisation 
deriving from the fact that the proportions of the data studied are substantial compared 
to the total size of the population studied. This was facilitated by the relatively small size 
of the Rwandan criminal justice system and the small number of the cases of rape 
normally handled in the country. Concretely, the study analysed 30.3 per cent of all the 
cases tried and 15.3 per cent of the cases dropped by prosecution from 2012 to 2016.125 
The observations were conducted in 6.6 per cent of the trials that took place in the year of 
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the fieldwork.126 The fraction of the legal professionals interviewed is also significant: 9.6 
per cent of the judges and 9.5 per cent of the prosecutors in civilian courts were 
interviewed.127 Two out of seven Military High Court judges and two out of sixteen military 
prosecutors participated in the study. The smallest ratio of participants compared to the 
rest of the population is that of the rape survivors interviewed who had been through the 
legal process, which is estimated at 1.9 per cent.128 Overall, these proportions are 
relatively significant for a qualitative research of this type.129  
The literature on social research methodology indicates that generalisation of qualitative 
findings requires a sampling process ensuring representation of diverse sources of data.130 
This was done as explained above. Generalisation also entails similarity between the group 
studied and the population to whom the result is intended to be generalised.131 In this 
study, there is no indication of any difference between, on one hand, the persons 
interviewed, the court hearings monitored and the case files studied, and on the other 
hand, the remainder not studied. Dissimilarity between both is highly unlikely. For all 
these reasons, some degree of generalisation can be allowed in this research. 
This study was subjected to two major limitations. The first is the scarcity of literature on 
rape myths in Rwanda. This resulted in the study relying on Western literature. Rwandan 
literature would have enhanced the analysis by providing domestic perspectives. These 
are missing in the study. On a positive note, it can be said that this paucity gives the 
present research the potential for being a key reference point for future studies in the 
country. The second limitation was related to the issue of language. Almost all the data 
were gathered in Ikinyarwanda, the Rwandan national language, which is my first 
language. This was a great advantage during fieldwork and data analysis. However, it 
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presented a challenge for translation. Translating passages from my first language to 
English, my fourth language, was not always clear-cut. This was aggravated by the 
inexistence of a proper Ikinyarwanda-English dictionary. The issue of language was also a 
difficulty for the study in general but many efforts were made to overcome it. For example, 
I attended English language courses during the period of research in order to improve my 
writing skills. 
I had these limitations but I also had a personal advantage during this research. This 
advantage derived from my professional background as I am a police officer. I have held 
senior positions in law enforcement for two decades before undertaking this research. 
This background has had a significant impact on the fieldwork I conducted in Rwanda. The 
good relationships created during my career and the knowledge of the system enabled me 
to obtain most of the data collected.132 However, I was permanently conscious that my 
status could also unconsciously affect the research because I am part of the system that I 
was researching on. Thus, I made every effort to be as objective as I could. This effort was 
enhanced by an attempt to support my findings with substantial and triangulated 
evidence.  
4. Thesis structure  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. After this introductory chapter, the second 
chapter is dedicated to analysis of the developments of rape laws in Rwanda. The next 
four chapters discuss the empirical findings as follows. Chapter 3 explores the role of 
victims in the legal process, to examine how they are perceived by prosecutors and judges 
and whether they participate effectively in the process. It focusses on investigating the 
existence of the myth of false accusations amongst Rwandan legal professionals. Chapter 
4 analyses different forms of evidence provided in rape cases, the rules and practices 
relating to evidence, the value attached to different types of evidence, and how all this 
affects the outcome of the cases. Specifically, it examines the impact of the myth that a 
rape victim must sustain genital and/or bodily injury and the myth of false accusations, on 
the provision of evidence in rape cases. Chapter 5 then explores pre-conceived ideas held 
by the legal professionals about how a victim of rape is expected to behave before the 
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professionals accept that a rape was committed. It analyses the influence of the myth that 
a “genuine” rape victim is someone who is chaste, who physically resists the attack and 
promptly reports the incident to the authorities. Chapter 6 investigates the finding that 
out of court settlements of rape cases are frequent in Rwanda. It explores their nature and 
their impacts on the legal process. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis.  
There is no chapter specifically dedicated to a “literature review” as I have opted for a 
recursive method and adopted a pervasive literature review throughout the thesis.133 This 
approach is used in the following way: Each empirical chapter develops one main finding, 
divided into two or three sub-findings. These sub-findings are preceded at each stage by a 
discussion of the literature on issues revealed in other jurisdictions that has informed 
identification of similar issues in the context of Rwanda. This method facilitates 
contextualisation of the findings and clarification of the relation between the results in the 
present study and the findings of previous research.   
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Chapter 2  
DEVELOPMENT OF RWANDAN RAPE LAWS 
 
Rwandan society has been experiencing a profound transformation since the genocide of 
Tutsi people in 1994. Since these traumatic events, there has been a period of immense 
social, economic and legal transition. Of greatest significance to the aims of this thesis is 
that there have been numerous legislative reforms put in place as the country has 
endeavoured to put an end to old legal systems that were outdated, ineffective or 
especially discriminatory against women.134 As part of this process of legal reformation, 
this chapter will examine Rwandan rape laws since 1994. It will start with an analysis of 
the laws adopted in the aftermath of the genocide to punish persons responsible for this 
atrocious crime. Following this, I will examine current rape laws that resulted from the 
gender-based violence law reform introduced in 2008. The chapter aims to scrutinise the 
changes that have been made to rape laws in order to assess whether these new laws help 
to enhance access to justice for victims of sexual violence. 
2.1. RWANDAN RAPE LAWS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENOCIDE 
Between April and July 1994, one of the worst genocides in the history of humanity was 
committed against Tutsi people in Rwanda. The Tutsi are one of the three main social 
groups that compose the Rwandan nation, along with the Hutu and Twa. The beginning of 
their mass extermination was triggered by the shooting down of the president’s plane on 
6 July 1994 and the resulting Hutu extremist coup d’état. 135  The new extremist 
government continued the propaganda against Tutsis as vermin, which had been ongoing 
for many years before, and executed the planned genocide.136 In total it has been 
estimated that the genocide claimed the lives of 1,074,017 people.137 Such a vast 
extermination of a single group was made possible by the mass participation of members 
of the Hutu population who were encouraged by government leaders to participate in the 
mass killings.138  
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Part of the incitement of hatred towards Tutsi people was the systematic stigmatisation of 
Tutsi women who were portrayed as sexual tools used by the enemy to conquer the 
Hutu.139 Much of genocide was therefore characterised by systematic rapes of Tutsi 
women, on an unprecedented scale both in terms of numbers of victims and the cruelty 
and barbarity with which the crimes were committed.140 It is estimated that between 
250,000 and 500,000 women were raped during the tragic 100 days of the genocide.141  
These rapes were generally accompanied by acts of extreme barbarism such as sexual 
mutilation, cannibalism, crucifixion of naked bodies of rape victims and other most 
unspeakable horrors.142  
The Rwandan Patriotic Front led government put in place after the genocide were given 
the very complex task of punishing the perpetrators of the genocide. This section provides 
an overview of how the systems put in place to punish genocide functioned in particular 
regard to rape. It examines the use of gacaca for victims of rape. The section then 
scrutinises the impact of the inclusion of rape in the first category of genocide offences on 
the procedure of confession and on guilty pleas. 
1. The justice process for rape in the gacaca  
a. Context and nature of gacaca  
In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda was devastated in all structural respects, 
including the justice system.143 More than 120,000 genocide suspects were arrested and 
detained awaiting trial in what was already a weak judicial system but which had been 
further shattered by the conflict.144 The government quickly started to rebuild the justice 
                                                          
139
 Kaitesi, U. (2014), Genocidal Gender and Sexual Violence. The Legacy of the ICTR, Rwanda’s Ordinary Courts and 
Gacaca Courts, Cambridge-Antwerp-Portland, Intersentia, p.71; Carpenter, M.M. (2008), “Bare justice: a feminist theory 
of justice and its potential application to crimes of sexual violence in post-genocide Rwanda.” Creighton Law Review, 41, 
p.140. The enemy in question was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which had launched a liberation war in October 
1990. 
140
 National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions (NSGJ) (2012), Gacaca Courts in Rwanda. pp. 212-218. 
141
 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) (2005), The Role of Women in Reconciliation and Peace 
Building in Rwanda: Ten Years after the Genocide 1994-2004. Contributions, Challenges and Way Forward. p.33.  
142
 NSGJ (2012), pp. 214-218. 
143
 Beside infrastructure degradation, the number of judicial personnel available had reduced after the genocide as 
follows: 70 to 12 prosecutors, 785 to 244 judges, 910 to 210 judicial officers and court clerks. NUR/CCM (2012), p33. The 
missing personnel had either been killed or fled out of the country. And yet, some of the available judicial personnel 
would also face justice themselves for genocide. 
144
 NSGJ (2012), pp. 14-15. 
40 
 
system to commence the prosecution of genocide cases.145 A specific law to enable this 
prosecution was enacted.146  
In December 1996 genocide trials started in conventional criminal courts. The trials were 
conducted by specialised chambers established within the Tribunals of First Instance and 
military courts.147 But the legal process in these courts was too slow compared with the 
backlog of cases awaiting trial.148 It soon became apparent that these courts were unable 
to handle the too numerous genocide cases.149 Over a four year period just two per cent 
of all the pending cases were tried by the courts.150 At this pace it was estimated that it 
would take hundreds of years to try only the genocide suspects that had been detained.151 
It was soon realised that the conventional justice system, with just 12 specialised 
chambers, was simply incapable of handling the massive number of genocide cases. In 
response to this, recourse was given to an alternative and traditional justice mechanism: 
the gacaca. The gacaca courts had the advantage of being very numerous (around 11,000 
existed throughout Rwanda) and were run by the members (typically elders) of local 
communities (there were 138,505 lay members including 47,456 women in 2005).152 
“Gacaca” is traditionally a population-based Rwandan customary judicial system that 
began in the 16th century whereby members of the community in a village (excluding 
women) sit together and resolve disputes through negotiation. The types of conflicts 
gacaca handled were generally disputes over land, domestic animals, and damage to 
property.153 The main purpose of gacaca was restoration of social cohesion rather than 
punishment.154 Gacaca sanctions included symbolic sharing of beer or food between the 
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parties of the dispute to encourage restoration of relationships but imprisonment was 
never inflicted.155  
Recourse to the gacaca to help resolve the many thousands of genocide cases throughout 
Rwanda was prompted by the need to expedite genocide cases, while many also felt that a 
constructive resolution to the genocide should be based on local populations, thereby 
allowing for the reconstruction of the social fabric of Rwandan society.156 Another reason 
for utilising gacaca was that the genocide against the Tutsi had been committed publicly 
and as such it was felt that the participation of the public in resolving genocide was 
considered necessary.157 Moreover, many thousands of survivors had no knowledge of 
what had happened to their loved ones. Gacaca was therefore considered a space where 
communities could seek out the truth allowing them to come to terms with what had 
happened.158  
However, gacaca was not unanimously endorsed as a system capable of solving the issue 
of genocide justice. During preparatory meetings many participants, especially lawyers 
and human rights organizations, opposed the idea of gacaca.159 Critics feared the courts 
would risk trivializing the genocide while the lay aspect of gacaca threatened to 
undermine the due process rights of suspects.160 They also expressed doubt about the 
ability of the population to handle genocide crimes.161 Further critiques raised the issue of 
compensation for victims and the challenges for gathering evidence to prove genocide 
cases such as the lack of witnesses because most witnesses had been killed. It has also 
been observed that forensic evidence was lacking in genocide prosecutions.162 Yet despite 
these significant concerns there appeared to be few other alternatives. The gacaca was 
consequently adopted as the best option that was available and that was capable of 
addressing the genocide of a mass scale.163  
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Gacaca Courts were established in 2001 with the following objectives: (1) revealing the 
truth about the genocide; (2) speeding up genocide trials and (3) contributing to national 
reconciliation.164 As time passed the gacaca were tested and it became necessary to make 
changes to respond to various challenges faced. In this regard, a number of new laws were 
consecutively adopted in 2004, 2007 and 2008.165 With more than 120,000 suspects to 
handle at the beginning, gacaca subsequently went on to facilitate public hearings 
bringing nearly two million suspects face-to-face with communities.166  Note that gacaca 
was primarily used not for planners but for those who murdered, raped and committed 
property offences directly. 
Gacaca trials took place in school classrooms, conference rooms or outdoors.167 The 
accused or complainant stood and testified before the local community, in front of a 
bench of lay judges, the inyangamugayo or “honest persons” elected by the local 
community.168 The number of the inyangamugayo forming the gacaca bench was usually 
nineteen but it could vary. Members of the community were allowed to intervene and 
give testimony about facts they witnessed during the genocide.169  
It is important to note that categorisation of genocide suspects has been a salient 
characteristic of the gacaca trials and genocide justice. In the face of the massive 
participation of the population in the genocide, it was clear that the punishments provided 
by the (ordinary) Penal Code were impracticable.  For example, based on the this Code, 
almost two million people could face the death penalty in a country that counted around 
seven million.170 It was therefore imperative to find punishments that should take into 
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account the need for justice but also the need to reconcile and rebuild the country.171 One 
way to achieve this was to categorise genocide perpetrators.  
Genocide crimes fell into different categories depending on the gravity of the crime 
committed, with the effect that the penalties were also graded accordingly. Categorisation 
of genocide offenders also enabled genocide planners, leaders and other notorious 
criminals who committed the crimes with zeal to be differentiated from the mass of 
criminals who participated in the killings under the influence of their leaders.172 These 
classifications were subject to minor changes through the consecutive texts but remained 
broadly the same.  The first category generally included genocide planners, leaders, the 
notorious murderers and sexual offenders. The second basically comprised other 
murderers. Serious assaults against persons usually came into the third category while the 
last commonly included those who committed crimes against property.173 
It should be noted that the consecutive genocide laws consistently placed rape and sexual 
torture in the first category with the most severe punishment regardless of whether the 
perpetrator was among leaders or notorious criminals. This was the result of lobbying 
efforts by national and international women’s rights organisations.174  
b. Implications of the popular and public nature of gacaca on the legal 
process for rape 
 
(1) Outcome for victim-survivors 
Despite some of the positive outcomes of the gacaca proceedings, as noted above, the 
public nature of the hearings may have had a number of negative implications for rape 
victim-survivors. In gacaca, suspects and witnesses, including rape survivors, were asked 
to give their testimonies before the local community, meaning that details of their 
experiences were to be stated in front of their neighbours, friends, relatives and the many 
inyangamugayo. Usta Kaitesi notes that the public involvement in such cases was both 
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“too large [and] too close to the victims.”175 Even though genocide rape victim-survivors 
very much wanted some form of justice, in order to begin to heal from their experience, 
the gacaca may have actually meant that for some victim-survivors “the burden and 
impact of reporting their experiences was even greater.”176 
Such a situation is likely to have led to restraint amongst many rape victim-survivors to 
speak out about their experiences of rape in public. This restraint was caused by two main 
factors. First, rape victim-survivors feared community rejection because of the shame, 
dishonour and stigma associated with rape.177 From her interviews with members of the 
Association des Veuves du Génocide Agahozo, (AVEGA)178, Sarah Wells revealed that rape 
victim-survivors expressed their reluctance to testify about their experience of sexual 
violence because they feared being rejected by their communities and, for those who 
wished to be married, losing their chance of marriage because community members 
would consider them as dishonoured and degraded.179 Second, rape victim-survivors also 
feared for their security.180 Given that rapists could face the death penalty, accusations of 
rape attracted reprisals from perpetrators and their relatives.181 Despite the fact that the 
government had taken measures to protect genocide survivors, many were killed.182 The 
killings were facilitated by the fact that the suspects and the victim-survivors lived 
generally in the same neighbourhood.183 
The burden of testifying was even heavier because rape victim-survivors were obliged to 
testify in two phases: before the gacaca and before ordinary courts. This is because 
gacaca initially conducted only pre-trial sessions for rape as their jurisdiction over the first 
category of offenders was limited to receive complaints or confessions and decide upon 
categorisation of the offence, then transmit the case to conventional courts for trial.184 
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The National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions185 acknowledged that not all the victims of 
sexual violence reported these crimes to gacaca because it required considerable 
psychological efforts and potential secondary traumas on the part of victim-survivors.186  
However, it is worth noting that there were many instances of rape victim-survivors 
testifying before gacaca.187 These individuals were encouraged by gacaca to overcome 
their fear and many testified about the crimes committed against them despite the 
trauma and shame caused by the dehumanizing acts they had been subjected to.188 Rape 
survivors have been counselled to understand that it was not them, the victims, who 
should be ashamed but that shame should instead be upon the perpetrators of these 
horrific crimes.189 Whether such counselling extended beyond the immediate victim-
survivors is unclear. The processes of attitudinal change and stigma relating to sexual 
violence can be a very slow process, meaning that for many victim-survivors of genocide 
rape, their ordeals will have continued long after the gacaca trials were concluded.  
That said, some rape survivors found that gacaca gave them an opportunity to heal from 
their experiences.190 Research conducted by De Brouwer and Ruvebana found that despite 
the difficulties of testifying before gacaca, many survivors including rape victim-survivors, 
noted that it had “unburdened their hearts” and paved the way for their personal and 
social healing.191 One rape victim-survivor interviewed in that study declared: “Testifying 
in gacaca was empowering my heart. I was able to tell people what I went through. It 
made me feel pleased and stronger.”192 
Nonetheless, public testimony has not been experienced by all survivors as a healing 
process. In fact, public testimony does not always restore the dignity of the person or 
enhance their healing, especially where their experiences of victimisation are linked to 
shame and stigmatisation.193 The Association Rwandaise des Conseillers en Traumatisme 
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(ARCT) 194  revealed that many survivors experienced increased emotional and 
psychological distress after testifying.195 Many who testified about their rape experience in 
gacaca reported that they endured this experience as if it was like re-living the 
genocide. 196  Some collapsed before the court, although they recovered and later 
reappeared in court to testify again.197 In brief, the outcome of rape victims’ participation 
in gacaca was mixed. 
(2) The role of offenders in victim-survivor recovery 
For the many genocide rape perpetrators who came forward and confessed their crimes 
before the community in gacaca the outcomes of such confessions have also been mixed. 
Confessions and expression of remorse and apologies have helped to ease the tension 
within communities.198 There have been instances where rape victim-survivors forgave 
their offenders who apologised sincerely.199 One rape survivor interviewed in De Brouwer 
and Ruvebana’s study testified that if genocide offenders confessed sincerely, “it would 
make the survivors heart set free. Sometimes a genocidaire would confess and apologise 
with sincere heart. Some of them kneeled down and you felt you can again be free in your 
heart.”200  
However, these confessions were not welcomed by all rape victim-survivors. Rape 
confessions have also negatively affected survivors, depending on the situation of 
particular individuals and the way in which the confessions were made. Some survivors 
reported having been further victimised by such confessions. They complained that they 
had concealed their rape experience to avoid family and community rejection but it was 
revealed in public without their prior consent.201 Moreover, confessions have been used 
by many genocide rapists as an opportunity to further hurt the victims by exposing and 
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humiliating them.202 The procedure of confession offered them an opportunity “to strike 
one last blow against the surviving victims.”203  
It should also be noted that there have been many cases of half confessions and most of 
the time the parts of the crime concealed concerned sexual violence because of the fear 
amongst defendants of being labelled a rapist.204 Many rape survivors expressed their 
grief and the difficulty to forgive those who made only partial confessions.205 These issues 
prompted new measures adopted by the legislature to stop the damaging effects 
explained above.  
c. Limiting the damaging effects of gacaca publicity on rape victim-survivors   
In response to the negative experiences outlined above, the legislature amended the law. 
The new 2004 Gacaca Law prohibited public testimonies about rape and sexual torture 
and provided a procedure to introduce rape complaints confidentially. 206  According to 
this provision, rape victims had the liberty to choose one or more inyangamugayo among 
members of Seat of the competent gacaca court to whom they could submit their 
complaint. Alternatively, the complaint could be filed in writing. Victims were also given 
the right to go directly to the agencies in charge of criminal investigations or the public 
prosecution when they did not trust the inyangamugayo. The obligation to keep rape 
complaints confidential remained applicable even in case of the death of the victim. In 
summary, this proscription applied to all proceedings related to rape and sexual torture, 
including confessions. 
In 2008 a new law gave gacaca full jurisdiction over first category offences, including rape 
and sexual torture.207 This law also took into account the necessity for “conducting rape 
and sexual abuse cases in gacaca courts in a way that avoids traumatising the victims and 
promotes confidentiality.”208 It provided specific measures to protect rape victims in 
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courts. Firstly, the law reaffirmed the principle of closed sessions initiated by the 2004 
Gacaca Law.209 Second, it provided for the possibility of trauma counsellors being present 
in gacaca to support rape victim-survivors. The counsellors could be present despite the 
process taking place in camera. Third, it stipulated harsh punishments for any 
inyangamugayo who would violate the confidentiality of rape proceedings. These 
sanctions ranged from dismissal to criminal prosecution.210 Beyond the above legal 
measures, a special training programme for the inyangamugayo who are expected to try 
rape cases was implemented.211 All these measures were aimed at ensuring a “discreet 
and humane way of handling these cases.”212 
Since the new measures implemented in 2004 and 2008 the risks of exposing rape victim-
survivors to additional trauma has been considerably reduced. Nonetheless, rape victim-
survivors have not been totally guaranteed confidentiality. Even the fact of requesting 
testimony in camera itself suggests that the complainant has been victim of sexual 
violence.213 In addition, the number of inyangamugayo composing the bench, mostly 
survivors’ neighbours, was also relatively large and the risk that the inyangamugayo could 
reveal the content of the testimonies remains real. Furthermore, it was sometimes 
possible for the members of the community to hear what happened during closed sessions. 
One rape victim-survivor reported that despite closed sessions, community members 
listened to her testimony though courtroom windows and even blamed her without the 
panel of judges reacting to the unwanted intrusion. 214  These persisting procedural 
problems mean that many rape victim-survivors remained reluctant to come forward.215  
2. Inclusion of genocide rape in the first category and implications for the 
procedure of confessions and guilty pleas  
The Genocide Laws recognised the extreme gravity of the crime of genocide rape and 
sexual torture,216 placing them in the first category and providing the most severe 
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punishments for offenders.  This tough stance against genocide sexual violence is 
understandable given the extreme nature of these offences. However, it may have 
impacted on confessions and guilty pleas which were essential to facilitate gacaca. 
The process of confession and guilty plea has been a cornerstone of the mass prosecution 
of genocide crimes in gacaca. It has been called the “procedure of confession, guilty plea, 
repentance and apologies.”217 This was not a simple guilty plea but a relatively complex 
process whereby offenders were required to make public apologies to Rwandan society 
and to the surviving victims, to give a full account of the offences committed, show where 
the dead bodies were thrown, and disclose their accomplices.218 This procedure had three 
main objectives: to reveal the truth about the genocide, speed up genocide trials, and to 
contribute to national reconciliation.219 To make this possible, it has been necessary to 
encourage confessions by reducing punishments. This reduction has been significant 
through the consecutive genocide laws since 1996 until the closure of gacaca in 2012.  
However, it may be argued that genocide rape suspects have not been encouraged to 
participate in the process of guilty plea as opposed to other genocide perpetrators. This is 
because the incentives for guilty plea in terms of penalty reduction were largely 
inapplicable to rape suspects. As an illustration, a comparative example is given below. 
The example distinguishes the legal situation of a rapist from that of a murderer. This is 
not to forget that rapists generally killed their victims during the genocide and thus a 
distinction between them may be only theoretical. Nonetheless, this differentiation is 
necessary if we are to study how rape, as a crime of genocide, has been punished.   
In the illustration, let us consider the situation of a rapist and a murderer who both were 
not among genocide planners, leaders or the notorious criminals. The table below shows 
the penalty faced by each and the reductions of penalty they could secure in case they 
confessed, under the consecutive Genocide Laws since 1996.220 
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OFFENCE PLEA 1996 2001 2004 2007 2008 
 
 
RAPE 
Not  
guilty 
Death 
penalty 
Death 
penalty 
 
Death 
penalty 
Death 
penalty 
Life  
imprisonment 
Guilty Death 
Penalty 
 
Death 
penalty 
Death 
penalty 
30 years 
imprisonment 
30 years 
imprisonment 
 
MURDER 
Not  
guilty 
Life 
imprisonment 
 
Life 
imprisonment 
30 years 
imprisonment 
19 years 
imprisonment 
19 years 
imprisonment 
Guilty 15 years 
imprisonment 
 
7 ½ years 
imprisonment 
7 ½ years 
imprisonment 
4 years 
 and 8 months 
4 years  
and 8 months 
 
This table shows clearly how advantageous it was for a murderer to confess and how the 
scheme was not encouraging for rapists.  
It is also important to put the reductions of penalty in context because they have had 
decisive effects during these time periods. In 2001 when the new law offered a reduction 
from a maximum of life imprisonment to an effective imprisonment of 7 ½ years for 
murderers who entered a guilty plea, there were many murder suspects who until then 
had refused to plead guilty, most of them having spent nearly 7 years in prison awaiting 
trial. This meant that a guilty plea was almost synonymous with release from prison. It is in 
this context that 20,000 people were released in the first wave of mass provisional release 
of genocide suspects in 2003. They did not include persons accused of rape as these were 
not eligible. Rape suspects arrested in 1994 had no incentive to plead guilty in 2003 as 
they would face the death penalty rather than release from prison.  
The advent of gacaca in 2001 resulted in another wave of arrests of genocide suspects. So, 
in 2007 when the law further reduced the maximum term of effective imprisonment to 4 
years and 8 months for murderers who confessed, many suspects arrested since 2001 
could be released if they confessed. However, rapists arrested during the same period and 
even before could not qualify for release as their punishment was much higher.  
Until the end of gacaca in 2012, genocide rape suspects had no immediate advantage in 
confessing their crime. Thus, the genocide laws were not susceptible to encourage rape 
suspects to come forward and plead guilty as opposed to murder suspects. This may be 
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the main reason why murderers pleaded guilty in large numbers (around 120,000) while 
genocide rapists pleading guilty remained relatively few in numbers.221  
Generally, sexual violence played a smaller role in genocide trials. According to De 
Brouwer and Ruvebana’s study published in 2015, the number of rape cases tried by 
gacaca is 8,000.222  There are also other rape cases tried by ordinary tribunals between 
1998 and 2008 which are likely to be in the hundreds.223 These numbers are very small 
compared to the vast numbers of rapes committed during the genocide, estimated 
between 250,000 and 500,000 as noted above.  
The fact that so few perpetrators of rape during the genocide have been punished 
suggests that the imposition of the heaviest penalties for rape without any chance of 
reduction in sentence has been counter-productive; at least in terms of achieving larger 
scale justice for rape victim-survivors. This is not to suggest that genocide rape did not 
deserve the most severe of punishments. However, the reductions in sentence provided 
on the basis of confession and plea bargaining meant that these practices became the 
cornerstone of the genocide justice. This was, however, missing for rape offences, 
meaning that the framework of justice used for the genocide did not apply to this type of 
crime.  
The problems discussed above should not completely eclipse the positive side of the 
justice process as it has still brought thousands of genocide rapists to justice. Such a feat 
should not be understated. In fact, it is the first time in history that wartime and genocide 
rapists have been held responsible for their crimes in such large numbers. Even the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, largely credited with being the first to punish 
genocide rape, has only held perpetrators accountable for rape in very small numbers. So, 
gacaca’s achievements in regards to genocide rape while clearly limited are still significant. 
2.2. THE RAPE LAW REFORM IN RWANDA 
In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, women’s rights organisations in Rwanda expressed 
very strong condemnation of the barbaric and widespread rapes perpetrated against 
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women during the genocide.224 These organisations continued to denounce the problem 
of sexual violence that remained widespread in post-genocide Rwanda.225 The gravity of 
the problem prompted the Forum of Rwandan Women Members of Parliament to initiate 
a legal reform in 2007. As a result, parliament enacted the Law on Prevention and 
Punishment of Gender-based Violence in 2008 (referred to below as the “GBV Law”).  
The GBV Law introduced a number of significant changes, such as the suppression of 
unequal punishments for adultery between men and women,226 criminalisation of sexual 
harassment, and criminalisation of the act of harassing one’s spouse.227 The law also 
criminalised abduction for the purpose of marriage.228 With respect to the offence of rape, 
the main modifications made were the criminalisation of marital rape and the provision of 
a definition of rape. The next section analyses these two changes including the current 
status of rape law as stipulated in the 2012 Penal Code.  
1. Criminalisation of Marital Rape 
Forced sex within marriage was considered legal in Rwanda until the enactment of the 
GBV Law. 229  This legality was justified by the assumption that consent to sexual 
intercourse was given by both spouses when entering into marriage, therefore the use of 
force once the woman refused sexual intercourse was considered as “violence légitime” 
(literally, legitimate violence). 230 This exemption was supported by other legal provisions 
in the civil code especially the “obligation de consommer le marriage” meaning the duty to 
have sexual intercourse within marriage.231  
Criminalisation of marital rape is an important declaration of criminal law but it is nominal 
because of the very low punishment provided. The GBV law provided a penalty of six 
months to two years’ imprisonment, reduced by the 2012 Penal Code to 2 – 6 months’ 
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imprisonment or a fine.232 This has automatically placed marital rape in the category of 
“petty offences.”233  
Placing marital rape within this category carries a number of negative implications. First, 
husbands raping their wives may not face preventive detention because it is not permitted 
for “petty offences.”234 This means that justice authorities may not be able to isolate the 
accused and prevent further victimisation during the legal process or prevent him from 
interfering with investigations. Second, attempted marital rape is not punishable because 
the law does not sanction attempt of “petty offences”.235 Third, the deterrent effect of the 
provision is limited because of the very low punishment. Moreover, recidivism of petty 
offences has no legal consequences as opposed to misdemeanours and felonies for which 
maximum punishments may be doubled in case of recidivism.236  
 
It is clear that the failure to proscribe marital rape as a serious offence creates a hierarchy 
of victimhood for rape victims in Rwanda.  Despite the vociferous arguments put forward 
in Parliament defending the lower penalties for marital rape (see below), there is no 
empirical basis for considering such rapes as being less harmful than other forms of 
rape.237 On the contrary, research conducted in other countries has revealed that marital 
rape is potentially more traumatic and in some instances it is life-threatening.238 Moreover, 
it is often accompanied by other forms of physical and mental violence, escalating in some 
cases into murder.239  
This study explored parliamentary debates on the GBV Law to understand its spirit, 
including why parliament has treated marital rape as a minor wrongdoing. Analysis of the 
debates revealed that the understanding of heterosexual relationships was dominated by 
acceptance of male superiority and a tolerance of violence against women that was shared 
by many members of parliament (MP). This bias was very noticeable in some MPs’ 
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declarations. As noted in Chapter 1, a number of MPs stated that marital rape did not 
deserve to be criminalised because permanent sexual consent is given at marriage, and 
“no negotiations” for sex within marriage should be required. MPs Irabona Liberata and 
Renzaho Giovani overtly stated that refusal of sexual intercourse within marriage is itself a 
violation.240 Further arguments against criminalisation of marital rape have been raised by 
those who rejected criminalisation on the basis of what they considered as the “necessity 
of family protection.”241 According to MP Nkusi Juvenal, criminalisation of marital rape is 
an invasion of family privacy because the law was then “entering in the beds of married 
couples”.242 In addition, it was argued by some MPs that punishing the husband could 
have negative effects on the wife and children, and that it was also important to consider 
family life after the husband’s return.243 A final argument against criminalisation was the 
difficulty of finding evidence of marital rape.244  
The majority of MPs repudiated categorically most of these ideas, explaining that marital 
rape was one of the vices that was undermining Rwandan society and that it should not be 
tolerated.245 They agreed that marital rape should be criminalised but some MPs insisted 
that the punishment should be lenient in order to limit its effects on the convict’s wife and 
children.246  This resulted in the adoption of the low penalty set out above. 
Part of the problem is that the offence of (non-marital) rape is itself not viewed as a very 
serious offence under Rwandan law. Apart from child defilement (i.e. “rape of a child”), 
which since the 2001 Law on Protection of Children has always attracted very severe 
punishments,247 the punishment for rape is set at five to seven years’ imprisonment.248 
This was in fact reduced from ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment under the GBV Law. This 
is not to suggest that all rapes should be given the most severe of punishments, indeed as 
we have seen in some situations this may actually be counter-productive, as observed 
above regarding genocide rape. However, punishments must reflect the gravity of 
offences as compared to other offences proscribed on the statute books. Where an 
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offence such as rape has a significantly lower penalty compared with other offences of 
physical violence, the message sent by the State is that these types of crime are less 
serious than other forms of violence and are, therefore, less condemnable as a social 
wrong.  
2. The definition of rape 
The first Penal Code introduced in Rwanda in 1940 by the colonial power criminalised rape 
without defining it.249  In 1977 another Penal Code was adopted, but it also did not define 
rape.250 Instead, the meaning of rape has developed within criminal jurisprudence and 
doctrine which came to define rape as an act of sexual intercourse imposed by a man on a 
woman without her consent, by use of violence, threat or fraud.251 During the preparation 
of the GBV Law, Parliament observed that it was necessary to provide a statutory 
definition of rape. The GBV Law consequently defined rape as “sexual intercourse without 
consent, by force, intimidation, trices and others.”252 The 2012 Penal Code changed this 
definition by replacing the word “trices” with “trickery” and deleting “and others.” It 
specifies that rape consists of “non-consensual sexual intercourse by using force, threat or 
trickery.”253  
There is as yet no available literature evaluating how useful or problematic this definition 
is. However, there are foreseeable problems with this definition given that research in 
other jurisdictions that have adopted a similar provision has revealed that it may fail to 
properly protect women’s sexual autonomy. It does not encompass all situations where 
the lack of consent is present and may therefore leave unpunished some unwanted acts of 
sexual intercourse. A similar definition in other jurisdictions such as England and Wales 
has in the past facilitated the requirement of use of force by the offender and physical 
resistance by the victim for the offence of rape to be established. This has been prejudicial 
to victims because non-consensual intercourse outside these requirements was not 
punished. The legal definition of rape in Rwanda may potentially lead to such 
interpretative issues especially considering the name of the offence in Rwandan language 
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which is centred on the term “ingufu”, meaning “force.”254 Exploration of parliamentary 
debates on the GBV Law reveals that the only issue discussed regarding the definition of 
rape concerned the choice of the right word expressing the concept of force in the 
definition.255 This illustrates the understanding that the crux of the definition of rape is the 
use of force. However, the legal definition adopted does not require force as the only 
factor showing the lack of consent in the offence of rape, as it also cites “threat” and 
“trickery”. The problem, as stated above, is therefore the interpretation of the definition 
which may tend to require force, and the issue of situations of non-consensual sexual 
intercourse not included in the definition. 
Another foreseeable issue in current Rwandan rape laws is the absence of a specific 
procedure for rape trials. It was seen above in relation to the prosecution of sexual 
offences in gacaca that victims of rape faced tremendous difficulties with gacaca and that 
the law was amended to protect them. However, there is no provision protecting victims 
of post-genocide rape in regular courts. In other jurisdictions, due to biased rules of 
evidence that have prevailed in the legal process for rape and the humiliation often 
experienced by victims in courts caused partly by the influence of rape myths (see Chapter 
1), many countries have adopted “rape-shield” laws meant to protect victims during the 
justice process. The absence of such laws in Rwanda may potentially facilitate unfair 
processes and mistreatment of victims in courts. Yet while there are a number of legal and 
definitional issues arising from the law, one cannot simply assume that they affect the 
legal process for rape in Rwanda in exactly the same ways as have been identified in other 
contexts. Although many of the issues, mostly relating to consent, will be similar to those 
jurisdictions, both the nature of sexual violation and its legal recourse must be understood 
within the historical and cultural contexts in which they occur. This thesis explores many 
of these contextual issues throughout the following chapters.  
While this thesis was being finalised, a new amendment of rape laws was adopted by 
Rwandan parliament.256 A quick analysis of the new provisions indicates some positive 
changes. First, the amendment improves the concept of consent. It specifies that the lack 
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of consent will be established by use of force, threats, trickery, abuse of authority and 
exploitation of victim vulnerability.257 By adding the last two factors, this new definition of 
rape potentially encompasses situations of non-consensual sexual intercourse that could 
not be included in the previous. Second, the actus reus of rape now includes penetration 
of a sexual organ into the anus or mouth and insertion of any object into the anus or 
sexual organ. These acts are comparably harmful and humiliating as unwanted sexual 
intercourse, so the change is relevant.  
However, the new law also contains some questionable modifications and omissions. 
Marital rape is no longer treated as rape; it is now called “sexual violence against a 
spouse.”258 It is placed among offences against morality, unlike rape which is in the 
category of sexual offences. This contradiction shows that the law continues to make a 
hierarchy of victimhood for rape victims, as noted above. Moreover, the new law does not 
introduce specific procedures for the prosecution of rape. The absence of “rape-shield” 
laws protecting victims against possible gender biases during the legal process still persists. 
In sum, the latest change makes some improvements but it does not address all possible 
issues pointed out above. This third amendment in ten years indicates that the legislature 
is continuously looking for appropriate rape laws to tackle sexual violence but there are 
still lacunas in law. This reinforces the pertinence of the present study. 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter has analysed the development of rape laws in Rwanda since 1994. It started 
with the laws adopted in the aftermath of the genocide to punish the perpetrators of 
genocide. The genocide laws demonstrated a resolve to punish rape in the most severe 
way. As Rwanda adopted the use of gacaca as the best available approach to repress 
genocide while pursuing national reconciliation, gacaca managed to bring communities 
including victims, face-to-face with nearly two million genocide suspects. Many pleaded 
guilty, benefiting from significant reductions of penalties aimed at encouraging confession 
and ultimately speeding up the proceedings and creating the opportunity for 
reconciliation. Given that gacaca were popular courts with active participation of the 
community, rape victims experienced considerable difficulties in gacaca because their 
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participation was generally accompanied with stigmatisation and sometimes humiliation, 
so many victims refrained from testifying. On the other hand, most perpetrators also 
abstained from confessing rape because this did not imply any advantage for them in 
terms of reduction of penalty, given the uncompromising stance of the law regarding 
punishments for rape as opposed to other genocide crimes. All this resulted in sexual 
violence playing a smaller role in genocide trials. However, this should not completely 
obscure the unprecedented achievements of gacaca with regards to repressing wartime 
and genocide rape. This is the first system that has managed to hold accountable millions 
of wartime and genocide offenders including thousands of rapists while these have 
historically remained unpunished across the world.  
While dealing with genocide justice, Rwanda has undertaken another campaign against 
post-genocide gender violence. A legal reform in 2008 was introduced to address gender 
violence, along with other measures described in Chapter 1. Several positive changes were 
made by this new legislation including criminalisation of sexual harassment and abolition 
of some discriminatory provisions. With regard to rape, two major amendments were 
introduced: criminalisation of marital rape and adoption of a statutory definition of rape. 
However, analysis of these changes revealed that they are still influenced by bias against 
women and might not bring about the results intended.  
The following chapters of this thesis examine what impacts these new laws are having on 
rape cases in Rwanda and whether they remain inhibited by the existing legal framework 
and the cultural contexts that have allowed some degree of tolerance of violence against 
women in Rwanda.  The thesis goes on to explore the extent to which the new provisions 
are being used by the courts to adequately protect women from sexual violence and 
punish sexual violence offenders. Specifically, it focusses on the role of rape myths in 
affecting how effectively the provisions are applied. As part of this endeavour, the thesis 
examines the foreseeable issues in the law of rape using empirical research.  
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Chapter 3  
ANALYSING THE ROLE OF RAPE VICTIMS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
PROCESS 
 
Rape victims are central to the legal process for rape. Having personally and physically 
experienced the commission of the crime, they are naturally the principal witnesses of the 
offence. They have a key role in reporting the offence to the police to start the criminal 
justice process and providing evidence to the justice system for the prosecution and trial of 
rape defendants. Moreover, as persons directly affected by the offence, they have a 
personal interest in the legal process. They need justice to be served, and eventually they 
may wish to obtain compensation for the crime committed against them. Therefore, victim 
participation in the legal process is essential for a fair and efficient criminal justice process 
for rape cases. Nevertheless, the literature reveals that rape victims’ contribution to, and 
enjoyment of justice has been historically hampered by distrust of rape victims in various 
jurisdictions across the world, due particularly to the influence of rape myths.259 Moreover, 
victims of crime in general (including rape victims), have been historically marginalised from 
the criminal justice system, which has resulted in victims’ dissatisfaction and distrust of the 
system.260  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the role played by rape victims in the criminal justice 
process as an essential component in the legal process. The chapter will first examine the 
issue of scepticism towards victims during the legal process. After this, it will explore the 
extent to which rape victims participate in the criminal justice process and whether they 
have a voice in this process. 
3.1. DISBELIEF OF RAPE VICTIMS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 
One of the major issues apparent in the literature on rape is the distrust faced by rape 
victims when they bring complaints to the criminal justice system, as they are commonly 
suspected of making false accusations. The following sections will review the broader 
literature on false rape allegations and then explore the distrust of rape victims in the 
Rwandan context. The existing literature reviewed is drawn primarily from the US, UK and 
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elsewhere in Europe. This literature is used to inform the analysis of the issue in the 
Rwandan context. 
1. Review of literature on false rape accusations 
a. The issue of false rape allegations 
Historically, criminal justice practitioners have shown disbelief of women when they filed 
rape complaints.261 The writings of Chief Justice Matthew Hale (a prominent 17th century 
English jurist) have been particularly influential in this regard. Hale claimed that: 
Rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to 
be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.262  
Other legal authorities later displayed similar understandings. For example, Justice Salmon 
stated in 1968: 
[H]uman experience has shown that . . . girls and women do sometimes tell 
an entirely false story which is very easy to fabricate, but extremely difficult 
to refute. Such stories are fabricated for all sorts of reasons, which I need not 
now enumerate, and sometimes for no reason at all.263  
Some authors suggested that the tendency to make false rape allegations is natural for 
women, as women are psychologically inclined to lie about sex. Wigmore wrote that: 
 Modern psychiatrics have amply studied the behaviour of errant young girls 
and women coming before the courts in all sorts of cases. Their psychic 
complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defects, partly by 
diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social 
environment, partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions. One 
form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual 
offences by men.264  
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The legacy of historical distrust of rape victims has thus been “sedimented” into the beliefs 
of justice practitioners.265 As a result, this suspicion of false allegations has become a major 
obstacle to justice for rape victims in many jurisdictions.266 Rape complainants are so 
disbelieved that when they file their complaint, this has typically started an ordeal of 
sceptical questioning throughout the legal process, leading often to humiliation of the 
complainant.267   
The distrust that victims face when they report rape has had serious consequences for 
“justice” in sexual violence cases, as it potentially allows disproportionately high numbers of 
rapists to escape criminal liability.268 Instead of concentrating on the suspects to investigate 
whether they are guilty or not, the tendency has been rather to focus on victims’ 
truthfulness.269 This problem of false accusation perception has been referred to by Lonsway 
as “the elephant in the middle of the living room” for the field of sexual assault, and it is an 
obstacle that needs to be removed to allow a fair treatment of rape victims.270  
The spectre of false rape accusations, referred to by Brownmiller as “the old syndrome of 
Potiphar’s wife” has historically not only created a culture of suspicion amongst criminal 
justice professionals but it has also been translated into special and biased rules of 
evidence.271 For example, the requirement that rape complainants’ testimonies must be 
corroborated by other evidence derives from the fear of false allegations.272 This fear may 
originate from the combination of the legacy of misconceptions about women’s natural 
dishonesty and vindictiveness, with men’s refutation of the blame of rape.273 In an effort to 
deny men’s responsibility for rape, it has even been theorised that rape was impossible to 
commit without stupefying the victim.274 
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Since the 1970s, the idea that false rape accusations are widespread has started to be 
challenged, especially by feminist researchers.275 The first argument against the belief that 
false rape allegations are common, is the absence of evidence to support the claim. Many 
studies have denounced the absence of any evidence of an especially high prevalence of 
false rape accusations, or at least higher prevalence compared to other offences (see the 
section on the prevalence of false allegations below).276  Given the lack of evidence 
supporting the claim, and the widespread character of the belief, the problem of false rape 
accusations has been denounced as a dangerous rape myth.277 
Another argument advanced to counter the myth of false accusations is that, far from being 
an accusation easy to make, rape has proved to be very difficult to report as the majority of 
rape victims do not report the incidents to the police.278 Moreover, the minority who do 
report rape often go through a challenging ordeal in the legal process as they are questioned, 
and re-questioned about their past relationships, sexual history and general character, 
making it a very difficult complaint to bring.279 Bringing a false allegation can be perceived as 
easy if one considers only the act of saying that the person was raped; but the subsequent 
processes are very difficult and sometimes humiliating for the complainants.280 
The myth of false rape allegations has also been challenged based on the perceived 
vindictive motive of such accusations. Kelly’s study on classification criteria of false 
accusations in some European countries has revealed that most of the allegations 
categorised as false were vague and did not name suspects.281 Also, the majority were 
identified at the beginning of the process and did not affect men as commonly feared. Kelly 
concluded that the fear of the dramatic effects of false rape accusations on men is an 
exaggeration compared to the reality.282 
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Some authors have quite understandably resorted to common-sense to counteract the myth 
of false rape allegations. Lees points out that: 
Myths about women making false allegations override common-sense 
explanations of why they should run naked into the street, cry compulsively, 
spend the night in police stations for fear of retribution for taking the case to 
court, change their name, move house or go into hiding… 
Commonly it is argued that women make false allegations through fear of 
their boyfriend or husband. Rarely does the question arise of why they do not 
just keep quiet about it if this were the case.283 
Lonsway also argued that the myth of false rape accusations is against common-sense in 
that, if a woman has to deliberately make a false accusation, she should reasonably fabricate 
a story that can be easily acceptable and which presents some coherence, but the majority 
of the rape complaints seem just the opposite: 
If I were going to file a false report of rape, would it make sense to give the 
type of account that victims do every day? For example, would I describe my 
own behavior in such unflattering ways as survivors do, by describing 
behaviors that are ill-advised, risky, embarrassing, or even humiliating? 
Probably not. Would I mention behaviors that might even be illegal? Almost 
certainly not. How about these particularly damning characteristics that Dr. 
Lisak highlighted: delayed reporting, drug and alcohol use, and inconsistent or 
even untrue statements. Surely, if I were filing a false report I would describe 
it as being prompt, and I would not say that I had used drugs or alcohol. Of 
course, I would also strive to give a statement that was clear, consistent, and 
chronological. This would be easy because I would be the one “writing the 
script.” In other words, if I were truly filing a false report, it would probably 
look nothing like the reports of sexual assault that police departments 
actually receive from victims every day.284  
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The move to challenge rape myths has contributed to legal reforms in many jurisdictions 
across the world since the 1970s, such as the abolition of the corroboration requirement or 
the rejection of the requirement of prompt complaint (these are discussed in Chapter 4 and 
5 respectively.) However, it seems that the problem is yet to be eradicated. Kelly found in 
2010 that despite the efforts to improve victim care, the “culture of suspicion” amongst 
criminal justice practitioners still persisted.285 More recent research presented similar 
findings, for example McMillan’s interviews with forty officers in a UK police force (2016), 
revealed that many believed that false rape allegations were common, though not all 
officers believed this.286 So, the need “to move the elephant from the living room” is 
contemporary.287 One way of achieving this may be to show the real prevalence of false rape 
accusations and remove unnecessary suspicions. But is there a scientifically established 
prevalence rate of false rape allegations? 
b. The prevalence of false rape allegations 
The literature on the prevalence of false rape allegations does not provide consensus on the 
exact or even the approximate rate. This is because there is a wide variety of figures 
provided by different research, with big gaps between them. More than fifty different 
figures have been cited in various studies, ranging from 0.25 per cent to ninety per cent, 
with the majority ranging from one to ten per cent.288 For example, Rumney reviewed about 
thirty different statistics found in the literature, ranging from 1.5 per cent to ninety per cent, 
from various jurisdictions in the US, the UK, New Zealand and Canada.289 It is important to 
note that most, if not all, of these statistics cited by different researchers derived from 
police records rather than academic research findings. This has methodological implications 
as will be shown below. 
 
One study frequently cited to show the high prevalence of false rape allegations is by 
Kanin.290  However, Kanin did not classify allegations as false. He only relied on police figures 
and classification of false reports in his study of the motives of false rape accusations. In fact, 
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the figure of forty-one per cent cited by Kanin is the number of cases categorised as false 
allegations by the police, not his own finding. He totally endorsed the police classification 
despite the flaws in their methodology (see below).  
Although some studies have appreciated Kanin’s research as the “most balanced empirical 
research” on the issue of false allegations, because it relied on “complainant’s own 
admission” of false allegations,291 this criterion should not be considered as a conclusive 
indicator of false allegation. The reason is that a rape victim may “confess” that she lied 
while in reality she did not. The current research reveals many cases where victims 
“confessed” to having lied while it was not the case (see Chapter 6). Certainly, the socio-
economic context of the present research is different from that of Kanin. Nevertheless, 
studies conducted in a context similar to that of Kanin also warned against the assumption 
that a recanted complaint is a false complaint.292 Kanin’s study has also been criticised for 
endorsing the technique of polygraph tests used by that police department to identify false 
allegations despite their potential to intimidate the victims and compromise the integrity of 
the results.293 Lisak noted that this practice has been rejected by the US Department of 
Justice and outlawed in many jurisdictions, but it was the standard procedure in that specific 
police unit because of their prejudices against rape victims.294 For Lisak, Kanin’s work is 
simply not scientific research and does not deserve to be referenced; especially because it 
does not have any added value to the work of the police.295  
The lowest prevalence rate commonly cited in the literature is the FBI Uniform Crime 
Reports Statistics of two per cent.296 Rumney has strongly criticised those that have cited 
this figure since the 1970s without critique of the methodological approach used to reach 
this statistic.297 Lonsway has also noted that the FBI figure of two per cent should be 
understood as relating to “unfounded” rapes, which include false accusations and other 
baseless cases, meaning that it does not reflect correctly the rate of false accusations.298 She 
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noted that later FBI higher rates of unfounded rape accusations were released (such as 5.8 
per cent in 2008) but the oldest figure of two per cent continued to be given as reference 
despite it being outdated.299 Without accepting this higher prevalence rate, both Rumey and 
Lonsway criticised the recurring claim that the rate of false rape allegations is no higher than 
other offences, because there are no established findings to support this.300  
 
De Zutter et al.’s more recent study found that the prevalence of false and baseless rape 
accusations in the United States was higher than the average of all offences except robbery 
(5.55 per cent, one per cent, and 5.78 per cent respectively).301 This finding is not conclusive 
as regards the prevalence of false accusations for two reasons. First, the figure of 5.55 per 
cent does not separate false from baseless accusations. The authors noted that baseless 
allegations are not necessarily false as they include cases that do not meet the legal criteria 
for the offence. Second, all these figures were provided by police, which raises the issue of 
the criteria used to classify a rape report as false. It was revealed that police tended to 
conflate false allegations with other allegations that were not necessarily fabricated, for 
various reasons (see discussion below on the meaning of “false allegations”). Based on these 
two reasons, it can be said that the real (and unknown) figure of false allegations is less, and 
perhaps much less, than the 5.55 per cent rate of false and baseless allegations found in De 
Zutter et al.’s study. Therefore, this figure is limited in comparing the incidence of false 
allegations of rape with other offences.  
 
In short, the real prevalence of false rape allegations is yet to be established by independent 
reliable research. Without evidence to the contrary, the rates are likely to be no higher or 
lower than for other types of crime, and thus there is no credible reason to treat rape as a 
special category of being more likely to be prone to false allegations. The excessive variety 
of the figures cited and the big differences between them may be essentially attributed to 
different methodological approaches, particularly the different perceptions of what 
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constitutes a false rape accusation.302 The central issue is, therefore, to understand the basis 
for the categorisation of an allegation as false and the meaning of a false allegation.303 
c. What is a “false allegation”? 
The concept of the “false allegation” is normally simple to understand.304 Its meaning is 
“self-evident” and “unproblematic.”305  Logic and common sense indicate that a false 
allegation is simply an accusation of a fact that did not occur.306 Despite this, there seems to 
be no agreement on what must be named a “false rape allegation.”307 This is due to the 
variety of reasons that influence criminal justice practitioners and researchers to believe 
that an allegation is false.308 For example, in the study conducted by McMillan, police 
officers admitted that inconsistency in the victim’s account is the primary reason for 
classifying a complaint as false.309 Other factors include lack of details in the victim’s account, 
a victim’s lack of cooperation, the absence of victim injury, victim withdrawal and 
amnesia.310 Some even confused false rape allegations with “no-crimed” or “unfounded” 
rape cases, whereas these categories also contain cases where there is a lack of evidence for 
the police to make an official record of an offence having been committed.311 Given all these 
different criteria used by different police organisations, it is unclear what in fact constitutes 
a false rape allegation.312 
According to Saunders, the problem is the confusion between “false complaint”, defined as 
an allegation of a rape that “did not happen”, and “false account”, which is “an allegation of 
rape containing statements of fact that are inaccurate and, consequently, not true.”313 
Saunders notes the failure of the police and prosecutors to make efforts in dealing with this 
complexity so they choose the easy way which is to conflate both concepts. She emphasises 
that criminal justice practitioners expect victims to always “tell the truth - the whole truth 
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and nothing but the truth.”314 Thus, they fail to recognise the possibility of a “false account 
of genuine rape” and to deal adequately with such cases.315 In fact, rape victims may abstain 
from disclosing some facts for various reasons, such as the worry of being untrusted or 
blamed. 316  Saunders’ distinction has been useful in that it revealed that the same 
respondents who believed false rape allegations were widespread, were “unanimous” that 
“false complaints” were rare.317 However, the criteria these respondents applied to classify 
an accusation as a “false complaint” or to decide that the alleged rape never happened are 
unknown. Perhaps, even these “false complaints” are not all really as “false” as they were 
perceived to be. As has been pointed out above, police officers may believe that the rape 
did not happen in a specific case for various reasons that are not always plausible.  
Some mistakenly believe that victim withdrawal, whether voluntary or induced, is an 
indicator of a false accusation.318 Nevertheless, victims may retract when they face mistrust 
or blame, or when they fear danger caused by the reporting of the rape.319 Research has 
also revealed that sometimes police officers themselves persuaded victims to withdraw.320 
The police then contribute to the high rates of withdrawal, which ironically reinforces their 
belief that they were right to doubt the complainants.321 Victims’ withdrawal may also be 
caused by a loss of confidence in the criminal justice process.322  
In summary, the literature provides scant reliable evidence of the prevalence of false rape 
allegations. Nevertheless, it shows that the real prevalence is conflated with other 
allegations which are not false in reality, because of the criteria wrongly used to classify 
false allegations. This means that the real prevalence of false allegations, although it is 
unknown, is lower and possibly much lower than believed by police, the public, and even 
some researchers.  
There is a need for further rigorous research to find out the real prevalence of false rape 
allegations and also the incidence of false reports for other offences so that an objective 
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comparison may be made. Given that many judges and prosecutors in this study believed 
that victim testimony is unreliable and therefore lacks evidential credibility (see section on 
victims’ evidence in Chapter 4), it is important to explore further whether biased views 
about female victims of rape amongst legal practitioners in Rwanda also extends to a 
general perception that women are predisposed to making up allegations of rape. 
2. Perceptions of false rape accusations in the Rwandan context 
a. The belief of the elite interviewees 
This study found that the belief in false rape accusations was deeply entrenched among the 
legal professionals interviewed. Of the twenty-nine lawyers, prosecutors and judges 
interviewed, twenty-five openly stated that false rape accusations are widespread. Some 
went as far as to state that true rape accusations by adult complainants are exceptional. For 
example, LAWYER2 was categorical that “genuine rape complaints are rare.” Similarly, 
LAWYER3 stated that: “Rape complaints are rarely true. Generally, there is mutual consent 
and if any issue arises, she makes the accusation.” LAWYER3 was so concerned with false 
rape accusations that she expressed her disappointment about the “innocent people” who, 
she said, are routinely convicted based on false accusations. The interviewee literally 
conflated rape complaints with false complaints, expressing her concerns in the following 
terms: 
Generally, the victims of lies are punished. We need to develop our forensic 
capacity to tackle false rape accusations. Too many innocent people are 
convicted unfairly…There are few acquittals in rape cases. When the 
complainant who came to lie is challenged, sometimes it is proved that they 
even never met and then the defendant can be acquitted.323  
Such was the widespread belief in false accusations that one judge (JUDGE4) exclaimed that 
“it is a culture.” Indeed, a number of judges revealed that they constantly keep in mind the 
risk of false accusations while conducting rape trials. In one court ruling reviewed as part of 
the case file analysis, the judge stated that one of the main issues to be analysed in the case 
was “to find out if the defendant is not falsely accused of rape.”324 In this case, the court 
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found that the accusation was false but the reasons advanced by the judge appeared to lack 
any basis in either law or evidence (this case is discussed further in the section on victims’ 
sexual experience in Chapter 5). 
Responding to the question about common types of questions asked during victims’ cross-
examination, JUDGE5 commented on rape complainants’ tendency to lie, and added: 
Yayayayayayaayaya! (loud exclamation) That is why we ask them if they have 
any issue with the defendant. It is very frequent that they lie. An adult person 
has the ability to respond to tough questions. The reason why we ask those 
questions is to be sure that they do not lie.  
JUDGE9 also said: 
We ask complainants many questions when there is not enough evidence or 
when we suspect that they are lying. That is why we prefer hearing in camera 
so that the complainant may feel relaxed.   
Such an attitude of deep distrust potentially has a considerable impact on the legal process 
for rape. As the victims are to give evidence of the crime, it can be feared that their 
evidence is less likely to be considered true because of this profound mistrust. The effects of 
the disbelief of rape victims’ testimony on the provision of evidence in rape cases are 
explained in Chapter 4.  
Two key reasons emerged during the study that underpinned interviewees’ belief that rape 
complainants frequently lie: the non-payment of sex work and the shame that they had sex 
with someone and this is being found out by others who will disapprove. Other perceived 
motives of false rape accusations were occasionally cited, such as the existence of prior 
conflict between the accused and the complainant or their families. The issue of “non-
payment” for sex was the most cited motive. This perceived financial motive for false rape 
accusations is linked to the critical issue of “the defence of prostitution”, discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5.  For the purposes of this chapter, I note simply that the study revealed that it is 
common for rape defendants and their lawyers to brand the victims as prostitutes without 
any proof, as a tactic to disprove the victim’s case.  
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Although the distrust of rape complainants was very deeply felt among most interviewees, 
four of them, including two judges, one prosecutor and one lawyer did not believe that 
women tend to lie about rape. JUDGE11 stated:   
Generally, rape complainants do not lie. There are cases of acquittals but 
these are normally due to the lack of evidence. When you look closely you 
realise that the crime was committed; that the complainant did not lie at all, 
but the evidence is not sufficient to convict the defendant.  
PROSEC8 appreciated that it is not easy to bring a rape complaint: 
It is frequently said that rape complainants tend to make false accusations.  I 
cannot confirm this idea. I believe that no one would lightly accept the brand 
of ‘rape victim’, with all the shame associated with it, unless there is a very 
serious reason.   
For JUDGE10, the frequent allegations made in court that women tend to lie about rape are 
simply meant to humiliate the complainants: 
Defendants and their lawyers generally say that women tend to lie about rape. 
However, this is not the reality. It is only a way of humiliating the victims. It is 
unfair to generalise that women lie. What about men? Such an attitude is 
dangerous. This is only aimed at demeaning women.  
Interestingly, one lawyer conceded that he frequently relies on this argument to defend his 
clients though he does not believe it: 
We defence lawyers, tend to say in court that rape complainants frequently 
lie. We give some reasons like non-payment of the price of sex. We say it 
routinely. However, to be honest, I cannot confidently affirm that women 
tend to lie about rape. On the contrary, many women are raped but never 
reveal it. If all rape victims reported the crime, we would have too many cases. 
(LAWYER4) 
Asked if he gives evidence in court when he alleges that the victim lied, LAWYER4 replied: 
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When you want to show that she lied, you make a parallel with other cases, 
you show that in those cases they lied but you do not give evidence of 
fabrication because you can’t find it. (LAWYER4) 
This revelation is very concerning because defence lawyers are auxiliaries of the criminal 
justice system and are supposed to assist the system in being more effective and fair. This 
research revealed that many lawyers are deliberately feeding others’ false perceptions in 
order to exonerate rape defendants. This is damaging for the system which relies on 
professionals who sometimes intentionally mislead judicial authorities. The implications for 
rape victims are not negligible because such lawyers reinforce the already existing distrust 
of rape complainants, which only contributes to further relegation of rape victims in the 
criminal justice process. 
In short, the majority of the justice practitioners interviewed deeply believed that false rape 
accusations were widespread but not all shared the same belief. This conclusion is similar to 
McMillan’s findings cited above. Saunders’ study also reached similar conclusions.325 
 Having found that the belief in the existence of widespread false rape accusations was so 
deeply entrenched among many interviewees, it was important to explore whether this 
belief had any supporting evidence in the Rwandan context.  
b. Justice professionals’ grounds for believing false allegations are widespread  
The elite interviewees were pressed to give concrete examples of false allegations to 
support their claim about the high prevalence of false accusations. Most could not give any 
single example. Even JUDGE4 who asserted that false accusations are a culture and 
LAWYER3 who equated rape complaints with false complaints, failed to give any tangible 
examples. Most participants simply replied: “I do not remember.” Some added comments 
that revealed the true meaning that they attached to a false accusation. For example, 
LAWYER5 said:  
I do not remember, but there are cases I pleaded where the defendants were 
acquitted, meaning that the accusation was false. 
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LAWYER5’s answer denotes confusion between acquittal and false accusation. This is 
evidently incorrect because an acquittal may be caused by various reasons. It cannot be 
assumed that if the defendant is acquitted in a trial, this means that he was falsely accused. 
It simply means that the court did not find sufficient ground to convict him. This may be due 
to doubts raised in the mind of the judge, insufficient evidence, procedural obstacles or any 
other reason that may pre-empt the judge to deliver a guilty verdict.  Conflating acquittals 
with false allegations therefore aggravates misconceptions about the high prevalence of 
false allegations.  
PROSEC10 also said he did not remember, and added the following comments: 
There are cases where you find that they agreed to have sex but because of 
any misunderstanding she says that she was raped. The suspect says that they 
agreed and when we try to find evidence we do not find any trace of force.  
This reply shows that the absence of victim injury led to the conclusion of absence of rape 
(see section on medical evidence in Chapter 4). This finding concurred with McMillan’s 
research conducted in the UK, which also revealed that a lack of injury was one of the key 
reasons why police officers believed a rape allegation was false.326  Such an attitude is linked 
to another pervasive rape myth discussed earlier in the introduction chapter, which 
conceives of rape involving a substantial amount of physical violence, and that the victim 
must consequently present significant injuries. This connected rape myth persists despite 
research persistently showing that the majority of rapes do not cause physical injuries, a 
theme that will be further explored in Chapter 4. 
In response to the same question about concrete cases of false allegations, PROSEC3 
commented: 
I could find some among the cases dropped, but we do not write that she lied; 
you only realise that there is no evidence of rape. (PROSEC3) 
This answer denotes that the recurrent conclusion of the “lack of evidence” in many rape 
cases (see Chapter 4 and 5) may conceal other extra-evidential considerations in the mind of 
the decision maker who may use it as an easy justification; especially that the concepts of 
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the “lack of evidence” or “insufficient evidence” may sometimes be more or less subjective 
and more difficult to challenge.  
Another interviewee failed to give a concrete case of a false rape allegation and said: 
I cannot remember exactly. I cannot say it is this or that specific case but 
there have been cases we investigated and found that they [the complainant 
and the accused] were friends. (PROSEC6) 
This response further reveals a connection between rape myths, which seemingly combine 
to strengthen an individual’s biased belief towards victims of rape. In this case, the 
prosecutor shows that a prior friendship between the suspect and the victim is to be 
equated with the belief that the victim must have consented. 327 
Some interviewees said that they did not recall the details but they remembered cases 
where the complainants themselves “confessed” to having lied. This issue of victims’ 
recantation is discussed in Chapter 6, which will demonstrate that recantations are not sure 
indicators of false accusations.  
Far from providing concrete examples of a false allegation, the interviewees’ responses 
revealed generalised comments that are based on an interconnected system of beliefs 
about rape that reinforce negative stereotypes about complainants. Most of the 
interviewees revealed that their classification of a case as a false allegation was influenced 
by common rape myths. Indeed, amongst the interviewees, just two could give actual case 
examples of perceived false allegation but these examples also betray a misconception of 
what is a “false allegation.” LAWYER6 remembered this case: 
There is one case I pleaded. It was a twenty-four-year-old man who shared 
[an alcoholic] drink with the woman. It was clear that the woman lied because 
even the prosecutor himself said that he had no evidence of rape. The man 
was released.  
This conclusion of false accusation was influenced by the absence of evidence in the case. 
Nevertheless, a lack of evidence must not be conflated with a false accusation because there 
are many reasons that can cause the lack of proof in a rape case, such as the absence of a 
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third party witness. This means that a rape may be committed but the investigation may still 
fail to gather cogent evidence. Therefore, conflating unproven rapes with false allegations is 
a misconception. 
JUDGE9 gave the following example: 
I remember the case of a girl who complained of rape in the Northern region. 
The defendant was her friend. The girl accepted to leave Kigali and visit him in 
the Northern region. She called him, then they agreed to meet in the evening 
and they went in a bush and had sex. Later she said it was forced. The boy 
said: ‘Check how many times she called me on phone. We had consensual 
sexual intercourse. It was in the bush but near a neighbourhood. If it had 
been forced, she would have screamed, it was near a church, she would have 
been helped. She travelled many kilometres to see me. Also, she dressed in 
trousers. How could I remove her trousers, put on a condom and rape her? It 
was consensual but she accused me because when she went back home they 
asked her where she came from and she could not explain. Otherwise she 
would have complained to people around because there were many homes 
nearby.’ 
This judge’s answer is dominated by the defendant’s arguments rather than the finding by 
the judge about the facts that happened. Although this judge endorsed the defendant’s 
arguments, these do not warrant the conclusion that the rape accusation was false: (a) if the 
girl travelled long distances to visit the boy, it does not necessarily mean that she went for 
sex; (b) wearing trousers cannot pre-empt rape. The victim may be threatened and obliged 
to remove the trousers or the assailant may overpower the victim and forcibly remove them; 
(c) the victim may not have screamed out of fear or out of hopelessness; or she may have 
screamed and not be heard, or even be heard and not be rescued; (d) it is unlikely that the 
victim lied to her parents supposedly because she lacked any explanation for her absence. 
As she intentionally travelled relatively long distances, it is more likely that she had an 
explanation for such a deliberate activity.  
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Collectively, these circumstantial factors do not provide any conclusive evidence of a false 
allegation. The example also does not reveal any effort was made by the judge to find out 
whether the allegation was false.  
A careful reading of the judgment in this case to check the reason given by the court, did not 
uncover any mention by the court of a false allegation. Rather, it found that there was 
“doubt” about the commission of the rape. This reinforces what was mentioned above that 
prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions are sometimes justified with legal explanations such as 
“doubt” or “insufficient evidence” while the drive of the decision was a personal and extra-
legal belief. Furthermore, this example illustrates the way that a perceived lack of evidence 
is often conflated with a false allegation. 
In short, none of the interviewees’ responses above provided any tangible evidence to show 
that a victim had made a false accusation. Most participants stated that they did not 
remember any specific cases, and those who gave some explanation to support their views 
betrayed the absence of any factual basis to ascertain the falsity of the allegations. They 
rather relied upon doubtful indicators of false accusations. 
It was observed above that in other jurisdictions the concept of the “false accusation”, 
although it appears to be straightforward, is often interpreted by criminal justice 
practitioners to include various situations which do not necessarily mean a deliberate 
fabrication of rape. Factors such as inconsistency in the victim’s account, the lack of 
evidence and so on, are but two examples that have been shown to influence justice 
practitioners to classify rape allegations as false. Similar to the findings in other jurisdictions, 
the following further perceived indicators of false allegations were found in this research: 
victim-offender acquaintance, absence of victim resistance, delayed reporting, victims’ 
sexual experience, victim withdrawal, victim recantation and perceived lack of evidence. The 
vast majority of the legal practitioners interviewed stated unequivocally that these factors 
are strong indicators of false allegations.  
The review of the files revealed that most of the cases where these perceived indicators 
were present have been systematically dismissed, regardless of the evidence contained in 
the files, on the ground that the allegations were false. As will be demonstrated in the 
following chapters, it was revealed that the facts in the cases declared false did not support 
77 
 
the conclusion of a false allegation. More importantly, the study revealed that not a single 
case declared false was investigated to find cogent evidence of fabrication before 
concluding the accusation is false.  The conclusions of false allegation derived exclusively 
from the dubious perceived indicators of a false accusation that have been explained above. 
If the influence of these perceived indicators was removed, it is unlikely that there would be 
a significant number of rape reports deemed “false.”  
In light of all this, it can be concluded that the (unknown) real prevalence of false rape 
allegations must be very much lower than believed by the criminal justice professionals. This 
supports previous findings that justice practitioners believe in high prevalence of false rape 
accusations while the reality is much lower.328 Chapter 4 will demonstrate how this belief 
shapes the whole system of evidence in rape cases and how the special evidentiary rules 
created for that matter have had dramatic consequences for the processing of cases 
through the legal process. 
3.2. VICTIMS’ LACK OF PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 
Historically, crime victims have been considered as the “forgotten” player in the criminal 
justice process in various jurisdictions across the world.329 The main concern of the criminal 
justice process has been the protection of society through sentencing of offenders, because 
crime was considered as a violation against the state rather than harm caused to individual 
victims.330 Victims were only used as “tools” for the prosecution of defendants, with a 
limited role as witness to the crime.331  
In the 1970s, what has been described as a “victim’s rights movement” emerged, promoting 
a more significant role for victims during the criminal process.332 This movement led to the 
adoption of measures in some jurisdictions in the US and in Europe, allowing victims’ greater 
participation and a voice in the criminal justice process.333 This has led, over time, to victims 
becoming a more integral part of the criminal process. For example, in the United Kingdom 
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and in the United States, victims of crime are allowed to submit a “victim impact statement” 
to court. This statement is given before the sentence proceedings and allows the victim to 
inform the court about the various effects the offence has had.334 In many jurisdictions 
(especially in the US), victims are also allowed to give their views prior to various judicial 
decisions such as pre-trial release, acceptance of plea agreement and the sentence itself.335 
The debate on victim participation in these jurisdictions has moved beyond an 
understanding of the role of victims as limited to a witness to crime and whether victims 
should play a greater role in the criminal process. The subject of most debates is now the 
extent to which victims should be involved in the criminal justice process, and how the 
effectiveness of victim participation can be increased.  
In the context of this study, the issue of victims’ participation in the criminal justice process 
is of a very different nature to many Western jurisdictions. The study revealed that victims 
are severely marginalised in all parts of the criminal justice process for rape in Rwanda. It 
was common that after victims made their complaint to the police, they all but disappeared 
from the criminal process.  The research showed that prosecutors almost never call them for 
questioning and judges mostly conduct trials without hearing victims’ oral testimony, except 
in very rare cases.336 Only victims’ written statements initially made before the police are 
considered throughout the whole process. During the ten sessions of court observations 
conducted, no victim was invited to testify. In addition, none of the eleven rape survivors 
interviewed attended court proceedings. Further, the review of the case files reveals that in 
the overwhelming majority of the cases, the victims never testified. 
Only military courts make an exception to this practice.337 The four military prosecutors and 
judges interviewed were unanimous in stating that they do not hold rape trials without the 
victim’s participation, unless she is exceptionally unavailable. The prosecutors stated that 
they normally arrange transport, accommodation and subsistence for the victims to attend 
trials. The examination of the thirteen military judgments studied also showed evidence of 
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victims’ testimonies in court. In one case, the trial was postponed in order to hear the 
victim.338  This disparity in the practice of civilian and military courts was difficult to 
comprehend, especially as both categories of courts are governed by the same rules of 
criminal procedure. A plausible explanation will be explored below. 
 The following sections discuss three main issues that arose during the empirical analysis in 
relation to victim participation: (1) the causes of victims’ lack of involvement; (2) the 
implications for justice and victims’ rights; and (3) the perceptions of victims about their 
marginalisation from the legal process.  
1. The causes of victims’ absence in the legal process 
The elite interviewees were asked why rape victims do not appear in court. Nine out of the 
twenty-nine elite interviewees believed that the legal system is such that victims are not 
needed in court because they are already represented by the prosecution. Four stated that 
the cases contained enough evidence so there was no need to hear further evidence from 
the victims. Others put the responsibility on prosecutors for not involving victims, while 
some blamed the victims for a lack of follow-up or a lack of willingness to testify. A few 
interviewees believed that rape victims needed to be protected against humiliation in court. 
Finally, one lawyer (LAWYER4) asserted that the lack of oral testimony was a direct result of 
judges’ laziness to thoroughly conduct the trials.  
Based on other findings of this research, it is doubtful that any one of these reasons 
advanced by the legal practitioners are an accurate reflection of victim non-participation. 
Instead, the study found that victims’ lack of participation during the trial was mostly likely 
due to a combination of two factors. The first factor relates to the value given to victim 
evidence in prosecutorial and judicial practice. The practice regarding the provision of 
evidence in rape cases gives almost complete precedence to medical evidence, with victim 
evidence being relegated to simple “information” that may merely inform the court, or 
otherwise it is deemed to be unreliable evidence which does not best serve justice.339 It is 
likely that, what is sometimes, an almost complete disregard for victim testimony 
contributes most saliently to the lack of interest in hearing them in court. However, this 
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factor alone does not fully explain victims’ non-participation. Even in foreign jurisdictions 
where rape victims have historically been disbelieved, they nevertheless appeared in court, 
though as it has already been highlighted, many have faced humiliation in the process.340 
Moreover, the disregard for victims’ testimony does not explain why the military courts 
have a different practice while both types of courts use the same procedural rules.  
The second factor explaining the non-participation of victims was revealed during court 
observations as pertaining to time constraints faced by the prosecutors and judges. Court 
observations revealed the effort by judges to try as many cases as possible within the 
shortest time possible. It was noted that, far from being lazy, prosecutors and judges were 
extremely busy.  They invariably entered the courtrooms with about ten case files scheduled 
to be completely tried the same day. The trials were so expeditious that a full rape trial was 
often completed in one session. During the ten sessions attended, nine cases were 
completely tried and only one was adjourned. The rape trials were extremely short to the 
extent that the longest case observed took one hour and forty-one minutes,341 while the 
shortest lasted just ten minutes.342 Most trials lasted between twenty-five and thirty-five 
minutes. It was concluded from these observations that the justice system was overloaded, 
leading to extraordinarily short trials.  
During the interviews, one judge explained that each judge is regularly given a large number 
of cases that he/she must judge within the required period. In fact, the issue of case backlog 
in courts has been a serious concern for the judiciary over the last two decades. The 
“clearing of case backlog and speeding up proceedings” is one of the main pillars of the 
successive strategic plans for the judiciary adopted since 2004.343 The 2009-2013 strategic 
plan openly required that each judge should aim to complete at least fifteen cases per 
month.344 As a result, the average number of cases effectively tried by one judge increased 
from two in 2004 to twenty-seven in 2013.345 The swift administration of justice is likely to 
have partly influenced the practice of not hearing victims and witnesses in civilian courts. 
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The situation is different in military courts as was confirmed by the military prosecutors and 
judges interviewed who stated that they do not have such time constraints. This enables 
them to hear victims and witnesses during trials. The military interviewees explained that 
they do this as a matter of principle in all cases, to ensure that the trials are conducted 
properly. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that they have a different attitude towards 
rape victims more generally.  
This evidence shows that the combination of the above two factors (disregard for victims’ 
testimony and time constraints) are the main causes of the marginalisation of victims in the 
legal process. However, it is important to note that despite time constraints, judges are still 
choosing what to prioritise within those constraints and are not prioritising victims. For 
example, one of the observed rape trials was adjourned only to obtain further medical 
examination (see section on the value of medical evidence in Chapter 4). Though the judge 
had many cases left to hear that day, she found time to adjourn the trial. Also, during the 
court observations, I noted that sometimes the judges could find time to hear witnesses. 
While waiting for the turn of rape cases to be heard, I attended a number of other criminal 
trials in which the courts sometimes received testimonies of victims and third party 
witnesses. This means that although the judges had tight schedules, they still had the 
discretion and possibility to prioritise the activities regarding the trials.  
2. Implications of victims’ lack of participation in the legal process 
The lack of victims’ participation in the legal process has detrimental effects on justice for 
rape victims.  First, prosecutors and judges lose vital information by not hearing victims. 
Second, the victims are denied a voice.   
a. Loss of vital information as victims’ written statements and prosecutors’ narration 
cannot entirely replace victims’ oral testimony 
Paradoxically, the legal professionals who are responsible for the marginalisation of victims, 
and who mostly believed that victim testimony is unreliable (see Chapter 4), acknowledged 
the pitfalls of not hearing victims’ testimony in rape cases. It is likely that the questions they 
were posed during the interviews influenced them to take a more flexible position. In fact, 
some of their comments below were given when asked about the advantages and 
disadvantages of the lack of participation of victims in the legal process. Also, at the end of 
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the interviews, the final open question about a general assessment of the law and what 
needs to be improved (see appendix 3), prompted many legal professionals to return to the 
issue of the lack of victims’ involvement, which was pointed out by most as an area that 
needs reform.  
Whatever the case, many legal practitioners admitted that the presence of victims in court 
may be useful and that their absence is detrimental to the process. Some added that the 
presence of the victim is preferable even when she is lying because it can help to ascertain 
that she made a false accusation. Hence, many justice practitioners acknowledged the 
disadvantages of holding trials without hearing the victims. For example, LAWYER7, who was 
critical of the system’s response to sexual violence, said that:  
There is a big impact on justice. When the person concerned is absent, the 
court loses the truth. Although prosecutors try to explain what happened, it is 
like telling stories.  
Some justice professionals rightly emphasised that the victim’s testimony in a rape case 
cannot be replaced by her written statements or prosecutors’ narrations of the facts, 
because:  
It is the victim who has the original version of the facts... There is a big 
difference between a written statement and a testimony of a person speaking 
about what happened to her. (JUDGE4) 
When somebody is explaining what happened to her, you feel the difference. 
You may even realise that it happened, through how she explained the facts. 
(JUDGE8) 
Many interviewees also noted that sometimes prosecutors fail to explain the facts 
adequately: 
 The presence of the complainants is essential because prosecutors 
sometimes fail to explain some issues. (LAWYER3) 
PROSEC4 similarly admitted that “sometimes there are questions that are asked by judges 
that only the complainant can answer.” JUDGE11 also confirmed that: 
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There are things that prosecutors cannot explain and which only the 
complainant can. Sometimes they fail to explain all the steps of the offence.  
PROSEC4 concluded: “This may be one of the reasons of failing some cases.” This conclusion 
was echoed by JUDGE4 who stated that “victims’ presence can increase the conviction rate.” 
Victims’ oral testimony can make a substantial difference to how evidence is interpreted 
during a trial. JUDGE11 explained one case where the testimony of the victim significantly 
affected the outcome of the case. 
One day while I was judging a case, a lady stood up in the court room and 
asked to intervene. She was the complainant in the case but we had not 
invited her to testify. I could see from her facial expression that she was very 
sad, so I found it important to give her the floor. She started explaining how 
the man (her husband’s uncle) raped her. She went on to explain that it was 
not the first time; that he used to come in her home and rape her when her 
husband left. She added that the defendant told her that she had become his 
wife because she would never reveal the rapes for fear of being repudiated by 
her husband. The complainant added that it was too much and that she was 
then ready to face all the consequences, that is why she reported the last 
rape to the police and decided to reveal the previous rapes in court. She said 
that she was ready to die instead of continuing that life. When the man was 
asked to react to the testimony, he was confused and he admitted some very 
critical facts, although he pleaded not guilty. I thanked God that I allowed this 
lady to speak. I imagine how she would have felt if I had refused to let her 
speak. Also, I am not sure if the verdict would have been the same if this 
complainant had not come forward. Her testimony, together with the critical 
admissions of the defendant prompted by the woman’s testimony, and other 
evidence in the case, resulted in the conviction of the defendant.  
This judge’s experience reveals the practical importance of hearing rape complainants in the 
legal process. First, this victim was relieved by the opportunity to tell her experience in court. 
Second, the judge himself admits that the victim’s testimony contributed to the verdict as an 
important part of evidence that led to the conviction of the defendant.  
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The study of the case files also revealed many instances where further interrogation of the 
victim’s testimony would have been crucial to examining the veracity of the accusation. For 
example, in PP v. Hategekimana Tite the court doubted whether the defendant was really 
the author of the rape in question. It found that the complainant’s written statement 
mentioning that she recognised the assailant by his height and voice was not enough to 
ascertain the identity of the assailant.346 Yet had the victim been given the opportunity to 
explain further why she asserted that it is the defendant who raped her, it could have 
become clearer whether she could in fact confirm the identity of the assailant. Another 
example of the importance of the victim’s oral testimony in court is PP v. Shumbusho, in 
which the court relied on a complainant’s letter of recantation to dismiss her account.347 The 
file contains a victim’s statement complaining that she had been pressured to recant but the 
judgment did not mention this statement. Perhaps the judge did not notice it.  He could 
have learned more by hearing from the victim why she has recanted her complaint, 
including whether her recanting was freely made or not. This would also allow the court to 
(re)evaluate other evidence in the case. For instance, the case file contained a testimony 
from a person who directly witnessed the rape. This testimony was overlooked because of 
the victim’s recantation. There are many other cases where the victims wrote letters of 
withdrawal, that have been dropped without hearing the victims. These cases logically 
required further interrogation of the victims and inquiry into the reasons for the 
withdrawals (see Chapter 6). 
The failure to hear victims’ testimony also results in a loss of opportunity for prosecutors 
and judges to obtain information that can allow them to identify further evidence. Note that 
in Rwandan law the duty to gather evidence is not limited to police, as prosecutors and 
judges also have the responsibility to enquire further when necessary.348 For example, if 
they come across information about a key witness who was not interviewed by the police, 
they can automatically summon them. 
The failure to involve rape victims during trials is detrimental to the justice process. Both 
interviews and case file analysis revealed that without oral testimony the chances for 
defendants to escape criminal liability is increased. In jurisdictions where victims normally 
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give evidence in court, it is believed that the prosecution is very unlikely to succeed in the 
absence of victim testimony.349 Considering the importance of victim testimony in rape 
cases and the vulnerability of such witnesses in court, Menaker and Cramer suggest that 
rape victims should be prepared (not “coached”) to give effective testimony.350 They argue 
that effective victim testimony may lead to more successful prosecutions of rape cases. 
Nevertheless, there are no available statistics showing the likelihood of conviction based on 
the presence or absence of victim testimony. This is an avenue for further research.  
b. Victims are denied a voice 
As noted above, victims of crime have been traditionally marginalised in the criminal justice 
process, and simply used as witnesses to facilitate prosecution of defendants. Historically, it 
is the defendants who have been in the centre of the criminal justice process.351 The 
presumption of innocence and the standard of proof required in the criminal process are put 
in place to protect defendants from being wrongly convicted.352  Hoffmann and King 
summarised this perception of criminal justice in these terms: “Justice means, first and 
foremost, ensuring that defendants are not convicted of crimes they did not commit.”353  
Victims have no formal voice in the legal process; they are theoretically represented by the 
prosecution, as other members of the general public.354 Nevertheless, the victim is unlike 
other members of society who are not directly affected by the offence.355  Their experience 
of victimisation gives them a specific interest in the criminal justice process and it is, 
therefore, important that they are given a voice in the process.356  Rape victims in particular 
have specific needs that require special attention.357 Their needs include the desire to relay 
their account of the incident and participate in the resolution of the violation. 358  
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“Participation” and “voice” are among the overriding needs as expressed by sexual violence 
victims.359 
In this study, one of the most disturbing findings is that the victims were systematically 
denied a voice. They were denied a voice both during the provision of evidence as witnesses 
of the offence, and during the entire criminal process as victims. With respect to victim 
testimony, it is usually said that in rape cases, the central issue is the evaluation of the word 
of the victim against the word of the accused. By not hearing the victim’s oral testimony, the 
advantage is given to the accused who may more easily convince the prosecutor or the 
judge although the victim’s account does sometimes prevail. The law compels prosecutors 
to re-interrogate suspects before taking the decision to confirm detention.360  This is meant 
to protect the accused; to ensure that there are reasonable grounds to convict the accused. 
The judges are also legally required to hear the defendants before deciding on their fate. 
Nevertheless, this can cause an unintended imbalance between the defendant and the 
complainant, particularly regarding the offence of rape because of its specific nature. As 
pointed out above, the issue in rape cases is often to evaluate the word of the accused 
against the word of the victim. Therefore, if only the defendant is heard, the risk of 
unfairness to the complainant becomes amplified.  
The denying of the victim’s voice extends beyond that of the trial process and affects all 
other proceedings of the legal process. The research study revealed that a vast majority of 
the decisions made during the whole process were taken without hearing and considering 
victims’ views. In particular, victims did not have the opportunity to share their experience 
of the impact of the rape. This may reduce the chances for prosecutors and judges to 
perceive the weight of the offence and the consequences of the crime. It was observed in 
many cases that the judges tended to consider that the rapes had no significant effect on 
the victims, especially when the victims did not sustain considerable physical injuries. For 
example, in the appeal trial of a gang rape case, the judge decided to reduce the penalty 
from six to three years although this reduction was not requested by the defendant, and 
one of the reasons for the reduction was that “the rape had no serious consequences.”361  In 
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this case, there was no evidence of the impact of the rape on the victim. Apart from the 
usual medical examination aimed at providing evidence of physical injury, the victim had not 
been examined to find out the extent of any psychological effect or any other damage 
caused by the rape, nor had she provided the court with any information regarding possible 
emotional, social or financial effects of the rape. Based on the absence of any relevant 
information in the court transcripts in this case, it can be said that the judge had no valid 
knowledge of the effects of the rape on this victim. The judge’s conclusion about the lack of 
serious effects is therefore uninformed. 
If judges are to make informed decisions on matters concerning victims, it is crucial that 
they hear them first. The authors of the Task Force Report are right in stating that:  
[v]ictims, no less than defendants, are entitled to their day in court. Victims, 
no less than defendants, are entitled to have their views considered. A judge 
cannot evaluate the seriousness of a defendant's conduct without knowing 
how the crime has burdened the victim. A judge cannot reach an informed 
determination of the danger posed by a defendant without hearing from the 
person he has victimized.362 
If in the above case (and other similar cases not mentioned) the victim had participated in 
the process and had had the opportunity to show the damage caused to them by the 
offence, the judge would have obtained information about the consequences of the rape on 
the victim.  This would have possibly changed his conclusion. 
It is not only the trial process that is negatively impacted by the lack of participation by 
victims. The study also revealed that a failure to engage with victims directly affected the 
appeal process. For instance, prosecutors sometimes exhibited less motivation in 
prosecuting rape cases because of victims’ lack of participation. Several prosecutors 
admitted that they were sometimes less encouraged to appeal against acquittals, because 
the victims were not part of the process to motivate them. Unlike in some jurisdictions 
where appeal by prosecution is not applicable, in Rwandan law appeal is a fundamental right 
of the defendants, the victims claiming damages and the prosecution.363 This study revealed 
prosecutors’ tendency not to appeal against acquittals even when there were tangible 
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grounds for appeal, such as an openly biased  court’s decision. By contrast, military 
prosecutors confirmed that they always appeal when they are not satisfied with the 
judgment. They said that the reaction of victims to the verdict plays an important role in the 
decision to appeal. Analysis of the case files shows that in ordinary courts, thirty-nine out of 
forty appeals were filed by defendants and only one by the prosecutor. But in four military 
appeal cases, two were initiated by prosecutors and two by defendants.  
 
The lack of a strong commitment of prosecutors in rape cases was also visible in some cases 
where they requested acquittals in court. This is not abnormal in the Rwandan legal system 
because prosecutors have the responsibility to incriminate but also exonerate the 
defendants depending on the evidence found during the trial process. The problem is that in 
those cases where acquittal had been sought, the case file analyses found no valid reason 
why the prosecutors did so. For example, in PP v. Hakizimana364 the case contained some 
evidence that could be examined by the court, such as the complainant’s testimony and the 
defendant’s confessions during preliminary investigations. Nevertheless, the prosecutor 
retracted in court without any apparent reason. He simply stated that there was “no 
evidence.”365 The case had been duly transmitted to court and the trial was taking its normal 
course when the prosecutor decided to request acquittal of the defendant. This prosecutor 
did not show any new evidence in favour of the accused or detail why any of the pre-existing 
evidence needed to be retracted.  Such an important decision to request acquittal should 
normally be grounded on serious facts and be appropriately reasoned.  
3. Victims’ perception about their lack of participation in the legal process 
The eleven rape survivors interviewed in this study were asked what they thought about the 
trial taking place without their participation (see appendix 3). They were unanimous in 
expressing their disappointment. For example, SURVIVOR8 and SURVIVOR5 stated: 
 I really wished to give testimony in court because I am the only person to 
have tangible information of what happened. I would have explained to them 
how the offence was committed and they would have understood. If they had 
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any issue I would have facilitated them. It would have been useful, but they 
never approached me. (SURVIVOR8). 
I would solidify the case. They would have understood my version. I feel that 
if they had understood my side, it could have changed the course. 
(SURVIVOR5) 
Several survivors were particularly upset by the fact that they were not even informed about 
the outcome of their cases or if the trial took place at all (note that their cases had all been 
tried at the time of the interviews). SURVIVOR2 complained: “I do not know if he [the 
accused] was arrested or not, or if he was prosecuted at all.” 
All the survivors interviewed expressed the feeling that their cases had simply been 
neglected; regardless of whether the defendants were convicted or not. In the case of 
SURVIVOR4, the defendant was convicted but still the victim felt that she was uncared for 
because she was not informed about the process and its outcome. She simply concluded: “I 
consider that they neglected me.” SURVIVOR7 knew that the defendant was convicted but 
still she was not satisfied because she did not participate in the process: 
I am very upset. Perhaps if they had seen me they would not have given him 
that punishment. They must have thought that it was a simple matter. 
(SURVIVOR7) 
This survivor had multiple scars on her face, visible at the moment of the interview which 
took place nearly one year after the assault. Her assailant was convicted to a term of seven 
years’ imprisonment - the maximum punishment - but she was still unsatisfied because she 
did not participate in the trial, and was not duly informed of the outcome of the case.  
This shows the importance of procedural justice.  Procedural justice is concerned with the 
sense of fairness and respect in the interactions between individuals and criminal justice 
authorities.366 Miller and Hefner’s study found that victims were more concerned about the 
fairness of the process than its outcome.367 They argue that when victims are treated with 
respect and dignity, and are given the opportunity to participate fairly in the legal process, 
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this gives more legitimacy to authorities’ decisions and more satisfaction to victims, 
regardless of the outcome of the process. They believe that a victim may remain unsatisfied 
despite the offender’s conviction if the process was not inclusive or did not fairly take into 
account the victim’s needs. Konradi’s study on rape survivors in particular, reveals that 
participants gave more importance to solving the emotional pain resulting from the rape 
than obtaining substantive justice and punishment of the offender.368 She advocates for well 
sustained participation of rape survivors in various proceedings of the criminal justice 
process to meet the needs of the survivors, which include continued “ownership of the rape” 
during the whole criminal justice process. 
In this study, some survivors managed to go to court without the court’s invitation, seeking 
the opportunity to participate in the process. SURVIVOR6 went there but she was not 
allowed to testify. This is how she expressed her disappointment: 
I wished to give evidence in court but they did not give me the opportunity. It 
could have been useful. They would not have freed him like that. They would 
have benefited from my testimony, for example some issues which they did 
not understand.  
Her friends later informed her that the defendant was acquitted. She concluded: 
I had realised that they had not given any weight to my case. I did not even 
appeal. It would have been useless.  
SURVIVOR11 also went to court and tried to find a way to testify in court but she returned 
without giving her testimony: 
I rose in the court and asked to speak but they said: ‘how come you are here?’ 
and yet I was the victim of the crime being tried! 
They told this survivor that she was represented by the prosecutor but she was not satisfied. 
She was frustrated and deeply disappointed for being disregarded in a case directly affecting 
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her. During the court observations, a similar scene was witnessed. Below is an extract of the 
notes taken from one hearing:369 
The judge asks the prosecutor to explain the complainant’s absence of 
consent... 
One woman holding a baby, seated on the left side of the courtroom stands 
up and says: ‘It is me.’ 
The judge asks: ‘What do you want?’ 
The woman replies: ‘How can you consent to somebody who breaks your 
door...?’ 
The judge says: ‘Stop! Madam.  The prosecution is here and they did not 
invite you. The court neither found it necessary to invite you. You do not 
appear anywhere and you did not even seek damages. You will follow the 
hearing like anyone else here.’ 
The woman: ‘I wanted to participate in the process!’ 
Judge: ‘We do not know that.’ 
(The baby held by the woman cries.)  Then the judge says: ‘Please see how 
you can rock the baby.’ 
The woman looks extremely frustrated, sits down and tries to take care of her 
baby. 
The defendant raises his hand and says: ‘I do not understand why she 
screamed. It must be because I gave her less money than agreed.’ 
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. The court based its 
verdict on the medical evidence which certified injuries and statements of witnesses who 
intervened to rescue the victim (the value attached to these forms of evidence is explained 
in Chapter 4). It is unknown whether the victim was informed about the verdict and whether 
she was able to sue for civil damages.  
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This shocking scene witnessed during court observations is an illustration of the frustration 
that can result from victims’ exclusion from the legal process. Victims’ marginalisation is 
negating efforts by the criminal justice system to punish rape offenders. This problem is 
summarised in the question posed by SURVIVOR5: “For whom did they think they were 
doing justice while the person concerned was excluded?” This is a powerful statement that 
shows the need to rethink the judicial practice. 
In summary, analysis of the victims’ interviews reveals that the victims were disappointed by 
their lack of participation in the legal process particularly because they believed that their 
lack of involvement made conviction less likely. Victims were also frustrated because they 
felt silenced. In many instances they attempted to speak out in court but they were refused 
any opportunity to speak. As observed above, the silencing of victims is very damaging 
because they have a personal interest in the trials therefore they should have a voice in the 
process, and their lack of participation only aggravates their emotional state.  
A further potential effect of victims’ marginalisation is the lack of opportunity to claim civil 
damages. The chances for seeking damages are affected by the fact that the victims are not 
informed and do not take part in the legal process. The law allows the victims to claim 
damages during the criminal trial without necessarily waiting for the verdict. This procedure 
is normally cost effective for the judiciary and fast for the victims. Nevertheless, rape victims 
rarely used this option. The victims sought damages only in nine cases out of the sample of 
175 cases reviewed for this thesis (five per cent). This figure almost coincides with a national 
figure released by the National Commission for Human Rights which reported that rape 
victims filed for damages in only four per cent of all the cases tried for the period of 2015-
2016.370 
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the effects of the quality of rape trials on 
reporting rates. However, the marginalisation of victims from the legal process is likely to 
have a significant effect on rape reporting. The failure to allow victims to testify, combined 
with a lack of information provided to victims throughout the legal process and the resulting 
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frustration of victims will undoubtedly reduce the trust in the system’s response to rape. 
This may dissuade reports and result in higher levels of impunity for rape offenders.   
 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the role of rape victims in the legal process as their involvement is 
essential for a fair and efficient criminal justice process for rape cases. The chapter has 
revealed that rape victims play a very marginal role in the justice process. It was found that 
rape complainants are profoundly distrusted by most legal professionals interviewed, and 
that this scepticism leads prosecutors and judges to dismiss many rape complaints, 
regardless of the contents of the criminal files. The main cause of this disbelief is the 
influence of the myth that women are prone to making false accusations of rape. It was 
revealed that in most cases this disbelief is not based on any evidence. 
The chapter also revealed that rape victims are rarely allowed to participate in criminal trials. 
Their role is limited to reporting the crime and providing written evidence. Not only are the 
victims denied a voice in various proceedings of the legal process, they are also denied the 
opportunity to give testimony in court. The lack of victims’ participation deprives 
prosecutors and judges of substantial input that can improve the evaluation of complaints. It 
also causes victims much dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system. This results in 
immense distrust which, when combined with the marginalisation of rape victims, inevitably 
impacts on the provision of evidence in rape cases. The next chapter explores further the 
effects of the disbelief and marginalisation of victims on the provision of different types of 
evidence in rape cases.  
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Chapter 4  
EXPLORING THE PROVISION OF EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES 
 
This chapter will explore the influence of rape myths on the provision of evidence in rape 
cases. Provision of evidence is crucial in criminal proceedings as the facts of a case are 
established based on evidence, and the defendants are convicted or acquitted based 
essentially on how the evidence has been evaluated in specific cases.371 However, feminist 
scholars have revealed that the application of the rules of evidence in rape cases has been 
biased and has contributed to a “justice gap” in many jurisdictions due primarily to the 
influence of rape myths.372  
 The chapter will analyse consecutively three main types of evidence applicable in such 
cases: victim testimony, medical evidence and circumstantial evidence. Analysis of victim 
testimony is important in this study, given the findings of previous research that this type of 
evidence has been relegated in many other jurisdictions, often resulting in unfair 
processes.373 It is particularly important in the context of Rwanda, based on the findings in 
Chapter 3, which revealed that rape complainants are deeply disbelieved by the justice 
professionals and marginalised from the legal process. As for medical evidence, the broader 
literature reveals that it has frequently been misinterpreted in other jurisdictions, causing 
many justice errors.374 This was a result of the belief that rape inevitably causes victim 
injuries.375 Finally, analysis of circumstantial evidence in rape cases is critical because this 
type of evidence can potentially contribute to solving rape cases, if well considered.376 
Given that rape is often committed in private and that direct evidence is usually absent, 
circumstantial evidence may play a vital role in such cases.377 
4.1. CORROBARATING VICTIM TESTIMONY IN RAPE CASES 
Chapter 3 illustrated how victim testimony can be central to rape trials. Despite this, rape 
victims’ testimony has historically been treated as unreliable in many jurisdictions unless it 
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is supported by corroborative evidence. For example, in some countries that observe Sharia 
law, rape victims’ evidence must be corroborated by at least four male Muslim witnesses.378 
Clearly, this is very unlikely, and the consequence of the existence of such systems of 
evidence is that rapists are almost ensured of impunity. 
The common obligation to have additional confirmatory evidence implicating the accused is 
broadly referred to as the “corroboration requirement.”379 This rule exists in a number of 
justice systems, although not as rigorous as in Sharia law jurisdictions.380 In many common 
law jurisdictions, it was commonly applied until the 1970s.381 In some jurisdictions, victim 
evidence could be sufficient to prove the case against the accused but the judge had the 
obligation to warn the jury about the danger of convicting the defendant on the 
complainant’s testimony alone.382 The rationale for this warning was based on the belief 
that women are prone to fabricate rape accusations, resulting in what was viewed as a 
necessary caution before convicting on the victim’s testimony alone.383  
The corroboration rule was to have a profound negative impact on trial outcomes, 
generating as it did prejudice against rape complainants and causing confusion and doubts 
in the mind of the jury; prompting many undue acquittals of rape defendants.384 Many 
scholars argued for the abolition of the rule, emphasising that it directly discriminated 
against women and is founded on an unjustified and misogynistic belief that women are 
inclined to lie about rape.385 As a result of these criticisms, many jurisdictions across the 
world have abolished this rule during the recent wave of rape law reforms.386 This section 
reveals the existence and the damaging implications of the corroboration requirement in 
the legal process in Rwanda and advocates for its abolition. 
1. The corroboration requirement in the legal process for rape in Rwanda. 
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Rwandan law does not require corroboration of rape complainants’ testimony. However, 
this study revealed that the legal professionals strongly believed that corroborative 
evidence is essential in rape cases. This understanding directly results from the deep 
disbelief of rape victims felt by the legal professionals, as demonstrated in the previous 
chapter. As seen in Chapter 3, many interviewees openly expressed the belief that women 
frequently lie about rape. It was for this reason that many participants believed that 
allegations must always be corroborated with other evidence, so as to avoid the wrongful 
conviction of innocent defendants. For example, JUDGE7 stated that:  
It is frequent that rape complainants lie. So we must be careful because it is 
about two people, one accusing and the other denying. She can easily accuse 
him of rape. It is therefore essential that her words be corroborated so that 
the judge does not take the risk of convicting an innocent.  
This view was shared by several of the prosecutors, one of which noted that: 
In most rape cases, it is the word of the complainant against the word of the 
accused. You cannot know who to believe. The complainant can even lie for 
different reasons. So it is important that her testimony be corroborated. 
(PROSEC5) 
It was clear from the majority of elite interviews that a pervasive disbelief in the allegations 
of sexual violence inhibited the successful prosecution of defendants. Such were the 
negative views held toward victims’ evidence that for many interviewees they did not even 
believe that the complainant’s written statement was evidence at all. This was illustrated by 
PROSEC1 who simply stated: “The statement of the complainant is considered as simple 
information, not evidence.” Such views were not specific to prosecutors, as one judge 
commented:  
Complainants’ statements serve as information. They are not evidence.  
Judges cannot rely on complainants’ testimony without other evidence. They 
must be corroborated. (JUDGE5) 
One reason given for this stance was that the victim is a complainant so her statement 
cannot be considered as evidence because she has a stake in the outcome of the case. This 
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justification is problematic because the defendant is allowed to testify when he has a stake 
in the case.  
Only a minority of legal practitioners recognised victims’ testimony as a legitimate form of 
evidence for examination in court. These interviewees believed that victim testimony had 
some value in rape cases. Still, such evidence was viewed as lacking in probative value 
unless it was supported by corroborating evidence. This suggested that like other 
interviewees there was still a pervasive belief that victim testimony, by itself, lacked 
veracity. 
The analysis of case decisions revealed a clear pattern of systematic disqualification of 
perceived uncorroborated rape victims’ statements in both prosecutorial and court 
decisions. The overwhelming majority of the cases dropped by prosecutors examined in this 
research were closed because of perceived “lack of evidence” despite the presence of 
victims’ statements in all these files. The prosecutors routinely concluded that there was no 
cogent evidence to base a prosecution on. In some cases, prosecutors simply ignored the 
relevance of victims’ statements altogether. In other cases, prosecutors mentioned that 
they could not rely on complainants’ statements because these were considered to be 
either untrustworthy, uncorroborated or simply not considered as evidence. For instance, in 
one of the cases, the prosecutor simply decided: “I cannot rely on the complainant’s 
testimony... to establish that the accused committed the offence. I close the case...”387 In 
another case, the prosecutor noted: “There is no other evidence except the statement of 
the woman... This statement alone is not sufficient because there is nothing else that 
supports it.”388  
In most cases, the prosecutors did not evaluate complainants’ statements and explain 
whether they were valid or not. They rejected these statements as a matter of principle, 
without justification, and regardless of their contents. Such attitude clearly denotes a bias 
against the complainants and a lack of proper consideration of important evidence available 
in the files. 
The study of the courts’ rulings revealed a similar trend in the overwhelming majority of the 
cases examined. For example, in PP v Hakizimana, the court decided that:  
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The complainant’s testimony alone cannot be evidence inculpating the 
defendant as long as there is no other tangible evidence supporting her 
testimony.389  
In PP v. Rutiyomba,390  the court simply dismissed the complainant’s testimony because it 
was believed to be untrustworthy: 
 The statement of the complainant...is not to be relied upon because it is her 
own words and there is no other thing that was revealed to confirm its veracity 
so that it can deserve trust.391  
In this case, the court did not explain why the complainant was untrustworthy. Yet, the 
review of the case file did not reveal any aspect suggesting fabrication on the part of the 
complainant. On the contrary, the case contained other corroborating evidence but this 
evidence was disregarded. This is another critical issue related to the understanding of what 
corroborating evidence actually is. This problem will be discussed later in this chapter. 
As pointed out above regarding prosecutorial decisions, the vast majority of the courts’ 
decisions that dismissed complainants’ statements did not contain any evaluation of this 
evidence. The statements that were perceived to be uncorroborated were simply dismissed 
without explication or justification.  
A unique case of successful prosecution without corroboration evidence 
Among all the 175 court decisions studied, only one case of conviction without 
corroboration evidence was identified. This is the judgment in PP v. Karekezi, in which the 
court decided as follows:  
...The fact that the defendant said that the sexual intercourse was consensual 
has no basis because he does not give any evidence especially that the very 
person who had the said sexual relationship with him complained before the 
judicial police, stating that she was raped...392   
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In this case, the defendant was convicted based on the complainant’s testimony alone. It is 
worth noting that this exceptional case has the singularity that the complainant was blind 
and deaf. The court did not explain why it was so convinced that the complainant was 
telling the truth. One assumption is that the veracity of the complainant was more 
believable because she was particularly vulnerable, indeed the court noted that the 
complainant could not call for help because of her disability. Although it is unclear from the 
court transcript, the judge may also have assumed that the complainant could not possibly 
have voluntarily engaged in sex because she was disabled.393  
Though this case raises the question whether a disabled rape complainant is necessarily 
more trustworthy than an able-bodied complainant, it demonstrates how the courts can, if 
willing to, rely on the complainant’s testimony alone to convict the accused. As is now the 
case in many other jurisdictions, the absence of corroboration should not be an obstacle to 
conviction, so long as the court can be satisfied that the complainant’s testimony proves 
that the accused committed the rape. The study has established that despite this, there is a 
de facto corroboration requirement in Rwanda that is applied in all but exceptional cases. 
2. The case for the abolition of the de facto corroboration requirement 
There is a case for legal proscription of the practice of the corroboration requirement for 
the following four reasons. First, this practice is based on a misconception that women tend 
to lie about rape. The previous chapter has demonstrated that although the belief in false 
accusations is deeply entrenched among many legal practitioners, there is no cogent 
evidence which indicates that women are inclined to fabricate rape allegations. Indeed, 
when pressed, most interviewees in this study could not give a single example of a tangible 
case of a false rape accusation in their experience of handling rape cases. For those 
interviewees who did give some examples, further analysis of these examples revealed that 
the suspicion of a false accusation was based mostly on stereotypes about women who 
report rape, such as the late reporting of the incident or the absence of the victim’s 
resistance, as against any conclusive evidence that the victim had actually lied about her 
victimisation. In fact, the study showed that in the few cases where prosecutors and judges 
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had concluded there had been a false accusation, these determinations had clearly been 
influenced by similar stereotypes and did not show any reasonable ground to suspect 
fabrication.  
Second, the requirement is unfair to rape victims and potentially contributes to the high 
rate of attrition for rape. By dismissing victims’ statements altogether, the prosecutors and 
judges disregard important evidence in the cases and lose the opportunity to build on these 
reports to find further evidence.  Note that prosecutors and judges have the legal 
responsibility in Rwandan law to conduct additional investigation when necessary.394 The 
failure to exploit victim evidence appropriately gives the accused an unfair advantage that 
frequently results in charges being dropped, thereby affecting the rights of many victims to 
obtain redress for the damage caused by the crime.  
Third, the practice has no legal basis. There is no legal justification for denying the evidential 
value of rape victims’ testimony. Rwandan law of evidence does not preclude complainants’ 
evidence; on the contrary, it recognises the value of this type of evidence. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to specify that complainants’ statement or 
testimony is a legitimate form of evidence.  
In PP v. Hakizimana et al,395 the appellant requested the Supreme Court to quash the High 
Court decision on the ground that the court had relied on the complainant’s testimony, 
among other evidence, to convict the accused. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal 
because “there is no legal provision preventing the complainant from giving testimony in 
court…”396 The court cited Article 63 of the Evidence Law which specifies that “any person 
can be allowed to testify in court, with the exception of those people who have no capacity 
to be witness in court,” so it concluded that the High Court had the discretionary power to 
decide on the veracity and admissibility of the complainant’s evidence, based on Articles 19 
and 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2004. Although this was a case of child rape 
rather than adult rape, this ruling has broader applicability to sexual offence cases. The 
decision provides general guidance on the issue of whether a complainant’s statement or 
testimony is a legitimate form of evidence that can be relied upon to convict a defendant.  
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In addition, the law does not stipulate any obligation of corroboration of rape victims’ 
testimony. It only provides that the testimonies of children aged 14 and below and adult 
persons with incapacity must be corroborated by other evidence.397 There is no provision 
requiring that victims’ testimony in general or rape victims’ testimony in particular must be 
corroborated. On the contrary, the law emphasises that the number of witnesses is 
irrelevant as regards the validity of their testimony.398 This clearly shows that the testimony 
of the complainant alone can be sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt. The law provides 
further guidance in this regard, stating that the court shall consider the “knowledge of facts 
and the objectivity and sincerity” of the witness, not their number.399    
Fourth, the requirement of corroboration of rape victims’ testimony is discriminatory. The 
law has limited the corroboration requirement to two categories of witnesses: children 
aged 14 and below and people incapable of communicating what they witnessed.400 This 
means that testimony of all other adults and children above 14 does not require any 
corroboration. Therefore, if among adults, rape complainants are conflated with those who 
lack capacity, it is discriminatory against this category of complainants. As the 
overwhelming majority of these victims are women, their assimilation to the incapable is a 
violation of women’s rights.  
In other jurisdictions, the corroboration requirement has similarly been criticised for 
discriminating against women.401 Ferguson has emphasised that it is unacceptable to 
impose stricter rules of evidence on one category of witnesses unless it is proved that there 
is some fundamental difference in that particular category of people, and yet, there is no 
evidence of such difference in the case of rape victims.402 Further, the “presumption of 
perjury” implied in the requirement of corroboration has also been denounced as pure 
discrimination against women.403  In this regard, Quansah’s statement is particularly apt to 
the Rwandan context: 
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The general constitutional rule that an accused is to be presumed innocent until 
proven guilty seems to have been translated, as far as the complainant in a 
sexual case is concerned, into one of being a liar until proven credible.404  
In light of the negative effects of the requirement of corroboration, as evidenced above, 
this unlawful and prejudicial practice must be brought to an end. Nevertheless, it can be 
expected that its prohibition will raise questions about the rights of the defendants and the 
risks of convicting innocent people.   
3. Protection of defendants’ rights without the corroboration requirement 
Whereas the belief that women tend to fabricate rape accusations is a myth, this does not 
mean that false accusations never occur in rape cases. False allegations are possible in rape 
cases as in any other criminal case, regardless of the offence. As such, concerns will 
inevitably be raised that by not requiring corroboration of the complainant’s testimony, the 
accused will be left unprotected in the eventuality of a false accusation. 
A number of points must be highlighted in response to such concern. First of all, it should be 
noted that the rejection of the corroboration requirement does not mean that victim 
testimony must be automatically relied upon and that conviction will automatically follow. 
Nor does the abolition of this rule mean that there is no value in having corroborating 
evidence in rape cases. The point is that victim testimony must be accepted as a legitimate 
form of evidence and that it can be sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt. What is 
important is that this evidence be evaluated and scrutinised objectively, both by the 
prosecutors in deciding to proceed with a case, and by the court in determining whether an 
accused has committed an offence. Both maintain their discretion to evaluate this evidence 
as any other evidence. In this regard, Quansah has argued that: 
If the judiciary's [sic] ability to evaluate evidence and to ascertain the veracity of 
a witness' testimony in cases other than rape, then, it is submitted that it must 
also be a sufficient safeguard for an accused charged with rape.405  
Temkin also points out that the accused in rape cases, as other persons charged with 
different offences, are protected by the requirement that he cannot be convicted unless his 
                                                          
404
 Quansah (1996), p.231. 
405
 Ibid, p.236. 
103 
 
guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt. The defence lawyer as well as the judge have 
every opportunity to check any insufficiency in the prosecution case. Therefore, the 
absence of a corroboration requirement should not be perceived as an unfair disadvantage 
for rape defendants.406  
In the case of Rwanda, there are many legal safeguards that protect the accused regardless 
of the charge.407 The whole range of mechanisms that safeguard defendants’ rights remain 
available to the judges in rape cases. Moreover, the court keeps the full discretion to assess 
the relevance and pertinence of testimonial evidence.408 It has the powers to decide at its 
sole discretion on the veracity and admissibility of the evidence produced.409 Beyond all 
these prerogatives, “the court may itself collect evidence which has not been collected by 
the Public Prosecution, the plaintiff, the accused or their representatives.”410 With all these 
prerogatives entrusted in the judges, and knowing that the absence of a corroboration 
requirement does not impose any obligation on the courts to automatically rely on victims’ 
testimonies without thorough and objective evaluation, there should be no genuine 
concern that the abolition of the corroboration requirement in rape cases would leave 
accused persons unprotected against false complaints.  
4.2. THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES 
Another critical issue related to the corroboration requirement which adds to the case for 
its abolition, is the finding from the study that the supporting evidence required to 
corroborate victims’ testimony can itself be very problematic. Specifically, medical evidence 
and direct witness testimony seem to be the only evidence that is admitted as 
corroborating evidence in rape cases. This thorny issue is examined in the following sections.  
First, the limitations of medical evidence in proving rape will be discussed. After that, the 
study will explore the application of medical evidence by prosecutors and judges in 
Rwandan cases. Finally, the framing of medical evidence by doctors in Rwandan cases will 
be analysed. 
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1. The limitations of medical evidence in proving rape 
Medical evidence has been valued in many justice systems as it is capable of showing traces 
of violence on the rape victim’s body and thus it is believed to be cogent evidence of sexual 
violence.411 Such traces include signs of injuries such as bruising or internal fissures and 
more particularly, genital injuries.412 The evidential value generally attached to genital 
injuries in rape cases has prompted a number of researchers to investigate to what extent 
such injuries can help to solve rape cases. The key question has been whether the presence 
or absence of genital injuries is conclusive evidence of the presence or absence of rape, as 
many legal practitioners have tended to assume there was a necessary association between 
rape and genital injuries.  
Many studies have revealed that this association between rape and genital injuries is 
erroneous since not all rape victims present such injuries upon medical examination. 413 For 
example, Bowyer and Dalton’s research found that twenty-seven per cent of rape 
complainants sustained genital injuries.414 McLean et al. found only twenty-three per 
cent415  while Maguire et al. and Sugar et al. found an incidence of thirty-nine and twenty 
per cent respectively.416 A much more recent study using a sample of 1266 women, found 
that the incidence of genital injuries among the complainants examined was 24.5 per 
cent.417 Collectively, these studies show that only a minority of rape complainants will 
present evidence of genital injuries upon medical examination. The common perception 
that rape inevitably causes genital injuries is therefore false. 
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Rape victims may not sustain genital injuries, or victims’ medical examinations may not 
reveal any genital trauma due to many factors.418  For example, the state or age of the 
victim, the sexual position during the assault, the victim’s resistance or absence of 
resistance, the use of a condom or lubricant by the assailant, and the degree of erection, 
can affect the likelihood of injuries.419 Also, some genital injuries might not be seen, 
depending on the examination techniques.420 Furthermore, tiny injuries heal fast and may 
not be documented if there is a delay between the rape and the examination.421 The 
experience of the examiner may also play a role in the documentation of genital injuries.422 
All this shows that genital injuries must not necessarily be expected after rape. 
Another research revelation is that hymeneal injury does not always happen at the initial 
sexual contact, whether consensual or not.423 White and McLean compared medical records 
of virgin adolescents alleging rape with data from adolescents who had prior sexual contact 
before the rape, and found an incidence of genital injury of fifty-three and thirty-two per 
cent respectively.424 This finding indicates that a victim’s claim that she was a virgin before 
the rape cannot be disproved by the absence of hymeneal injury. 
Research has also revealed that the presence of genital injuries does not always indicate 
presence of rape.425 Both consensual and non-consensual sexual intercourse can cause such 
injuries.426 However, it is unusual for consensual intercourse to cause trauma on sexual 
organs.427 McLean et al. found that six per cent of women presented genital injuries 
following a consensual sexual relationship.428 Besides sexual intercourse, small genital 
injuries may also be caused by tools used during examination, and be mistaken for having 
been caused by an assault.429 All this emphasises the need for careful interpretation of 
evidence of genital injuries in rape cases.  
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Apart from trauma on sexual organs, it is often expected that rape victims will experience 
other external bruising as they struggle against their assailant.430 However, research has 
shown that they do not always present bodily injuries and that they frequently have no 
injury at all. Sugar et al.’s study found that fifty-two per cent of rape victims had bodily 
injuries and forty-one per cent sustained no injury, whether genital or extra-genital.431  
Maguire et al. found an incidence of sixty-one per cent of injured victims.432 Bodily injuries 
are generally correlated with the circumstances of the assault.433 These findings reinforce 
the idea that the absence of victim injury does not indicate absence of rape.  
In sum, the findings discussed above demonstrate that medical evidence has very limited 
ability to provide evidence of rape. It is centred on victim injury while research has 
established that rape may occur without causing injury. The legal professionals in Rwanda 
and elsewhere must therefore be mindful of this limitation and exercise caution in the 
evaluation of medical evidence. 
2. Application of medical evidence by prosecutors and judges in Rwandan 
cases 
The relegation of victims’ testimony explained above resulted in a clear preference for 
medical evidence, considered by most legal practitioners as much more reliable and 
objective. Many prosecutors noted that they cannot pursue rape cases without a conclusive 
medical report. For example, PROSEC8 stated: “Medical evidence is the most important 
evidence in rape cases. Without it, we do not send the file to court.” Similarly, PROSEC1 said: 
“Sometimes we don’t even agree to receive files from the police, which do not contain 
medical reports.” The majority of the judges interviewed took a similar stance. For example, 
JUDGE8 called medical evidence “the number one proof in rape cases.” He added that “in 
most cases without medical evidence, the defendants are acquitted.” It is clear from the 
above statements that these legal professionals attach superior value to medical evidence.  
The impact of such a positioning of evidence is that other types of evidence were 
overlooked by prosecutors and judges, resulting in high numbers of cases dropped and 
defendants acquitted. For example, in one case the victim complained of having been raped 
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by a person well known in the neighbourhood.434 There were witnesses who heard the 
victim screaming, went to rescue her and saw the accused running away. As the medical 
report did not confirm rape as expected by the prosecutor, he dropped this case, giving the 
following explanation:  
 Although the witnesses interrogated said that they saw the suspect running, 
and that the complainant told them that he attacked and raped her ... the 
medical report does not show that the complainant had sexual intercourse by 
force. Therefore, the statements of the complainant and witnesses cause 
confusion as they are contradicted by what was revealed by the doctor. As a 
result it is difficult to confirm that the complainant was really raped.435  
Another example is PP v. Habimana in which the court reasoned as follows: 
...Among the evidence produced, there is the statement of the complainant... 
the declarations of the suspects who said that the complainant has no other 
issue with them ... Nevertheless, the court fails to know if the complainant 
was really raped, because this should be ascertained by a report by the 
doctor who examined her but this report is not contained in the file.436 
  
In these cases, as with most others, the absence of a “conclusive” medical report in the case 
file resulted in the release of the suspects regardless of other evidence in the file that could 
be exploited.  
 
The unwarranted superior value attached to medical evidence was also evident during trials 
directly observed in this study. In many hearings attended, medical evidence was the 
central issue of discussion in the court. An example was a gang rape case hearing that was 
attended in the High Court on 14 June 2016.437 As the case file did not contain any medical 
report, the judge asked the prosecutor many questions about this lack of medical evidence 
and postponed the trial in order to obtain some medical expertise.438 Although the 
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prosecutor had mentioned the existence of witnesses, the judge did not show an interest in 
these witnesses or in the complainant. 
 
The main reason underlying the pre-eminence given to medical evidence is the association 
of rape with genital or bodily injury.  The study revealed that the vast majority of the legal 
professionals believed that rape must result in genital and/or bodily injuries and so they 
tended to conclude that rape was not committed when the medical report did not provide 
such evidence.  Only a few judgments recognised that the absence of injury does not 
necessarily mean absence of rape.439 
 
This practice of giving pre-eminence to medical evidence and requiring evidence of 
genital/bodily injury in rape cases needs to be stopped for the following reasons. First, it is 
based on a false assumption that rape must be accompanied by genital/bodily injuries. It 
has been demonstrated above that this idea is a misconception. Second, it lacks a legal basis. 
Rwandan law stipulates the principle of freedom of proof in criminal matters and does not 
create any hierarchy within the types of evidence admissible.440 Medical evidence therefore 
has no special value in law. In fact, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has explicitly 
denied any superior value to this type of evidence. In Akimaninzaniye Agnes v. PP, the 
appellant challenged his conviction on the ground that it was not based on any medical 
evidence. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal as follows: 
 
On the question that there is no medical report relied upon to convict the 
defendant, the court finds that if the medical evidence had been available, it 
could only have been one of the pieces of evidence the court could rely upon. It 
would not have been the decisive evidence.441  
 
This is an important decision as it relates to a child rape case and is therefore directly 
applicable to cases involving sexual offences. The decision therefore provides guidance that 
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is applicable in adult rape and other cases as regards the absence of supremacy of medical 
evidence. 
 
Similarly, in a case of adult rape,442 the High Court also clarified that medical evidence is not 
superior to other forms of evidence. In this case, the appellant requested that this 
conviction for rape be quashed on the ground that the judgment ignored the medical report, 
which concluded that there were no signs of sexual violence. The High Court rejected the 
appeal as it found that: 
 
The fact that the Intermediate Court did not rely on the medical report is not a 
valid ground for appeal because medical evidence is evidence like other 
evidence; it has no special evidential value.443 
  
Despite the clarity of the law and the jurisprudence, the vast majority of the legal 
practitioners continue to consider medical evidence as the decisive evidence in rape cases. 
This shows that the beliefs mentioned above underlying this practice are very powerful. The 
solution to the problem will therefore require not only legal reforms but also education and 
a change of attitude. 
 
The third reason for abolishing the practice of giving precedence to medical evidence is that 
this undermines the prosecution of rape defendants. It causes neglect of other forms of 
legally admissible evidence that can be used against rape defendants, and which are 
commonly used in other jurisdictions. This reduces the chances of successful prosecution of 
rape cases in Rwanda, entrenching a “justice gap” that discriminates against the testimony 
of, mostly female, rape victims. The practice further undermines prosecution by requiring 
victims’ injury to prove rape. The danger of this requirement is that violence may be used 
and not necessarily result in documentation of genital or extra-genital injuries upon victims’ 
examination, as explained above. Moreover, there are situations of rape without use of 
force, such as the circumstance of submission where the victim surrenders without 
resistance, or fraud where the victim simply does not realise the nature of the act she is 
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being involved in, or any other situation of lack of consent. Such rape cases may not be 
proved if evidence of injury is required because victims’ injury is less likely in such situations, 
given the absence of force.  
 
The study revealed cases of rape without use of physical force where the prosecutors still 
expected evidence of bodily injury. An example is a case where the victim complained that 
the accused deceived her and brought her into the bush, threatened to kill her, then raped 
her. The medical report concluded that there was “no sign of physical trauma.”444 The 
prosecutor dropped the case because “the doctor did not show signs of violence to 
establish that the complainant was raped.”445  Nevertheless, the file contained clear 
information that the complainant, overwhelmed by fear, submitted to the assailant.446 
Despite this, the prosecutor still wanted to have evidence of injury on the complainant’s 
body.  
Medical evidence must not be given the special consideration it is given in practice as it is 
not forensically decisive. As pointed out above, this type of evidence is very limited with 
regard to its ability to prove rape. It is crucial while interpreting medical evidence, to be 
always mindful that the absence of genital or bodily injuries is not conclusive evidence of 
absence of rape, and should not be considered as such by the criminal justice 
practitioners.447 Both prosecutors and judges in Rwanda should understand that “it is 
normal to be normal,” as pointed out by Adams et al., emphasising that it should not be 
surprising that even child victims of sexual abuse may not present abnormal genital injuries 
upon forensic medical examination.448 Unfortunately, the reality has not always been the 
case, and the mistaken reliance on medical evidence in various jurisdictions has significantly 
contributed to the “justice gap” in rape cases.449     
The misinterpretation of medical reports caused by the belief that injuries are a necessary 
outcome of rape raises the question whether the authors of these reports should also 
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provide explanations to guide the criminal justice practitioners and inform them about the 
limitations of medical evidence. White and McLean have suggested that it is the 
responsibility of medical doctors to “put any examination findings in context” and explain 
their results to avoid misinterpretation by the legal professionals.450 Rees also showed the 
concern that forensic medical examiners do not have the opportunity to provide adequate 
explanation to the legal practitioners to help them properly understand the right meaning 
of absence of genital or bodily injuries in medical reports.451  
Forensic examiners tend to avoid contentious issues and prefer to make “neutral reports,” 
defined as “reports that neither confirm nor deny the complainant’s allegation of rape.”452 
According to Rees, this approach diminishes the evidential value of the report and is useful 
only when the reports match the “real rape” stereotype prevalent among prosecutors.453 
He suggests that forensic medical examiners should take further steps to “educate” 
prosecutors and help them understand that the association of injuries and rape is a myth.454 
This idea looks attractive, but it might not always be effective. First, it seems to be founded 
on an assumption that, on one hand, the doctors are all free from the influence of rape 
myths in their examination of the victims, and that on the other hand it is only the legal 
professionals who are influenced by the “real rape” myth and confuse bodily/genital 
injuries with rape. This may not always be the case, as both categories of professionals live 
in the same society and are exposed to the same social beliefs, meaning that even doctors 
can be influenced by these myths. 
Research has shown that forensic doctors have themselves historically been influenced by 
rape myths in their examination of rape victims.455 They were generally influenced by the 
“real rape” myth and their conclusions about rape were characterised by the association of 
rape with body and genital injuries.456 In addition, forensic doctors historically went beyond 
purely medical physical examinations of the victims to study their character and find out 
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whether the victims were making false allegations.457 Some were judgmental about women, 
and their reports were influenced by their own attitude towards women and towards 
rape.458 Medical evidence that should normally be scientific and therefore objective, 
became a reflection of social beliefs.459 In the jurisdictions where these studies were 
conducted, there is no evidence that forensic doctors are totally free of rape myth influence, 
at least until recently.460 In the present research, it was found that many doctors and 
judicial professionals shared the same misconceptions about the association of victim 
injuries with rape (this finding is discussed in the next section).  
Second, even if it were certain that the doctors are not influenced by rape myths in their 
examination, it would not be sustainable that they take the burden of “educating” 
prosecutors in every case. This seems not to be their responsibility and, in any event, it is 
unsure that the prosecutors would act according to their explanations. Indeed, in this 
research study, it was found that when some doctors took the step to explain that the 
absence of evidence of injury in their reports did not mean absence of rape, the prosecutors 
still dropped the cases because of “lack of evidence” (this issue is also debated in the next 
section).  
Doctors’ attitude towards rape is beyond the scope of this study, but a brief exploration of 
their perceptions about rape is conducted below in order to have a better comprehension 
of their influence on prosecutors and judges. 
3. Framing of medical evidence by doctors in Rwandan cases 
The following sections examine two issues: the implications of doctors’ perception of 
“evidence of rape”, and the problems caused by the disclosure of victims’ sexual history and 
other personal information in medical reports.  
a. Doctors’ perception of “evidence of rape” 
An attempt to understand doctors’ perception of the recurrent mention of “evidence of 
rape” in their reports was made through analysis of medical reports contained in the files 
examined in this study. The study revealed that similar to the legal professionals, many 
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doctors meant by “evidence of rape” the presence of genital injuries. For example, in one 
report, the doctor concluded as follows: 
Client consulted with complaints of being raped. On examination, there was no 
sign suggestive of genital injuries.461  
In many other reports, it was apparent that the doctors concluded there was “no evidence 
of rape” when they did not find injuries, particularly genital injuries. For instance, a doctor 
mentioned: 
...The history is in favour of Gender-based violence (sexual assault) but the 
physical examination and laboratory findings show no evidence of rape....462 
Another report states that: “There is no evident sign that can confirm this rape.”463  
It is legitimate for the doctors to search for genital or bodily injuries while examining rape 
victims. The problem is that many medical practitioners are providing a written conclusion 
to the absence (or presence) of rape. For example, having found signs of injury on the 
complainant, one doctor concluded: “She has been raped.”464 Another went as far as to give 
the following details: “...31 year old victim of rape by a business colleague.”465 As explained 
above, it is not the duty of the doctors to make a finding of whether a rape has been 
committed or not. It is even less their role to identify the offender. This is the very task of 
prosecutors and judges who must assess the evidence provided by medical practitioners.  
The damage caused by medical reports that confirm or deny rape was evident in this study. 
Such reports negatively influenced the outcome of many cases, as outlined above. It is very 
concerning that the doctors’ reports which themselves wrongly confuse genital injuries with 
rape are given considerable weight by the legal professionals. This has dramatic effects on 
the prosecution of rape cases especially that medical evidence is in practice treated as “the 
number one evidence” in rape cases. This situation caused prosecutors to unfairly close 
many cases and the judges to acquit those accused of rape without further examination of 
the evidence. Conversely, it may also lead to wrongful conviction of innocent defendants.  
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However, it is worth noting that not all medical reports were misleading. Some reports 
avoided confusing the absence of genital injuries with the absence of rape. Some doctors 
even took steps to “put the examination finding into context”, explaining that the absence 
of genital or bodily injuries should not be interpreted as absence of rape. For example, one 
doctor concluded that he found no sign of sexual assault, and went on to advise that: 
“Other investigations are needed to confirm or deny the hypothesis.”466 In another case, 
after finding no trace of lesions on the complainant, the doctor suggested the following: “I 
cannot conclude that she was not raped. There is a possibility that she has been raped.”467  
In another similar case, the doctor advised that “[the] physical examination and 
investigation are normal, but [I] cannot say that the rape is done or not.”468  
It is important to understand the effects of the doctors’ advice regarding the meaning of 
absence of injuries; whether the prosecutors judiciously used the doctors’ explanations. 
Analysis of the files containing these medical reports reveals that, instead of following the 
doctors’ advice, the prosecutors used these medical reports to conclude that there was no 
evidence of rape. Returning to White and McLean’s and Rees’ suggestion that forensic 
doctors should help the prosecutors understand the significance of injuries in rape cases, 
this seems not workable at least in this study. Finding a solution to this problem will be 
challenging. A the very least it must involve new guidance on, and education about, the use 
and validity of medical evidence in rape trials for both categories of professionals to counter 
the myths that influence many of their respective members. 
 b. Disclosure of victims’ personal information in medical reports 
The study found that many medical reports frequently disclosed victims’ personal data. I 
will not attempt to define types of information that should or should not be disclosed by 
forensic doctors as this issue is beyond the scope of the research. However, it is crucial to 
analyse the effects of disclosure of complainants’ personal data on the outcome of rape 
cases. 
(1) Disclosure of victims’ sexual history  
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This research found that doctors routinely mentioned victims’ past sexual experience in 
their reports. Below are some examples: 
“We cannot tell if she had sexual intercourse as she is sexually active.”469  
“The client is not virgin. She has had sexual relations before the age of 18” 470   
“She is used to having unprotected sex.” 471 
The relevance of such information is doubtful. For example, it is unclear how the fact that 
the complainant is “used to having unprotected sex” would have helped to solve the issue 
whether she was raped or not. Such statements are potentially prejudicial to complainants, 
as noted by PROSEC8: 
When the doctor adds the mention of the victim’s sexual habit, it dilutes the 
case. People ask why she complained while she is used to having sex; and the 
suspect builds on that to say that the complainant was consenting. It really 
devalues the case. It is better for the doctors to abstain from adding such 
mentions especially because we do not ask them to tell us the victim’s sexual 
habits… If it happens that the complainant is not married, automatically the 
defence claims that she is a prostitute, and that she therefore consented but 
lied later because of some broken agreement. Depending on the prosecutor’s 
understanding, such case may even be dropped as a result of the mentioning 
of the complainant’s sexual habit in the medical report.  
Indeed, the research revealed that the disclosure of sexual history in medical reports was 
very detrimental to the complainants and negatively affected the outcome of the cases. For 
example, in one file, the prosecutor concluded that: 
 There is no evidence because the medical report which is the evidence 
remaining to be relied upon does not help; it shows that the complainant is 
used to having sex....472 
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This passage shows that the prosecutor, relying too much on medical evidence, was heavily 
influenced by the doctor’s information that the complainant was “used to having sex.” This 
information has contributed to the conclusion that there was “no evidence” whereas it 
should in fact have no logical connection with the issue of consent. In another case, the 
prosecutor quotes the complainant’s sexual habit disclosed by the doctor as part of the 
reason why he dropped the case: 
 The doctor too confirms that the woman is used to having sex, and that she 
had given birth before. Further, the medical report shows that there is no 
evidence that the complainant was raped...473  
Similar decisions were taken by judges. For example, in PP v Banyakiri, the court reasoned 
as follows: 
The defendant shows that he is a friend of the complainant; he accepts that on 
the same day they went together to watch a football game and that 
afterwards they had consensual sex... As it is apparent, the woman is aged 22 
and the boy 22, therefore it is not clear how they can have sex without 
planning it and yet she did not call for help, and the medical report shows that 
she has no problem, she is used to having sex.474 
This quote raises various issues that are discussed elsewhere. For the purposes of this 
section, it shows that the judge was negatively influenced by the information that the 
complainant was “used to having sex”, which contributed to the judge’s conclusion that she 
consented. Such conclusions are based on an erroneous belief that a woman who is sexually 
active must mean that she will always consent to sex.475  
The scrutiny of this judge’s paraphrasing reveals that he added his own interpretation to the 
doctor’s information. In fact, the part stating that the complainant “has no problem,” is an 
inference made by the judge alone because the medical report does not contain such a 
statement. The terms used in the report are the following: “This lady is sexually active.” 476 
For the judge, if the complainant is sexually active, then “she has no problem.” This shows 
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the extent to which the disclosure of the complainant’s sexual history in medical reports can 
be prejudicial and yet, there is no evidence that it helps to solve cases.  
However, some legal professionals exceptionally refused to be influenced by doctors’ 
irrelevant observations. For instance, one medical report mentioned the following: 
Single mother who gave birth 3 years ago but has sexual relationship with 
multiple partners. ... The clinical examination reveals a woman sexually active 
who has given birth and is presently pregnant. The second pregnancy is not 
related to the suspected violence.477  
In this case, the judge was not impressed by this excessive information and he simply 
ignored it and never referred to it in any part of his judgment.  
(2) Other personal information disclosed in medical reports 
The study found that apart from victim sexual history, some medical reports disclosed other 
types of personal data which also influenced the outcome of the cases. For example, one 
medical report concluded: “there is an absence of any sign of sexual aggression.” It then 
added: “Note that she [the complainant] has been followed up for a mental health issue for 
two years.”478 This information appeared in the prosecutor’s justification for dropping the 
case, as he noted that: 
The report of the doctor who examined [the complainant] shows that there is 
no evidence that she was raped. It also shows that she spent two years being 
seen among patients who have mental problems.479 
Here again, there is no clear connection between the fact that the complainant has been 
seen for a mental health issue and the issue of non-consent. Despite this, the information 
seems to have influenced the prosecutor. Perhaps he considered that the complainant’s 
account was unreliable because of the doubt about her mental health.  This would be unfair 
because a mental health patient does not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of 
giving a credible testimony. 
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The negative influence of the disclosure of victims’ sexual history and other personal 
information in medical reports demonstrates the need for guidelines on acceptable 
contents of medical reports. This is a subject of interest for further research. 
To conclude the discussion on medical evidence, the research reveals that the use of this 
type of evidence is very problematic to the extent that it seems to be more an obstacle to 
justice than a form of corroborating evidence as believed by many legal practitioners. 
Medical evidence was unfairly given superior evidential value in most rape cases; causing 
disregard of other types of legally admissible evidence, and resulting in inopportune closure 
of rape cases and uncertain acquittals of rape defendants. It was also grossly misinterpreted 
in the majority of cases where the absence of genital/bodily injury was confused with 
absence of rape, thereby negatively affecting the outcome of the cases.  
4. 3. THE ROLE OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES 
It was clear from the study that victim testimony and medical evidence were the two most 
salient forms of evidence that made or (more frequently) broke a case. However, in some 
cases there are also other forms of “circumstantial” evidence that can prove pivotal when 
prosecuting an offence of rape, such as where there is indirect evidence pointing to the 
commission of the offence. The following sections will discuss the meaning and importance 
of circumstantial evidence before exploring the role of this type of evidence in Rwandan 
rape cases. 
1. The meaning and importance of circumstantial evidence 
Circumstantial evidence has traditionally been opposed to direct evidence. 480  Direct 
evidence is defined as: 
 
…testimony given by a witness of the witness’s perception by her own senses 
(sight, hearing etc) of one or more of the facts in issue. It can also include the 
presentation of documents or things in issue to the tribunal of fact.481  
Circumstantial evidence is, “evidence from which a fact in issue may be inferred.”482 It is: 
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…a combination of circumstances, no one of which would raise a reasonable 
conviction, or more than a mere suspicion; but the whole, taken together, may 
create a strong conclusion of guilt, that is, with as much certainty as human 
affairs can require or admit of.483 
Illustrating the distinction between both forms of evidence, Allen explains:  
 
Suppose x is a fact that has to be proved. It can be proved in two different 
ways. You may be able to prove it by producing a witness who, with his own 
senses, perceived x: such evidence is sometimes called ‘direct evidence’ of x. If 
you cannot do this, you may be able to prove x by producing a witness who, 
though he did not perceive x, did perceive directly facts y and z, from which x 
can be inferred: such evidence is called ‘circumstantial’ evidence of x.484 
 
There are so many types of circumstantial evidence that it would be very difficult to try to 
make an exhaustive list.485 The following are some examples: (a) Motive: evidence of facts 
that a person has a particular reason to carry out a specific action, such as hatred towards 
the victim in a murder case, can be accepted to prove the high probability that the person 
committed that act;486 (b) preparatory acts: evidence that the accused made plans and 
preparations to commit an offence may be used to show that he committed the offence;487 
(c) opportunity: proof that the suspect was present at the scene at the time the offence was 
committed may be used against them especially if the suspect fails to provide a valid 
alibi;488 (d) failure to explain: failure for the suspect to provide swift elucidation of his 
conduct or insufficient explanation may also serve as circumstantial evidence.489  
Circumstantial evidence is sometimes perceived as an inferior form of evidence compared 
to direct evidence, but such a perception is short-sighted.490 Both direct and circumstantial 
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evidence can have the same evidential value.491 Circumstantial evidence, unlike hearsay, is 
not “second hand” or secondary evidence, but rather it is original and independent 
information that can be used as probative evidence in establishing criminal liability.492  
Nevertheless, it is admitted that there may be more problems of evaluation with respect to 
circumstantial evidence, compared to direct evidence.493 There are two risks of error 
regarding direct evidence, which are mistake and perjury by the witness, whereas 
circumstantial evidence presents a third risk: the possibility of incorrect inference.494 There 
is always a danger of making hasty conclusions in inference, especially when such 
conclusions match the witness’s pre-conceived ideas.495 To mitigate the risks of error in 
inference, it is advised that: 
…circumstantial evidence must always be narrowly examined… It is also 
necessary before drawing the inference of the accused’s guilt from 
circumstantial evidence to be sure that there are no other co-existing 
circumstances which would weaken or destroy the inference.496 
Further, Bucknil emphasises that: 
The strength of circumstantial facts exists when those facts not only point in 
the direction of the fact which they are thought to prove, but also are such 
that the mind cannot reasonably imagine them as pointing in any other 
direction, cannot reasonably imagine any different fact which would fit in 
them.497 
Crucially, circumstantial evidence must not only create a strong inference of guilt, but it 
must also point to the guilt of the accused as the only reasonable conclusion. Therefore, 
circumstantial evidence is better defined as follows: 
 A circumstantial case consists of evidence of a number of different 
circumstances which, taken in combination, point to the guilt of the accused 
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person because they would usually exist in combination only because the 
accused did what is alleged against him… Such a conclusion must be 
established beyond reasonable doubt. It is not sufficient that it is a reasonable 
conclusion available from that evidence. It must be the only reasonable 
conclusion available. If there is another conclusion which is also reasonably 
open from that evidence, and which is consistent with the innocence of the 
accused, he must be acquitted.498  
 
In light of the above discussion, it can be said that circumstantial evidence is typically useful 
as part of the prosecution’s case, but it must be carefully evaluated before reaching any 
conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused. The key to safe conviction lies therefore in the 
proper evaluation of the evidence, rather than the type of evidence available in the case. 
Criminal cases including serious crimes such as murder can be proved entirely by 
circumstantial evidence.499 Indeed, if direct evidence were the only evidence to be accepted, 
many cases would not be proved.500  
 
Circumstantial evidence is particularly important in rape cases. As noted above, it may have 
particular importance in situations where the issue is consent because in such cases both 
the complainant and the defendant agree that the sexual intercourse took place and there 
is typically no third person to testify to the lack of consent.501 An example of circumstantial 
evidence that can be useful in such cases is distress. In England and Wales and in Scotland, 
the victim’s distress resulting from the rape has been admitted in many cases as 
corroborative of the victim’s account.502 However, distress must be spontaneous to qualify 
as corroborative of the complainant’s evidence.503 In the case of Moore v HM Advocate the 
complainant had shown distress neither to her boyfriend nor to other people until twelve 
hours after the incident. The conviction was quashed for a lack of spontaneity.504 However, 
it was emphasised that the key factor as regards distress is not the time that elapsed 
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between the alleged incident and the expression of distress but the spontaneity of the 
distress. 
 
What matters is not the time interval as such but whether the shocked 
condition or the distress of the complainer was caused by the rape. Only then 
can it be said that it provides separate and independent testimony to 
corroborate what she herself has said in her evidence. The shorter the interval 
the more likely it is that the condition was spontaneous and independent, and 
thus evidence of itself of what occurred. The longer the interval, the more 
important it becomes to examine what happened during that period.505 
With respect to distress, some exceptions to the common law rule of hearsay are applicable 
as circumstantial evidence of rape. The hearsay rule provides that statements made out of 
court cannot be admissible to prove the fact stated.506 One exception to this rule in some 
common law jurisdictions is “the excited utterance.” 507  This exception means that 
statements made in the aftermath of a moving incident while the subject is still in a state of 
shock or emotion, may be admissible as proof of the facts stated.508 The rationale of the 
exception is that the person concerned may not have had the time to think of her 
declaration; therefore, her statement is likely to be true.509 Orenstein emphasises that given 
the nature of sexual offences, which often cause shame, distress and fear, this exception 
should not be limited to declarations made by the victim immediately after the rape 
because women’s experience of sexual assault is that many keep silent in the aftermath of 
the assault.510  The author makes a parallel between this exception and the biased 
requirement of prompt complaint,511 and suggests that even declarations made by a rape 
victim long after the rape should be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.512 
Another exception to this rule directly applicable to rape is the statement made by a victim 
                                                          
505
 Lord Justice-General, quoted by Davidson, Ibid. 
506
 Orenstein (1997), p.165. 
507
 Ibid. 
508
 Ibid. 
509
 Ibid. p.168. 
510
 Ibid. 
511
 The requirement of prompt complaint will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 5.  
512 Orenstein (1997). 
123 
 
to a forensic nurse for medical diagnosis or treatment.513 Barnoon and Sytcheva point out 
that these exceptions are particularly important in rape cases since such cases often turn on 
“he said-she said” testimony and the reliability of the victim can shift the balance in favour 
of one side.514 
A further example of possible circumstantial evidence in rape cases is the wider concept of 
rape trauma syndrome (RTS). It has been recognised as circumstantial evidence of rape in a 
number of cases in the United States and in Scotland.515 RTS is defined as: 
An identifiable cluster of emotional and physical symptoms suffered by a 
woman who has experienced a sexual encounter as rape.516  
 
It is considered that because a person who has been raped may experience RTS and that 
another who had consensual sex may not, evidence of RTS is therefore admissible as 
circumstantial evidence of the absence of consent.517 Nevertheless, the concept of RTS 
remains controversial, as discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
Distress and RTS are only a few examples of possible circumstantial evidence in rape cases. 
As pointed out above, it is not possible to give an exhaustive list of the types of 
circumstantial evidence applicable in rape cases, as they are unlimited.518 This means that 
the circumstances of the rape in a specific case may provide a wide range of evidence if the 
investigation is focused and thorough. Circumstantial evidence may be particularly useful in 
jurisdictions that recognise the principle of free proof in criminal matters. In civil law, this 
principle allows prosecutors to prove facts by all means, and gives judges full discretion to 
assess the evidence produced without being restricted to some types of evidence. This is 
the case for Rwandan law, which recognises the freedom of proof in Article 86 of the Code 
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of Criminal Procedure.  Giving the example of the hearsay rule discussed above, Rwandan 
law does not prohibit hearsay; therefore, it is the responsibility of the courts to judiciously 
evaluate the declaration made out of court and decide on its admissibility and value. This 
shows the extent to which circumstantial evidence may be instrumental in prosecuting rape. 
The problem may come from the legal practitioners themselves since it has been revealed 
that they tend to apply the rules of evidence in an unusual and prejudicial way in rape 
cases.519 Concern has been raised in some jurisdictions that circumstantial evidence to 
support rape victims’ accounts is often provided in court but it is not considered as 
corroborative.520  
The following sections will explore whether circumstantial evidence is given its real value in 
cases of rape in Rwanda. 
2. Recognition of circumstantial evidence in Rwandan law 
As in many other jurisdictions, Rwandan law recognises circumstantial evidence as a 
legitimate form of evidence.521 The Evidence Law 2004 provides that written evidence, 
testimony, circumstantial evidence, confession or any other material evidence are all 
acceptable forms of evidence.522 It does not discriminate between these types of evidence 
or create any hierarchy among them. Neither does it require circumstantial evidence to be 
complemented by direct evidence. This means that a court can rely entirely on 
circumstantial evidence in determining the guilt of an accused. 
The Supreme Court confirmed the legitimacy of circumstantial evidence in the case of 
Karekezi,523 where this type of evidence was directly challenged. It was a murder case 
where the defendant attacked the victim with a grenade. However, no witness saw him 
throwing the grenade at the victim. The conviction was based on the following 
circumstantial evidence: One witness saw the defendant at the scene at the time of the 
attack. Other witnesses testified that the defendant had repeatedly openly stated that he 
would harm the victim with whom he had an open dispute over property. Witnesses also 
testified that after the attack, the defendant’s house was searched in their presence, as the 
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authorities found and seized military equipment and other weapons. The defendant then 
admitted that he killed the victim.  
Although the defendant denied the allegations in court and stated that there was no direct 
evidence against him, the High Court relied on all these facts and convicted him. The 
defendant appealed on the ground that the High Court based its decision on “suppositions”. 
The Supreme Court reviewed all the evidence in the case and found that the evidence 
presented coherence between the various testimonies and facts. Rejecting the appeal, the 
Court concluded: “…All these facts taken together, which have been relied upon [by the 
High Court] are not mere suppositions but evidence.”524   
An example of the application of circumstantial evidence in a rape case is PP v. 
Nshutiyabagabo.525 The facts of this case as explained by the prosecutor are as follows. The 
defendant was in a neighbourhood together with a girl (Witness X). The victim was passing 
nearby, and then the defendant stopped her and obliged both girls to accompany him 
around, threatening to break their legs if they ever refused. They submitted and both 
walked away with him. While walking, the defendant grabbed the victim’s pagne526 and 
wore it on his neck. When they reached an uninhabited place, he told the victim that she 
was used to rejecting men but that he was then going to check her virginity. He started to 
strangle her and ordered witness X to go. Witness X ran away. He then raped the victim.  
There was no direct witness who saw the defendant committing the rape and he denied the 
crime. Further, the medical report did not provide any “evidence of rape.”527 The court 
relied on the following evidence to reach its verdict: (a) the complainant’s detailed account 
of the rape; (b) the testimony of witness X who confirmed the defendant’s threats and 
declaration that he was going to check the virginity of the victim; (c) the fact that the 
suspect took away the victim’s clothes; and (d) the testimony of another witness, Y, who 
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saw both girls together with the suspect in the neighbourhood before they walked away. 
The court found that all of these facts combined constituted evidence of rape.528  
It is fair to say that the court’s judgment in this case is sound. The court made thorough 
evaluation of the evidence available: the judge properly appreciated that the absence of 
“medical evidence of rape” did not mean absence of rape; something which many 
prosecutors and judges fail to do (see section on medical evidence above). It also put 
evidential value on the victim’s evidence, which is not always the case (see section on 
victims’ evidence above). Further, it recognised the importance of circumstantial evidence 
and its capacity to assist in proving rape. In fact, it has  noted that all the facts of this case 
taken together pointed to the culpability of the defendant and there was no other 
conclusion that could be reasonably be drawn from the facts of this case.529 This judgment 
provides a good example of judicious evaluation of evidence in rape cases. However, this 
study suggests that it is not typical of judicial practice, as will be shown further below.  
3. The disregard for circumstantial evidence and the requirement of direct 
evidence in prosecutors’ and judges’ practice 
Notwithstanding the clarity of the law regarding the legitimacy of circumstantial evidence 
and its practical importance in proving rape cases, analysis of the elite interviews and the 
prosecutorial and judicial decisions reveals a tendency to disregard such evidence. Speaking 
of evidence in rape cases, most of the legal professionals emphasised the unreliability of 
victim evidence and the importance of medical evidence (see sections above). None 
mentioned circumstantial evidence, except for one judge. The review of the case files as 
well as the court observations showed the same trend. The majority of the 101 prosecution 
cases studied contain circumstantial evidence, yet in each case this evidence was 
overlooked. With respect to the cases tried, the convictions were essentially based upon 
medical evidence and direct evidence; very rarely on circumstantial evidence. Out of the 
175 judgments studied, just two cases (1.1 per cent) relied on circumstantial evidence. One 
of these is the example directly given above. The tendency is, rather, to disregard 
circumstantial evidence and to require direct evidence as proof of rape. 
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This study revealed a recurrent rejection of testimonies given by witnesses who “did not see 
the rape being committed.” Most of the testimonies disregarded provided valuable 
information that could amount to circumstantial evidence but they were dismissed simply 
because the witnesses “did not see the rape” itself. For example, in the case of D.J., the file 
contained the following evidence: (a) a statement of a witness who testified that the 
accused threatened the complainant before the rape;530 (b) testimonies of witnesses who 
were called for help and found the complainant immediately after, complaining that the 
accused just raped her;531 and (c) the statement of the complainant that describes the 
alleged rape and which coincides with all the witnesses’ testimonies. The prosecutor 
dropped the case for “lack of evidence” because “the medical report did not provide any 
proof of rape” and “the witnesses did not see the rape being committed.”532  
In another case,533 the following was testified:  the complainant, a mentally disabled young 
girl was alone at home when the suspect, a family acquaintance, forcibly brought her 
behind the house and raped her. This happened while the complainant’s mother was on her 
way back home together with another person. They were near home when it happened and 
when they arrived, they saw the suspect running away. They found the victim crying and 
trying to wipe dust from her clothes. She immediately told them that the suspect had torn 
her underwear and raped her. The prosecutor similarly closed the case because of “lack of 
evidence” on the ground that: 
The doctor shows no evidence that the complainant was raped and the 
witnesses said that they did not see the complainant being raped.534  
It is clear in the two examples above that although the witnesses did not “see the rape”, the 
facts as they were testified were both coherent and cogent. These could reasonably amount 
to circumstantial evidence. The prosecutors should have exploited them to pursue 
investigations and/or eventually prosecute the cases in court, but instead, they closed the 
cases. There are many other similar cases that were identified.   
                                                          
530
 Statement of witness X, C.13. 
531
 Statements of witnesses X, C.14; Y, C.17; and witness Z, C.21.    
532
 (Emphasis added) Report on Provisional Closure of File, 25 August 2015, p.6. 
533
 Prosecution Case File RONPJ 29628/S1/15/JM/RJ. 
534
 Report on Provisional Case File Closure, p.2.  
128 
 
Requiring direct evidence and disregarding circumstantial evidence has serious implications 
in criminal proceedings. Circumstantial evidence is essential because many cases may be 
solved based entirely on this form of evidence.535 By dismissing this type of evidence, 
judicial practitioners are creating extensive scope for perpetrators of rape to escape liability.  
Many rape cases that might be proved are simply being dropped by prosecutors or 
acquitted by the judges who require direct evidence.   
The insistence to rely on direct evidence alone is most likely connected to the pervasive 
suspicion of false rape accusations observed among many legal professionals interviewed 
(see Chapter 3). Linked to this perception is the sense amongst practitioners that they must 
protect against innocent people being falsely convicted. Many stated that they are very 
careful when they handle rape cases. For example, PROSEC1 and JUDGE5 respectively 
admitted: 
 When we receive rape cases, we are always very, very cautious in order to 
avoid prosecuting innocent people.  
 As false accusations are frequent in rape cases, these cases require extra-
caution because if you are not extra-cautious, you may end up convicting 
innocent men.  
It is certainly legitimate to be cautious when handling any serious case to ensure that the 
evidence is collated properly and evaluated carefully. However, if this caution is excessive it 
can undermine the fairness of a trial. By seeking absolute certainty and requiring direct 
evidence only, the legal professionals’ caution is likely to obstruct, rather than safeguard, 
the criminal process. As has been rightly pointed out by Coleridge, 
[t]he law does not demand that you should act upon certainties alone…In our 
lives, in our acts, in our thoughts we do not deal with certainties; we ought to 
act upon just and reasonable convictions founded upon just and reasonable 
grounds.536 
This idea is applicable in Rwanda as Rwandan evidence law does not require absolute 
certainty and allows decisions to be based on reasonable grounds. The study indicated that 
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the problem lies in the legal professionals who have created their own rigid rules of 
evidence. Paradoxically, many of them believed that the problem with prosecuting rape is 
that “rape is an offence very difficult to prove”, but with little acknowledgment that the 
profession has curated this difficulty.537 While it is fair to acknowledge that there are some 
genuine issues of evidence, especially related to the lack of forensic evidence, the 
conviction that rape can only rarely be proved should be situated in the context of 
pervasive and erroneous beliefs about the types of evidence that can be used to evidence 
rape. Not only do rape myths affect the value of certain types of evidence, but much 
evidence is frequently overlooked because of a mistaken understanding as to what actually 
constitutes “evidence.” 
CONCLUSION  
This chapter discussed three important research findings about the provision and 
interpretation of evidence in rape cases. First, the chapter showed that most legal 
professionals treat victims’ evidence as unreliable and therefore they systematically dismiss 
victims’ statements, often as mere “information”. This perception prompted the judicial 
practitioners to create a de facto requirement of corroboration of victims’ evidence. Second, 
the study found that medical evidence is the form of evidence privileged by prosecutors and 
judges as capable of corroborating victims’ statements. However, it was revealed that 
instead of serving usefully as corroborative evidence as believed by the prosecutors and 
judges, medical evidence can in fact undermine the processing of rape cases because of two 
common misconceptions about this evidence: (a) medical evidence is unjustifiably 
considered as superior evidence, rendering other forms of evidence irrelevant, and (b) 
medical evidence is expected to provide proof of genital or bodily injuries, despite previous 
research showing that genital or bodily injuries are not a necessary outcome of rape. This 
injury expectation is especially erroneous because Rwandan law does not require force as 
the only cause of the lack of consent in the definition of rape.  
Third, the chapter also revealed that although circumstantial evidence can legitimately 
prove rape cases, judicial professionals almost invariably make it irrelevant in cases where 
such evidence is available. This resulted in the creation of another unjustified de facto 
requirement of direct evidence in rape cases. In most instances, practitioners only give 
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value to testimonies of the witnesses who “saw the rape” being committed, and ignore 
other testimonies despite critical evidence provided in those testimonies. 
The misapprehension of all these forms of evidence significantly reduces the ability of the 
criminal justice system to prosecute rape offenders. Typically, only cases with 
overwhelming medical and direct evidence of violence are likely to pass through the legal 
process and secure conviction. As a result, many rape cases are unjustly dropped, and 
defendants undeservedly acquitted. This is extremely detrimental to the rights of women to 
be protected against sexual violence.  
The data presented in this chapter has been directly linked to rape myths, particularly the 
myth of false allegations and the “real rape” myth discussed previously (see Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 1 respectively). It is these myths that prompted prosecutors and judges to relegate 
victims’ testimony, to give undue value and weight to particular types of medical evidence, 
and to require direct evidence only as evidence of rape. The study found that these myths 
have negative impacts on the legal process beyond these initial findings. The next chapter 
explores the influence of other misconceptions about victims’ behaviour.  
Chapter 5 
EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF VICTIM CHARACTERISTICS AND 
BEHAVIOUR ON THE OUTCOME OF RAPE CASES 
 
The literature on sexual offences has revealed many causes of the “justice gap” in the legal 
process for rape. Linked to the biased rules of evidence examined in the previous chapter, 
another major factor that produces unfair processes in rape cases is the tendency of 
judicial authorities to hold false beliefs about characteristics and behaviour of a “genuine” 
rape victim and to focus on these, instead of the defendants’ actions. This chapter aims to 
explore the extent to which these beliefs effect rape trials in Rwanda. The chapter will 
analyse the effects of victim conduct before, during and after rape respectively. At every 
step, it will draw on the broader literature to inform the analysis of the issue in the 
context of Rwanda. 
5.1. VICTIM BEHAVIOUR BEFORE RAPE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE LEGAL PROCESS 
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1. The chastity requirement in other jurisdictions  
Historically, the victim’s sexual history has become the focus of many rape trials across 
jurisdictions.538 In the nineteenth century, common law courts admitted evidence of 
victim past sexual conduct as relevant to their credibility as witnesses and to the issue of 
consent.539 It was widely accepted that unchaste women were untruthful and more likely 
to have consented to sexual intercourse.540 This resulted in a rule of practice that women 
needed to be chaste in order to secure legal address for rape, which Michelle Anderson 
has termed the “chastity requirement.”541 In this context, the complainant’s prior sexual 
conduct became the centre of attention in rape trials, rather than the acts of the 
accused.542 
It has been argued that the chastity requirement and the admissibility of sexual history 
evidence, such as prior sexual relations, have contributed to the low conviction rates for 
rape in a number of jurisdictions.543 For example, Adler’s study revealed that complainants’ 
sexual experience significantly influenced the outcome of rape trials in England. She found 
that conviction was more likely in cases where the complainant was a virgin (ninety-four 
per cent) and less likely where it was known that she was sexually experienced (forty-eight 
per cent).544 When the victim admitted previous sexual activity with the defendant, he was 
almost invariably acquitted.545  
Since the 1970s, the admissibility of victim sexual history evidence began to be challenged 
in various jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.546 For example, in England and Wales, its harmful effects have been revealed by 
the Heilbron report published in 1975.547 This document exposed the stigmatisation of 
rape victim-witnesses in court resulting from the focus on their past sexual conduct, and 
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questioned the relevance of the practice. It recommended restrictions on admissibility of 
such evidence.548  The criticism was echoed by many scholars in the 1980s, 1990s and 
onwards.549 Since then, two major arguments against sexual history evidence have been 
advanced in the literature: its irrelevance to the issue of rape and its distressing and 
humiliating effects on victims. 
The lack of relevance of sexual history evidence results from the “twin myths”550 
underpinning the practice. These are: the belief that sexually experienced women are 
more likely to consent to intercourse with the defendant, and the conviction that such 
women are not credible. It is now widely acknowledged that these ideas are erroneous. 
First, there is no empirical evidence supporting the claim that women with sexual 
experience are more likely to have consented to intercourse in any particular case than 
those without such experience.551 Although it can be admitted that people tend to behave 
in a usual manner, there is no evidence to support the presumption that a woman who 
consented previously to X will necessarily do so with Y.552  Indeed sexual consent is not 
indiscriminate; neither is it transferable to other people.553 The following words by Lady 
Hale can best express this idea: 
It is difficult to think of an activity which is more person and situation 
specific than sexual relations. One does not consent to sex in general. One 
consents to this act of sex with this person at this time and in this place.554 
Further, if a woman grants sexual consent to one person at some point, this does not 
mean that consent is given to that individual at all times and in any circumstances.555 
Consent is not unlimited in time or independent of circumstances.556 Therefore, victim 
consent must not be inferred from previous consensual intercourse with the defendant.557 
The other “twin myth” related to women’s lack of credibility has also been widely refuted, 
as articulated in the following extract:  
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 The idea that a complainant's credibility might be affected by whether she 
has had other sexual experience is today universally discredited. There is 
no logical or practical link between a woman's sexual reputation and 
whether she is a truthful witness.558    
 
This belief is again connected to the myth that women are prone to making false 
allegations of rape, a theme that runs throughout this thesis (see Chapter 3). 
 
The second main argument commonly put forward against the admissibility of sexual 
history evidence is its distressing and humiliating effects on victim-witnesses. Numerous 
studies conducted in different jurisdictions since the 1970s have concluded that 
complainants’ cross-examination on their past sexual behaviour is generally degrading and 
upsetting.559 The studies reveal that the vast majority of rape complainants felt it was they 
who were on trial rather than the defendants.  
The victims were routinely asked irrelevant and upsetting questions.560 Some examples 
are the following questions asked to different witnesses during trials: “do you have any 
boys in Antonio that you go with to dances?”,561 “Had any other boy or man put their 
private parts in you before?”562, “Isn't it true that you have been known to kiss men at 
public parties?”,563 "Isn't it true that you have had sexual intercourse many times before 
with a number of different men?” 564  There have also been instances where the 
complainants have been questioned about whether they “enjoyed” the intercourse,565 or 
asked about the use of contraceptives and gynaecological experience.566 Tapper points out 
that in this context, a victim-witness could be compelled to “defend her whole life” since 
sexual activity may be frequent.567  Sometimes victims were cross-examined by the 
defendant, causing re-living of the assault.568 Easton cites the example of a complainant 
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who was questioned by the accused for six days on trial in the case of Ralston Edwards in 
1996.569 The types of questions mentioned above and the way in which the complainants 
were frequently cross-examined were often exasperating and distressing for the victims. 
The criticism of sexual history evidence prompted the adoption of “rape-shield” laws in 
many jurisdictions such as Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and England 
and Wales.570 These laws restrict admission of evidence related to the complainant’s prior 
sexual behaviour in order to protect witnesses against unnecessary distress and 
embarrassment.571 For example, in England and Wales, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) 
Act 1976 limited the admissibility of evidence of victim sexual experience with a third 
party.572  Such evidence could be allowed only upon leave given by the judge on 
application made to him in the absence of the jury, if he was satisfied that it would be 
unfair to the defendant to refuse the evidence.573 Two decades later, the Youth Justice 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 extended the restriction to evidence of sexual activity with 
the defendant, but provided a number of exceptions.574 In the United States, many 
jurisdictions opted for the general exclusion of sexual history evidence, subject to some 
exceptions.575 Similar regimes were adopted in Canada and in Australia.576  
Since these reforms, there has been considerable debate over the validity and efficiency of 
the “rape-shield” provisions.577 Analysis of the legitimacy and effectiveness of these 
reforms is beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, it is worth noting that these 
provisions have been severely criticised in the literature, mainly because of their potential 
to undermine defendants’ rights.578  
Nonetheless, supporters of the “rape-shield” laws believe that these should be 
strengthened instead.579 They denounce both the loopholes in the texts, which do not 
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allow effective protection of the victims and resistance by the legal professionals who 
exploit these gaps to undermine the changes.580 More recently McGlynn has revealed that 
admission of victim sexual history evidence continues to be an issue in England despite 
previous legal amendments.581 She has emphasised that it is still a source of unwarranted 
humiliation for victims, distracting the courts from their legitimate purpose and inhibiting 
them from exploiting useful and relevant evidence. She points out that this has had 
detrimental effects on the integrity of rape trials and has ultimately contributed to the 
failure to provide justice to rape survivors. McGlynn consequently recommends further 
law reform to address the problem in courts, and more importantly, to help change 
societal attitude towards rape.582  
Notwithstanding the continuous criticism of the “rape-shield” laws and the judicial 
resistance to their implementation, it is fair to note that these laws may have improved to 
some degree the treatment of rape victims in courts.583 Kebbell et al.’s 2007 study on rape 
complainants’ experience in English courts has revealed that the participants were 
generally satisfied with their experience.584 Although this study was limited (nineteen 
victim-survivors participated), and did not focus on sexual history evidence, it nevertheless 
shows that the situation of rape complainants in court may have been ameliorated to 
some extent. This is because the respondents did not express considerable dissatisfaction 
with the process, contrary to the previous accounts of the more extreme contention of 
“judicial rape.”585 By contrast, they generally displayed a sense of satisfaction with the 
criminal justice system. Further empirical studies are needed to further clarify the benefits 
and limitations of “rape-shield” laws.  
These findings from the broader literature will help in the study of the Rwandan context. 
Informed by them, the analysis will scrutinise instances where Rwandan legal 
professionals focused on victim characteristics and prior conduct, and examine whether 
this resulted in biased outcomes.  
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2. Impact of victim behaviour before rape in Rwandan cases 
Similar problems relating to the use of victim sexual history evidence found in other 
jurisdictions were revealed in the present study. Analysis of the elite interviews as well as 
prosecutorial and judicial decisions revealed a tendency to dismiss (1) rape complaints 
where the victim showed sympathy or familiarity towards the assailant before the rape 
and (2) cases of complainants who allegedly had previous sexual experience with the 
assailant or other men. These two factors will be analysed in the following sections 
respectively. Afterwards the practice of the “defence of prostitution” revealed in this 
study will be explored. 
a. Expression of familiarity with the assailant prior to the attack 
In their interviews and written decisions, the legal professionals used one recurrent term 
regarding victim familiarity with the assailant. It is the verb “kwijyana.” Kwijyana means 
“to go alone.”586  In the study context, the term was used to state that the complainant 
went freely and willingly to the defendant’s place. Kwijyana was often interpreted as 
evidence of consent to sexual intercourse, or provocation of rape. For example, JUDGE8 
stated:  
Sometimes you find that the woman went freely to the man’s home. In this 
situation, you realise that she contributed to the assault.  
PROSEC6 confirmed that: 
 If the woman was raped at the defendant’s place, judges tend to ask why 
she went freely to visit him knowing that he is single.  
LAWYER6 said that “if a woman is raped in the defendant’s house, generally she has some 
responsibility in the rape.”  
This attitude was also revealed in prosecutorial and judicial decisions. For example, in the 
case of N.B.587 the prosecutor decided: 
N.B. [the accused] said that he had consensual sexual intercourse with N.C. 
[the complainant] and that this is shown by the fact that she left her home 
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and went to visit him.  He received her at Nyabugogo. This coincides with 
N.C.’s own admission that N.B. called her and they met at Nyabugogo then 
they went to his home. This shows that she was not raped.588 
This prosecutor assumed that the complainant consented to sex, based solely on the fact 
that she went voluntarily to the suspect’s home. Such assumptions are problematic and 
feed directly into erroneous stereotypes about the behaviour of women. Moreover, there 
were no facts in this case file that could suggest the complainant had consented. On the 
contrary, the file contained information capable of corroborating the accusation of rape. 
For instance, upon immediate report of the incident to the police, the assailant 
immediately went into hiding. Further, the forensic medical report showed evidence of 
genital trauma. Such a report was considered by most prosecutors as credible evidence of 
rape,589 but it was overlooked in this case. This indicates that, for some prosecutors, victim 
behaviour can prevail over even direct evidence of rape during their evaluation of cases. 
Apart from “kwijyana”, expressing attention or interest towards the accused prior to the 
assault or sharing drinks with him, was considered as provocation of rape. The following 
interview quotes illustrate this attitude: 
 There are cases where the complainant shows a provocative behaviour. 
For example, when a woman sits close to a man and gives him attention. 
(JUDGE3) 
 Rape may sometimes be caused by the victim. For instance, a woman 
agrees to share [alcoholic] drinks with a man in a bar and attracts him, and 
then the man is provoked to have sex with her. (JUDGE2) 
Such prolific assumptions about the behaviour of complainants, as evidenced in this study, 
are reflective of a culture in Rwanda that blames women for their own victimisation. By 
shifting the blame onto victims, men are able to deny responsibility for what is often 
viewed as innate or primal instincts to have sex with women; whether they are willing 
participants or not.590  Women are imbued with the responsibility to protect themselves 
against male sexual advances, and those who fail to, or who are perceived to “provoke” 
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men into sexually violating them are deemed to be the main cause of that violation. While 
this belief was still clearly dominant in the Rwandan legal system, it is by no means 
isolated to this jurisdiction.  Brownmiller writing in the 1970s spoke of these patterns of 
behaviour and systemic beliefs about women as occurring throughout history. These 
structural and cultural prejudices deny women the freedom to live a life free from the 
threat of sexual violence. The sharing of a drink with, or giving other people attention 
(men or women) is part of basic human interaction. If women are expected to avoid other 
people and to be insensible, then they cannot freely socialise.  
 
Such attitudes must be challenged by evidence. Previous research has revealed that rape 
is a “pseudosexual act”591 motivated essentially by factors such as punishment, revenge, 
power and domination.592 In fact, many of the cases analysed in this study included 
evidence that the rapist’s motive was something other than sexual desire. For example, in 
PP v. Nziringirimana and Barayagwiza the defendants inflicted severe cuts on the 
complainant’s vagina using a razor blade after the rape.593 Mark Walters and Jessica 
Tumath cite such a heinous act as an example of evidence of gender hostility which should 
warrant classification of the act as a hate crime in addition to being a sexual offence.594 
They emphasise the importance of identifying hate motivations present in some sexual 
assaults driven by gender hostility and suggest to treat these according to their particular 
gravity. This would contribute to changing gender-biased attitudes towards rape.595 
Another example is the case of M.J. and E.S.596 where the drive of the accused was to 
punish the victim (a prostitute) for allegedly having infected him with HIV during a 
previous consensual sexual relationship. Evidence in the case showed that the accused 
had sworn to punish the woman, and later he hired two other men to help him beat and 
gang rape her. These actions are evidence of revenge and punishment, not sexual desire, 
otherwise the accused would have paid for sex and have sexual intercourse alone with her 
as he had done before.  
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Beyond the interviews with the justice professionals, the review of the cases further 
revealed that victim characteristics or behaviour was at the centre of the evaluation of 
many cases, rather than the evidence of rape. Sometimes the prosecutors and judges 
openly based their decisions on moral judgments about the complainant. For example, in 
the trial of PP v. Nibishaka597 the judge reasoned as follows:  
Based on the fact that M.J. [the complainant] went freely in N.J.P. [the 
defendant]’s home, while they had stopped the relationship aimed at 
marriage, and that she went there knowing well that the young man was 
preparing to marry another girl; the court finds that this is an act of 
provocation aimed at disrupting N.J.P.’s marriage.598 
This is clearly a subjective judgment of the complainant’s actions. The facts cited in this 
passage do not disprove the accusation of rape, but they influenced the judge’s decision 
to acquit the defendant. Another example is the case of H.V.599  where the prosecutor 
concluded: 
There is no evidence that N.D. [the complainant] was raped, for the 
following reasons: 
N.D. stated that on 6 December 2015 while she was coming from hospital, 
the night fell then she requested to be accommodated by B.J.P. Here a 
question arises how a woman can request accommodation from a young 
man. We find that this is problematic. They then went to a bar and she 
shared drinks with young men and it is her who paid the bill. It is also very 
confusing how after this she may have been raped... N.D. herself called H.V. 
[the accused] to come and share drinks. How can it be that H.V. may have 
raped N.D while they had shared drinks?600 
This prosecutor’s reasoning is clearly contestable. The passage contains moral judgments 
about the behaviour of the complainant, and does not show any objective evaluation of 
facts which led him to conclude there was a lack of proof. The prosecutor relied on a 
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personal assessment of the circumstances from which he assumed that the alleged rape 
could not have been committed. Whether the complainant shared drinks with the accused 
and paid the bill cannot in law be a reasonable indication that she consented to have sex 
with the defendant, or that rape was not plausible in such circumstances. Consent is not 
defined in terms of someone’s prior actions in relation to drinking or paying the bill. It was 
therefore erroneous of the prosecutor to question how someone could be raped given 
these facts. 
 b. Victim past sexual activity 
This study revealed that victim past sexual activity can heavily influence the outcome of 
rape cases. Analysis of case files revealed that many accused were released due to the 
complainant’s previous sexual conduct which was disclosed in medical reports.601 In these 
cases, the prosecutors and judges assumed that a victim who was “used to having sex” 
must have consented to the sexual intercourse at issue and therefore had fabricated the 
accusation of rape. In addition to disclosure of victim sexual behaviour by forensic medical 
examiners, allegations of complainants’ past sexual activity made by the defendants or 
their lawyers produced similar effects. For example, in PP v. Mbarushimana the court 
reasoned as follows: 
 Based on the fact that Mbarushimana [the defendant] accepted that he 
had sexual intercourse with U. [the complainant] and that it was the fifth 
time or so, the court finds that the intercourse in question was 
consensual.602 
This judge’s reasoning reflects the traditional misconception that sexual consent is 
“temporally unconstrained.”603 Anderson points out that it is a misapprehension to believe 
that sexual consent given to one person at a certain point is without time limit.604 Even 
within marriage, sexual consent is not unlimited. This is a reason why marital rape has 
been criminalised in many jurisdictions including Rwanda.605 
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Victims’ past sexual relationships with other person(s) than the accused have also 
influenced many prosecutorial and judicial decisions. For example, in the case of N.O.606 
the complainant was pregnant and had been cohabiting with another man prior to the 
incident. In the prosecutor’s assessment of the case, he noted that the complainant was 
pregnant before the alleged rape and concluded:  
 This shows that she went to the accused’s home while she had already 
had a prior sexual relationship. Therefore, there is no evidence that the 
suspect committed the alleged offence.607   
As in the other cases above, here the prosecutor focused on the complainant’s past 
behaviour rather than the investigation of the rape itself. He concluded there was “no 
evidence”, based on facts that were unrelated to the issue of consent. Clearly, the 
complainant’s pregnancy before the encounter with the alleged rapist was not relevant to 
the issue of consent; especially as she never imputed the pregnancy to the accused. Such a 
situation perfectly exemplifies McGlynn’s assertion that, by focussing on the victim’s 
character, legal practitioners are often distracted from the primary purpose of the 
investigation and fail to properly evaluate other  relevant evidence.608 It also shows that 
rape complainants viewed as promiscuous are often considered not deserving protection 
of the law.609 Many complaints were simply dismissed because the complainant had 
previous sexual experience, as if this category of women did not deserve to be protected 
by the law. One judge, having found that the complainant was “used to having sex”, 
openly concluded “she ha[d] no problem”, and acquitted the defendant, as if there was no 
issue in raping that woman.610  
Notwithstanding the common practice of dismissing cases where the complainant had 
prior sexual history, in a minority of cases the defendants were convicted despite victim 
sexual experience. However, even in these cases, prior sexual history evidence remained a 
prevalent factor in sentencing. For example, in one trial where the complainant had had 
consensual sexual intercourse with one of the accused before the rape,611 the judge 
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convicted the defendants but showed them excessive sympathy. The judge openly blamed 
the complainant and insinuated that she should have accepted the sexual intercourse in 
question. This is how he expressed his attitude:  
Based on the fact that it is their first offence, there is no reason why they 
should serve their sentence in prison especially given that they have been 
provoked to commit the crime. She [the complainant] went to visit I.T. and 
when she did not find him she exposed herself to unknown people who 
bought her drinks until she agreed to have sex with one of them (B.I.) but 
when B.I. called his friend so that he can also have sex with her the woman 
refused.612 
This passage is alarming. It suggests that complainants who have previously “exposed” 
themselves and who have agreed to sexual intercourse with someone else must have 
provoked their own victimisation. Such a conclusion shows a disturbing misconception 
amongst parts of the judiciary that sexual consent is transferable. 613  Such judicial 
conclusions have serious implications, not only for the interpretation of rape law, but for 
the many victims of rape whose experiences of sexual violence are blamed on them. 
In summary, the study revealed that victims’ past sexual conduct significantly influenced 
prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions. This factor, rather than material facts relating to non-
consensual sexual activity, was the focus of the decision-makers in a high proportion of 
cases. Many accused were released or acquitted based on it, regardless of the evidence 
available in the case file. This tendency reflects a cultural tendency within the Rwandan 
criminal justice system to subjugate women and to portray rape complainants as sexual 
predators who aim to entrap men. It is this pervasive belief that has contributed to what I 
refer to as the “defence of prostitution”, a specific manifestation of the focus on victim 
behaviour that is particularly prevalent in the Rwandan context. 
c. The “defence of prostitution” 
(1) “She is a prostitute, so there is no rape” 
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In many jurisdictions, prostitutes have been historically considered as “unrapeable.”614 In 
England, for example, rape of a prostitute was recognised in the 18th century.615 However, 
Sullivan’s study revealed that despite this, the judicial practice was that men were not 
prosecuted or convicted for rape of a sex worker. It is only since the 1980s and 1990s in 
the UK, Australia, Canada and New Zealand that prosecution practices started to 
change.616  
In Rwanda the law allows prosecution of rape of a prostitute but similar to the situation 
before the 1980s in England and other commonwealth countries, the practice remains one 
of resisting prosecution of defendants accused of raping sex workers. Interview data, as 
well as case review analysis, revealed a strong tendency towards exonerating rape 
defendants based on allegations of victim prostitution. Perhaps even more concerning was 
that the elite interviews also revealed that defendants and their lawyers routinely assert 
that the victim is “indaya” (a prostitute) to show that the alleged rape did not take place, 
regardless of whether the complainant had any history of sex work. In many cases they 
abstained from expressly using the term “indaya” and simply stated that the accusation 
was motivated by non-payment of the price of sex.  
LAWYER4 admitted: 
We frequently advance that the complainant is a prostitute, that she is 
used to having sex voluntarily and that consequently there was no rape.  
Many participants thought that suspicion of victim prostitution sometimes caused silent 
hostility towards the complainant and influenced the decision to acquit the defendants:  
 Allegations that the complainant is a prostitute affects judicial decisions in 
rape cases. Sometimes the judges show antipathy towards the 
complainant and alleviate the responsibility of the defendants without 
stating it openly. (PROSEC1) 
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In our society prostitutes are considered as marginal people. If the 
complainant is a prostitute, the judge says to himself that a prostitute 
cannot be raped. (LAWYER7) 
Some prosecutors thought that the judges do not expressly rely on victim prostitution to 
acquit the defendant but they often find any loophole in the case to justify their decision.  
If the complainant is married, it is difficult to acquit the defendant. If she is 
unmarried and used to having sex, and the defendant says she is a 
prostitute: ‘I am used to having sex with her but this time I failed to pay’, 
this type of argument influences the judges and if there is any trivial aspect 
in the file that can potentially cause a slight doubt, the judges use it to 
acquit the defendant. (PROSEC9) 
In most cases, actual evidence of prostitution was not provided to support the defence’s 
allegation, as explained below. The “defence” was used even in situations where it was 
patently clear that the rape did not take place in the context of sex work. I noted this in a 
number of trials during court observations. For example, during the hearing of 
Nyabyenda,617 it was raised in the following circumstances: the prosecution case was that 
the defendant broke the door of the complainant’s house at night while she was sleeping 
with her children, then he raped her and inflicted serious injuries on the victim. The 
defendant explained that he failed to pay the totality of the money agreed, and that this 
was the reason why she accused him. It was clear that this was not a case of disagreement 
between prostitute and client over the price of sex, based on the description of the 
circumstances given by the prosecutor and the judge’s decision.  
The legal professionals were asked whether and how evidence of victim prostitution was 
provided in court to prove the allegations. Most admitted that these were often unproven 
assertions made against the complainant. For instance, LAWYER6 recognised that “victim 
prostitution is frequently invoked without evidence.”  JUDGE8 also acknowledged that: 
“They [the defendants and their lawyers] generally show that the complainant lives in a 
place commonly known to accommodate prostitutes.”  
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These comments were in line with the findings in Chapter 3 that revealed how defence 
lawyers often intentionally feed others’ false perceptions in order to exonerate 
defendants. For example, LAWYER4, who was particularly willing to admit defence 
malpractices throughout the interview, was asked if he and his colleagues provide 
evidence of victim prostitution when they make such allegations in court. He replied 
without hesitation: “Never. We only pick here or there anything to argue that she is a 
prostitute. Generally, they [the victims] are not prostitutes.” Such comments illustrate 
that there is an issue of professional ethics that must be addressed.  
Prosecutors and judges are also responsible for allowing this unfair practice to take place. 
Asked if they take steps against lawyers who display such behaviour, most judges 
responded that they never sanction the attorneys who allege victim prostitution because 
it is their right to defend their clients. For example, JUDGE3 stated: 
 The accused has the right to defend himself, so we let him or his lawyer 
make such statements. They frequently allege that the victim is a 
prostitute but it is generally in the absence of the victim. (JUDGE3) 
In spite of this judge’s view, the complainant’s nonattendance does not justify such 
conduct. Unsubstantiated allegations of this type have devastating effects on the integrity 
of rape trials in Rwanda. Whether the victim is present or not, such allegations clearly 
influence the judge’s decision, while additionally re-victimising victims and tarnishing their 
reputation before the public.  
Only a few judges stated that they discourage the practice but they never take serious 
measures against the defence lawyers concerned.  
Most times we only give a warning to the defendant or the defence lawyer 
who maliciously alleges victim prostitution, or we ask them to withdraw 
their declaration. (JUDGE9) 
This seems insufficient, especially given that withdrawal of a statement may not guarantee 
the removal of its effects particularly on the victim if she is present, on the public and even 
on the judges. There is consequently a need for more serious measures to prevent victim 
defamation and humiliation.  These measures should be mandatory for all the participants 
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of the criminal justice process because in some instances the judges themselves raised 
issues of victim prostitution (see below). 
Although evidence supporting an allegation of victim prostitution was generally not 
provided, it was in some cases. For example, on rare occasions where the victim appeared 
to give testimony in court, defence lawyers sometimes used subtle means during cross-
examination to show from the witness’s answers that she is a prostitute. LAWYER7, who 
disapproved of this practice, stated: 
 They [defence lawyers] merely allege that the complainant is a prostitute 
without any evidence but sometimes they induce her to confess facts 
which show that she is a sex worker.  
Some of the cases studied contained witness statements, victim confessions, and other 
reports confirming victim prostitution. Such evidence was fatal for the complainant, as 
revealed in the examples below.  
(2) Rape complaints filed by prostitutes 
The elite interviewees were unanimous in recognising that non-consensual sexual 
intercourse with a woman is rape, whether the person abused is a prostitute or not. This 
appeared to be a simple declaration of legal opinion rather than a statement of facts 
because the study revealed that the reality was often the opposite. In practice, the cases 
of victims known to be prostitutes resulted invariably in disqualification of the complaints 
irrespective of the evidence contained in the case files. This discrepancy reveals the extent 
to which prosecutors and judges’ bias against this category of rape complainants is 
overriding, as demonstrated in the following cases. 
In the case of M.J. and E.S.618 it was clear from various testimonies, including the 
complainant’s statement, that she was a prostitute. She previously had sexual intercourse 
with M.J. who later suspected that she infected him with HIV. Witnesses stated that M.J. 
swore to them he would kill her in retaliation. Days later, she complained that M.J. 
brought her into a bush where M.J. together with E.S. and another unidentified person 
tied her up and raped her. Witnesses confirmed that M.J. brought the woman from the 
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neighbourhood at the time of the alleged rape. Another witness confirmed that he found 
the complainant near the crime scene still tied up and he untied her.  He added that she 
had wounds on her mouth. This was confirmed by the medical report. The police also 
seized the ropes used to truss up the victim.  
The prosecutor decided to drop this case, giving the following dubious reasoning: 
There is no evidence because M.J. [the accused] and N.D. [the complainant] 
both stated that they were friends and have had sex before and that N.D. 
is a prostitute. He cannot conspire against the complainant whereas he 
used to have consensual sex with her.619  
This prosecutor’s written decision does not withstand critical scrutiny.  First, the 
assumption that N.D. could not conspire with other people to abuse N.D. simply because 
they previously had sexual intercourse is erroneous, since this fact does not reasonably 
exclude the possibility of conspiracy. Second, the claim that there is “no evidence” flies 
directly in the face of the material facts as presented in this case. Whether the 
complainant is a prostitute and had a sexual relationship with the accused before cannot 
on any factual basis explain a lack of evidence. The real matters of evidence were the 
complainant’s and suspects’ testimonies, the ropes seized, the complainant’s injury, and 
the statements of the witnesses who saw the accused moving away with the complainant 
and those who heard him swearing that he would kill her. This prosecutor seemingly 
overlooked all these relevant facts and concluded there was “no evidence.” Based on all 
this, it is highly likely that the underlying reason for dropping this case was that the 
complainant was a prostitute, rather than there being “no evidence.”  
This case is another illustration that victim character is given more weight in the 
evaluation of the cases than the evidentiary matters at hand. The evidence shown above 
could have been exploited by the prosecutor to pursue the case but it was simply 
disregarded because of the complainant’s status.  
The prosecutor took another unusual and arbitrary decision in this case. She astonishingly 
went as far as to destroy some evidence, by burning without justification the ropes made 
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from the victim’s clothes used to tie her up during the rape.620  This action lacks any legal 
basis because material evidence are normally destroyed during investigation if they are 
perishable or dangerous to store,621 which was not the case here. Moreover, the ropes 
could be needed in court although the case was closed because the victim still had the 
right to initiate private prosecution, in which case the prosecutor would be obliged to 
participate in the trial and produce the evidence collected during investigation.622  Based 
on the fact that this prosecutor’s action had no legal basis and that she did not give any 
justification in her official report on destruction of evidence, it can be suspected that she 
was driven by what some interviewees called “silent hostility” towards rape complainants 
allegedly prostitutes (see quotes above). The destruction of evidence in this case is a 
serious professional misconduct, but it is unclear from the file whether the prosecutor was 
held accountable. 
In another case, the court openly cited victim prostitution among the reasons to acquit the 
defendant: 
Based on the fact that U.J. [the complainant] is a prostitute and that she is 
now in detention for being found having sexual intercourse in the street at 
night… 
 The court finds that the evidence produced by the prosecution is 
insufficient.623 
Here again it is clear that the complainant’s status as a prostitute is not relevant to the 
issue of evidence of non-consent. Nevertheless, the court relied on it to conclude the 
evidence was “insufficient.”  
The military prosecutor appealed against this judgment. One of the grounds for appeal 
was that victim prostitution should not lead to acquittal of the defendant because 
prostitutes are as capable of being raped as other women. Unlike the first court, the 
Military High Court avoided referring openly to the profession of the complainant but this 
played an important role in its decision to confirm the first judgment. This is because one 
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key testimony was dismissed on the ground that the witness (G.E.) might have had a 
promiscuous relationship with the complainant known to be a prostitute. G.E.’s evidence 
was that he saw the defendant forcibly pulling the complainant to the direction of the 
crime scene, and heard her crying.624 The court asked another witness called H.I. what was 
the usual behaviour of the complainant. This question suggests that the court wanted to 
confirm if she was a prostitute. H.I. replied it is said in the neighbourhood that she is a 
prostitute and that she is used to sleeping with Ugandans.  On this basis, the court 
concluded that the complainant was a friend to the Ugandans, including the key 
eyewitness G.E. (G.E. was Ugandan). It consequently dismissed G.E.’s testimony.  
This judgment denied any credibility to the key witness simply because he probably had an 
unconfirmed relationship with the complainant said to be a prostitute. This is not a valid 
reason to dismiss otherwise important testimony. It exemplifies the assertions of some 
interviewees cited above, that the judges often look for any excuse to justify the decision 
to acquit the defendant when the complainant is a prostitute. 
(3) The case for abolishing the “defence of prostitution” 
There are three main arguments for abolition of the de facto “defence of prostitution.” 
First, as has been successfully defended in many other jurisdictions, evidence of victim 
sexual experience (including prostitution) is irrelevant to the issue of whether the 
complainant was raped or not. Moreover, the law does not discriminate between women 
protected against rape as all women, including prostitutes and sexually active women 
have the same legal protection against sexual violence.    
Second, the “defence of prostitution” is a major obstacle to victim participation in the 
legal process. Chapter 3 of this thesis advocated for greater victim involvement in the 
criminal justice process, after it was revealed that rape victims very rarely appeared in 
Rwandan courts to give evidence. Victim participation in the legal process will be counter-
productive if there is no conducive environment allowing them to have a voice. Several 
elite interviewees revealed that on the rare occasions where the complainants testified in 
court or claimed damages, they were humiliated and distressed to the point that many 
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cried and failed to pursue their testimony. The main reason being that they were called 
prostitutes or said to be “used to having sex.”  
This de facto “defence” proved to be capable of affecting any woman complaining of rape, 
including prostitutes and other women with past sexual experience as well as chaste 
women, since it was revealed that the allegations of prostitution were often made without 
evidence and with impunity. This “defence” is in fact extremely harmful to complainants. 
Indeed, PROSEC2 was right to say that it is “a terrible weapon against rape victims.”  
Third, the “defence of prostitution” serves no legitimate purpose. According to most of 
the elite interviewees, the main reason for accepting this practice is the protection of 
defendants’ right to a fair trial (see above). Nevertheless, although this “defence” led to 
the release and acquittal of many accused persons, this benefit for defendants is not fair 
because it derives from the decision-makers bias against female victims. Such an 
illegitimate advantage cannot be a justification for maintaining the practice. If the 
defendants lose this unjust opportunity, their defence rights will not be affected because 
these are meant to ensure a fair, not an unfair trial.  
In other jurisdictions, the issue of whether exclusion of sexual history evidence violates 
defendants’ rights has been raised in courts. A case in point is Oyston v. United 
Kingdom.625 The Court of Appeal in the UK refused to admit evidence of a witness who had 
had a previous sexual relationship with the complainant. The evidence was meant to 
prove that she was not as vulnerable as she claimed to be. The defendant brought the 
case to the European Court of Human Rights arguing that this refusal denied him the right 
to a fair trial and equality of arms. The European Court found that in this case the Court of 
Appeal had given every opportunity to the applicant to defend himself and had found the 
evidence in question irrelevant and unable to render his conviction unsafe. It unanimously 
rejected the claim and declared the application inadmissible.626  
 
This decision is significant but it is specific to that particular case and does not lay down a 
general principle. Despite this ruling, there is a need for some caution because there may 
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be exceptional situations where sexual history evidence can be relevant to a rape trial.627 
In such cases, it can be prejudicial for defendants to exclude the evidence.628 For instance, 
in Seaboyer,629 the defendant argued that evidence of the complainant’s previous sexual 
conduct could clarify the cause of her bruises and other condition presented in court as 
evidence of rape. In this case, the Supreme Court (Canada) found that the provisions 
excluding sexual history evidence infringed the right to a fair trial principally on the ground 
that they had the potential to reject evidence which may be relevant to the defence. 
 
In this light, although there is an urgent need for abolition of the de facto “defence of 
prostitution” in Rwanda, this change requires very careful consideration to avoid the risk 
of unfairness to defendants. Moreover, it is important to note that legal reforms will not 
be sufficient to resolve the issue. This is because the underlying cause of this problem is 
the attitude towards rape victims. As revealed above, the legal practitioners were 
conscious of the law but they failed to implement it in many cases because of their bias 
against the complainants. Therefore, education, judicial training and a change of attitude 
are a prerequisite for fairer rape trials.  
 
In summary, this section has demonstrated that victim past sexual behaviour is an 
important factor in prosecutorial and judicial decision-making in rape cases in Rwanda. 
Many defendants were discharged based on the victim’s past sexual conduct irrespective 
of the evidence against them and regardless of the irrelevance of the victim’s sexual 
history. This was due to prosecutors’ and judges’ bias against women who were allegedly 
sexually active. The practice is extremely problematic, resulting in significant numbers of 
unfair acquittals. There is clearly an urgent need for both legislative and cultural change to 
prevent further prejudice to rape victims. Before exploring how these changes might be 
brought about, the next section will analyse the effects of victim behaviour during rape. 
  
5.2. VICTIM BEHAVIOUR DURING THE ASSAULT  
 
                                                          
627
 Temkin (2002), p.224. 
628
 Ibid. 
629
 R. v. Seaboyer, 26 March 1991. 
152 
 
The literature on rape reveals traditional public and legal expectations in various 
jurisdictions that a woman victim of rape must physically resist the attack to ensure that 
she did not consent to the sexual intercourse.630  This section begins with a discussion of 
this requirement and its implications as revealed in the literature before analysing the 
issue in the legal process for rape in Rwanda.  
1. The resistance requirement in the broader literature 
Rape laws in many jurisdictions have traditionally required that a victim of rape must resist 
physically to prove use of force by the assailant and her non-consent to the intercourse.631 
At common law, in the US for example, the victim needed to resist to the utmost of her 
physical ability for the offence of rape to be established.632 The following stance of the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin is an illustration of this requirement:      
Not only must there be entire absence of mental consent or assent, but 
there must be the most vehement exercise of every physical means or 
faculty within the woman’s power to resist the penetration of her person, 
and this must be shown to persist until the offence is consummated.633  
Research has revealed that the requirement of physical resistance disregards various ways 
in which women express non-consent and resist rape in real-life.634 Resistance may take 
several other forms than physical struggle but these are not often recognised.635 Randall 
calls this misunderstanding by the legal professionals a “psychological illiteracy in law.”636 
She emphasises the need to acknowledge that rape victims’ resistance strategies are 
“complicated, varied, creative, often subtle, and always context-specific.”637  
Bucher and Manasse’s study on acquaintance rape has revealed that only 18.7 per cent of 
their sample denied consent by physical resistance while forty-nine per cent expressed 
                                                          
630
See Anderson, M. (2010), “Diminishing the legal impact of negative social attitudes toward acquaintance rape victims”, 
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, (13)4, p.653. 
631
Anderson, M. (2010), “Diminishing the legal impact of negative social attitudes toward acquaintance rape victims”, 
New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal, (13)4, p.653. 
632
 Ibid. 
633
 Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wis. 1906), cited in Estrich, S. (1987), Real Rape, Harvard University Press, p.30. 
634
 Bucher, J. and Manasse, M. (2011), “When screams are not released: A study of communication and consent in 
acquaintance rape situations”, Women and Criminal Justice, 21(2):123-140. 
635
 Randall, M. (2010), “Sexual assault law, credibility, and ‘ideal victims’: Consent, resistance, and victim blaming”, 
Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 22(2): p.420. 
636
 Ibid, p.398. 
637
 Ibid, p.422. 
153 
 
non-consent verbally. Among these, only fifteen per cent objected by screaming. Most 
opposed the act by saying “no” repeatedly and some said it only once.638 Forty-two per 
cent did not resist verbally or physically in spite of their lack of consent.639 
Various other studies have revealed that the absence of any physical or verbal resistance 
may stem from uncontrolled factors or sometimes be deliberate. A victim may 
intentionally abstain from resisting despite being unwilling to have sexual intercourse for 
many reasons such as fear of death or injury.640 Such a victim response is often referred to 
in the legal literature as submission. It has been widely emphasised that submission is not 
consent despite its appearance. A victim may also “freeze” and be unable to offer any 
resistance. Bucher and Manasse cite the following examples of “freezing” extracted from 
various victims’ accounts:  
He began kissing my neck and breast and I froze...my body froze...I froze, 
his height and weight, I just froze…I felt like I could not move and was 
frozen during it…My heart was racing, and I was screaming so loud in my 
head...my body was frozen and I couldn’t yell out…He threw me on the 
couch and I couldn’t move. I just laid there...I wanted to scream but 
nothing came out.641  
Psychologists have attempted to explain victim “freezing-up” using the concept of “tonic 
immobility” experienced by some animals under overwhelming attack. Tonic immobility is 
defined as a state of uncontrolled freezing or deep motor inhibition caused by fear and 
restraint.642 It implies a sense of inescapability and is characterised by a motionless 
position, insensitivity to pain, loss of vocal ability, unfocussed gaze and shaking.643 This 
state is normally found in species such as insects, fish, reptiles, mammals and primates.644 
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It has been argued that human victims of traumatic stress may experience tonic 
immobility as well.645  
A number of studies have revealed that tonic immobility can happen to humans during 
sexual assault. TeBockhorst’s research on the behaviour of seven women who experienced 
immobility due to sexual assault found strong similarities with tonic immobility.646 She 
found the following in the victims’ experience: Shock, fear, profound desire to avoid eye 
contact with the attacker, moments of eye closure, loss of vocal ability, incapacity to 
command body movements, urge to run away, lack of sensation, confusion in the 
immediate completion of the attack, slow recovery of body movement control and 
tremor.647 Suarez and Gallup analysed various reports of rape-induced paralysis and found 
that this is analogous with tonic immobility. 648 Rape-induced paralysis is the concept 
commonly used to describe  a reaction of motionlessness found in victims of rape.649 Marx 
et al. also studied the literature on rape victims’ conduct and reached a similar 
conclusion.650 Interestingly, they further point out that rapists also often respond to 
victims’ behaviour as some animal predators react to their prey.651 
Various research statistics have revealed that tonic immobility is frequent in rape victims.  
In their empirical study on a sample of 298 women, Moller et al. found that seventy per 
cent reported significant immobility and forty-eight per cent experienced extreme 
immobility during the attack.652 They reported previous studies that have also revealed 
that the incidence of tonic immobility in sexual assault victims was relatively high: thirty-
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seven, forty-two and fifty-two per cent.653 However, Fuse´ et al have specified that the 
proportion of the victims who experienced extreme immobility was  ten to thirteen per 
cent.654 Although there is no agreement on the prevalence of tonic immobility in victims of 
sexual assault, these studies show that it is nevertheless likely to be a common reaction. 
This finding should inform the legal authorities who must appreciate that sometimes the 
lack of victim resistance may be a natural biological response to the assault rather than an 
indication of consent.655  
In summary, contrary to pervasive traditional legal and social expectations, it has been 
established that women do not always physically express dissent to unwanted sexual 
intercourse, and many communicate non-consent by various means such as verbal 
resistance, while others simply fail to resist either verbally or physically as they freeze with 
fear. This shows the inadequacy of the resistance requirement to establish the lack of 
consent. 
In response to this issue, feminist scholars have developed a number of models of consent 
over the last four decades with the view to improving concepts that can better protect 
women’s sexual autonomy. An example of these is the “no means no” model. This model 
aims at rejecting the requirement of victim physical resistance and affirming the value of a 
woman’s verbal response to sexual advances. It maintains that if a woman says “no” to 
sexual propositions by a man, it must be understood as such; therefore if the defendant 
disregarded the woman’s verbal objection and proceeded with the sexual intercourse, 
rape must be established despite the absence of physical resistance.656 This model has 
been criticised for not addressing the risk of misinterpretation of the victim’s passivity 
because if the victim fails to object for any reason, this silence can be interpreted as 
consent while it may be genuinely caused by a number of other factors such as 
disorientation, confusion or fear.657 With respect to tonic immobility explained above, the 
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model cannot protect a woman affected by this condition because she is unable to say 
“no.” 
The “affirmative consent” model658 attempts to rectify some weaknesses of the “no 
means no model.” According to the affirmative consent model, consent will be deemed 
present if the woman positively stated that she wanted to have sexual intercourse, or 
showed through “unambiguous body language” that she desired to engage in such 
activity.659 This model can address the issue of a frozen victim. The absence of a positive 
response from the frozen victim may confirm her lack of consent.  However, the model 
has also been criticised for a number of reasons, including the risk of inferring sexual 
consent from a woman’s erotic conduct.660  
In order to address the weaknesses of the previous two models, other models have been 
developed, such as the “communicative sexuality” model 661  and the “negotiation 
model.”662 These promote communication between the two partners, to ensure that both 
agree to the sexual intercourse, and the absence of communication should be an 
indication of a lack of consent. Another related model is the “freedom to negotiate” 
model.663 It is proposed as an alternative to consent and advocates for recognition of the 
importance of the surrounding circumstance of sexual negotiation, which must be free in 
order to ensure the legitimacy of the resulting sexual encounter.664 Finally, the “coercive 
circumstances” model adopted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
Akayezu, suggests that coercion does not require exercise of physical force and may be 
inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or the military presence.665  
All these models have their strengths and weaknesses but they present progressive ideas 
about sexual autonomy which may improve the understanding of sexual consent.666 Some 
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of the above ideas have contributed to (or sometimes been prompted by) changes of 
legislation in various countries, aimed at protecting women’s sexual autonomy in a more 
meaningful way. All this reinforces the assertion that the resistance requirement is 
inadequate to establish rape. 
2. The resistance requirement in the prosecution of rape in Rwanda 
Under Rwandan law consent does not require physical resistance, as explained in Chapter 
2. Despite this, the study revealed a persistent application of the resistance requirement in 
Rwandan judicial practice. This finding is based on the review of case files, as well as 
analysis of the interviews with the legal practitioners. For instance, the vast majority of the 
elite participants stated categorically that victim resistance during the assault is essential 
to establish rape. One interviewee, JUDGE4, simply stated that “without victim resistance, 
[they] do not consider rape.” In dismissing cases where the victim did not resist, some 
were concerned that evidence of force used by the assailant was difficult to find in such 
cases. Many others merely claimed that the absence of resistance was indicative of victim 
consent. For example, PROSEC9 stated that: 
When the complainant is adult and she did not resist we immediately 
consider that she consented and that she made the accusation of rape 
because of some other misunderstanding. (PROSEC9) 
LAWYER5 similarly noted: 
In cases where the complainant did not resist it is considered that she has 
consented especially if the complainant is an adult. (LAWYER5) 
Commenting on the issue, one female judge laughed and exclaimed:  
“If the woman does not resist, for example she does not scream or 
attempt to fight, then it means that she consented, especially given that 
Rwandan women do not say expressly ‘yes’ to men’s sexual advances” 
(JUDGE7) 
Such comments illustrate the common belief that silence means consent. As we have seen 
above, such beliefs can carry damaging implications for victims of rape. 
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From the elite interviewees’ comments it was clear that they meant by resistance either a 
physical struggle or at least a loud scream. They conceded that in some exceptional cases 
it could be understandable that the victim did not resist, such as cases of persons with 
cognitive impairments or very old and weak women. PROSEC1 gave the following example: 
I remember the case of a very old woman severely injured by the 
defendant. The police asked her why she did not at least bite him. She 
replied that she had no teeth. The court convicted him.  
Analysis of case files also showed that prosecutors’ and judges’ tendency in cases of 
absence of victim resistance was to conclude that the rape did not occur. For example, in 
PP v. Byararangiye the complainant did not scream, so the court reasoned as follows: 
“What happened is a drama because an adult person cannot be raped and fail to 
scream.”667  
The danger of such an understanding is that when a victim is unable to scream or chooses 
to submit after realising that it is the best option for her in order to survive or sustain less 
injury, any reports of rape are likely to be dismissed.  Further evidence of this finding was 
found in multiple case files. For example, in the case of N.J.668 the complainant was very 
sick and was being treated by a doctor who allegedly raped her during the treatment while 
her mother was waiting outside the treatment room. Asked if she screamed, the woman 
answered that she attempted to but her voice could not be released because of her 
condition. In spite of this, the prosecutor concluded: “If she had been raped, she would 
have screamed and her mother who was nearby would have helped her.”669 The case was 
consequently dropped. In another case the complainant stated that she could not scream 
as she was threatened by the assailant (witnesses confirmed that the suspect was armed 
with a knife), yet the judge noted that “...it is not understandable that she was raped while 
she did not call for help.”670  
 
In many cases prosecutors and judges additionally expected rape victims to fight with their 
utmost energy to prevent the intercourse before it could be accepted that they did not 
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consent to the sexual conduct. They also expected that the resistance should be sustained 
throughout the duration of the attack, similar to the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in 1906 quoted above. A case in point is PP v. Ntahomvukiye.671 In this 
judgment, the court decided that the sexual intercourse in question “was consensual” for 
a number of reasons, including that:  
Ntahomvukiye had enough time to put on condoms. The first was torn 
down and he found more time to put on a second one while she was 
looking on.672 
In a similar case, one prosecutor dismissed the complaint because it was “not 
understandable that he [the accused] could find time to put on a condom.”673 In another 
case, the prosecutor noted: 
She never screamed. In addition, she stated that he raped her two times, 
which is impossible because after the first rape she would have tried to 
flee.674  
According to this understanding, the victims were supposed to permanently resist the 
assault. This interpretation of non-consent does not conform to the reality of rape, as it 
has been established that not all rape victims physically resist the attack (see discussion 
above). Further, there is no evidence that those who do struggle to prevent the rape fight 
persistently from the beginning to the end of the assault. On the contrary, empirical 
evidence shows that victims may resist but submit out of exhaustion or 
discouragement.675 These examples also reveal the lack of awareness that a rape victim 
may be in a state of powerlessness or inhibition, which may prevent her from resisting 
physically or verbally. Further, they expose the failure to conceive that a woman may 
express non-consent in other ways than physical resistance or screaming.  
The study of the cases further revealed that the screaming expected of rape victims must 
be loud enough to be heard at a good distance. In many instances, if the incident was 
alleged to have happened in a neighbourhood or at a time when people were around and 
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that the complainant was not rescued, it was assumed that she did not scream and 
consent was presumed. For example, in one case,676 the prosecutor concluded: 
 The complainant says that she screamed until she lost her voice then he 
raped her but at that place where N.B. [the accused] lives there are many 
people living around. Therefore, it is not understandable how she can 
scream to the point of losing her voice and not be rescued while it 
happened in day time.677 
Such attitudes highlight how justice professionals continue to hold victims responsible for 
the lack of assistance of other people. It reveals the failure to recognise that women may 
call for help and not be heard, or even be heard but not be rescued. Each of these 
misconceptions about victim resistance are profoundly damaging to rape complainants. 
They reinforce the myth that women are prone to making false rape allegations (see 
Chapter 3) and dismiss women’s experiences of sexual violence. They consequently 
aggravate the harms experienced by complainants while simultaneously contributing to 
the discharging of rape offenders.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there are legal practitioners in the Rwandan criminal 
justice system who are not categorical about the resistance requirement. A small minority 
of the elites interviewed appreciated that a rape victim may be unable to resist depending 
on the circumstances and that the lack of resistance should not bar conviction for rape. 
JUDGE11 stated that: 
 If the victim does not resist, this should not rule out rape because she may 
be unable to do so for various reasons.  
JUDGE8 also remarked:   
A woman may find herself in a state of defencelessness. In this situation 
she may submit because she had no other alternative. This is rape.  
Unlike PROSEC5 and JUDGE6, JUDGE1 emphasised that: “If the victim says ‘no’ and the 
defendant proceeds with the sexual intercourse then he must be convicted of rape.” Yet it 
was only this single judge who adopt the “no means no” model of rape explained above. 
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The review of the cases also revealed one exceptional judgment which did not require 
victim resistance to establish the lack of consent. The decision in PP v. Uwizeyimana678 is 
the only case of conviction without evidence of victim physical or verbal resistance 
identified out of the sample of 175 court rulings analysed in the present study. In this 
unique case the defendant did not use force to obtain sexual intercourse and the victim 
did not resist. The court convicted the defendant based on the following: 
 When Uwizeyimana Jerome [the defendant] was interrogated by the 
prosecutor, he confessed in these terms: ‘The girl had been told to sleep in 
the living room. She found me in the bedroom where I was sleeping and 
told me that she was feeling cold. She then came and shared the bed with 
me. I touched her tummy and she did not react, then I pulled up her skirt 
and went upon her without exchanging any word with her and 
immediately proceeded to have sexual intercourse.’ Uwizeyimana Jerome 
also confessed before the judge of detention that he had a sexual 
relationship with M.C. [the complainant] without mutual agreement.679  
This judgment is very significant, although the case is unusual with respect to evidentiary 
matters because on top of the medical evidence provided, the defendant confessed and 
was later tried in absentia. It shows that the lack of consent does not always require victim 
physical or verbal resistance. Nevertheless, the decision is challengeable based on the 
state of current Rwandan law, which requires force, threat or fraud to prove the lack of 
victim consent.680 In this case it was found that the woman did not consent to the sexual 
intercourse but a strict application of the law would have dismissed the offence of rape 
despite the lack of consent because the defendant did not use force, threat or fraud.  
The judgment reveals not only a gap in the law but also the misconception of consent 
among the majority of the legal practitioners interviewed. If one endorses the 
understanding of many professionals shown above, the victim’s passivity in this case may 
be interpreted as consent. This would be reinforced by the fact that the woman freely 
joined the defendant on his bed. If the defendant had been present and had not confessed, 
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these weaknesses would most likely have been exploited by his defence lawyer and they 
could perhaps have influenced the verdict. 
Notwithstanding the potential legal challenge to this decision and the speculations about 
an alternative outcome of the trial, the Uwizeyimana judgment is outstanding. Its merits 
are that it did not focus on the complainant to enquire what she did to show non-consent 
or why she did not fight to avoid the rape. It found that consent was absent based 
principally on the actions of the defendant. This is what has been constantly advocated for 
by feminists to ensure women’s sexual autonomy and preserve them from being the focus 
of the trials. Had this judge concentrated on the complainant’s behaviour rather than the 
defendant’s actions, he would possibly have acquitted him, given the tendency revealed 
above, since the complainant had not expressed non-consent. This would have been 
unfair because in spite of her passivity, this woman did not consent to the intercourse and 
was in fact raped.  
The judge in this case seems to have adopted a position somewhere between the 
communication and the negotiation models. Both theories require communication 
between the parties about the sexual relationship. Therefore, the intercourse that 
happened in this case may not be legitimate under these models because communication 
never took place. This judge’s stance better protected the victim’s sexual autonomy 
because it did not infer sexual consent from the complainant’s silence and passivity, her 
act of joining the defendant on the bed, and her willingness to sleep on the same bed with 
him the whole night. The “no means no” and the “affirmative consent” models would 
have failed the victim in this case because they could have allowed the above victim’s acts 
to be interpreted as consent. This judgment is a signal that Rwandan law needs 
amendment in order to more effectively protect women against sexual violence. 
5.3. VICTIM BEHAVIOUR AFTER RAPE 
The literature on rape reveals traditional legal expectations in many jurisdictions that in 
the aftermath of rape the victim had to promptly report the assault to the authorities.  The 
present section analyses this requirement in the broader literature before exploring the 
issue in the context of Rwanda. 
1. The requirement of prompt complaint in other jurisdictions 
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The requirement of prompt complaint has been traced back to the 13th century.681 The 
victims of rape in many common law jurisdictions were required to report swiftly the 
assault after its occurrence for their complaint to be valid.682 This was a rule of practice but 
in some jurisdictions, it was codified in statute.683 For example, the United States Model 
Penal Code (1962) imposed a three-month prompt complaint rule.684 The rationale of the 
rule was the assumption that late complaints were false.685 The following conclusion by 
Wigmore illustrates this belief:  
It was entirely natural, after becoming a victim of assault against her will, 
that she should have spoken out. That she did not, that she went about as 
if nothing had happened, was in effect an assertion that nothing violent 
had been done.686 
 
Another example of this attitude is a judgment delivered by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
United States:  
The natural instinct of a female thus outraged and injured prompts her to 
disclose the occurrence, at the earliest opportunity, to a relative or friend 
who naturally has the deepest interest in her welfare; and the absence of 
such a disclosure tends to discredit her as a witness, and may raise an 
inference against the truth of the charge.687  
 
This requirement has persisted in many common law jurisdictions until the 1980s when it 
started to be challenged by feminist scholars and activists.688 Following this, it was 
abolished in many countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom.689 Many 
acknowledged that the rule was prejudicial to women and founded on false beliefs.690 
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The literature has continued to reveal that the requirement of prompt complaint is 
fundamentally flawed because it does not take into account women’s real experience in 
the aftermath of rape. It shows that a number of genuine reasons may prevent a rape 
victim from immediately reporting the assault. Firstly, previous research has revealed that 
many victims needed time for deliberation before making the decision to complain. 
Konradi’s study as well as Patterson and Campbell’s have indicated that many women 
experience anxiety after sexual assault and weigh various parameters before making the 
resolution to bring the complaint to police.691  
The majority of the rape survivors interviewed in Konradi’s research (fifty-seven per cent) 
who decided on their own to report the assault needed time for reflection before taking 
the decision. 692  In this process, they weighed a number of factors such as the 
consequences of the complaint on their relationships with other people including the 
assailant especially in close relations, or the risk of retaliation by the assailant.693 The 
study provides several examples of fear of reprisal including a woman who informed her 
husband after being raped, but abstained from reporting to police for fear of reprisal 
against her family.694 The couple inquired into this risk and found after some time that it 
was very low. It is then that the woman decided to bring the case to the police. The study 
further reveals that victims’ family members and friends played an important role in 
persuading them to report.695 In some cases total strangers supported and encouraged 
victims to refer the matter to police.696  
Patterson and Campbell’s study also found that more than one quarter of their sample 
was persuaded by other persons to file the complaint.697 One quarter refused to complain 
but other people did it for them without their authorisation.698 This shows that the 
decision to report rape is not easy. Therefore, it is not abnormal for a victim to spend 
some time before taking this step.  
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Secondly, uncertainty about the justice process may delay reporting.699 This doubt is more 
likely when the experience does not conform to the social construction of rape.700 
Konradi’s study reveals that the women who reported the assault without taking much 
time to reflect were mostly those whose experience conformed to the stereotype of “real 
rape.”701 Stewart et al.’s study compared the experiences of women who sought post-rape 
treatment within one month to those who delayed. It found that the women who were 
raped by a “friend” were more likely to delay treatment but those who resisted the assault 
physically were less likely to do so.702 In Patterson and Campbell’s study, some victims 
worried whether they would be believed by the police due to the nature of their 
experience which did not conform to public expectations about rape.703 Victims may also 
doubt if their violation matches the legal definition of rape despite being victimised.704 As 
Kranstuber points out, a woman may ask herself: “Was I raped?”705 Due to such hesitations, 
it is understandable that a victim may delay her complaint. 
Thirdly, the fear of social stigma can also delay or prevent victims from reporting.706 Rape 
victims often worry about being blamed, branded as devalued or marginalised by their 
communities.707 The public disgrace accompanying rape in some communities is such that 
there are victims who choose to kill themselves instead of facing humiliation and stigma 
for the rest of their lives.708 Suicide in the aftermath of rape is reported to be a victim 
response conditioned by social norms in some societies.709 It may also be caused by post-
trauma emotions.710  
Emotional trauma resulting from rape is another factor that can affect reporting of the 
assault. Such trauma is often called “Rape Trauma Syndrome” (RTS). This is a form of post-
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traumatic stress disorder which may affect victims in the aftermath of rape.711 RTS has 
been recognised in many judgments in the United States as a cause of delay in reporting 
rape.712 It has also been used as circumstantial evidence to corroborate the victim’s 
account.713  
Despite its evidential benefits, this concept is nevertheless controversial.714 Stefan’s work 
cited above is possibly the most detailed critique of RTS.715 Stefan argues that RTS 
pathologises victim responses to rape and that this runs the risk of creating a new set of 
rigid expectations about how a genuine rape victim would behave. Other studies have 
questioned the scientific value of RTS.716 O’Donohue et al. simply recommend stopping its 
use in court.717 They suggest addressing each rape case as unique rather than relying on 
the general concept of RTS because each individual victim may experience a subjective 
emotional response. However, in spite of this controversy there is no question about the 
potential of rape to cause immense emotional trauma to victims. Therefore, whether the 
condition is classified as RTS or not, this does not change the fact that the psychological 
distress caused by rape can affect a victim’s decision-making and cause delay in reporting.  
In light of the discussions above, it can be concluded that the (“natural”) immediate 
reaction of most victims in the aftermath of rape is not to complain to police. Some report 
the assault promptly, others take time to reflect on the course of action, while many 
others are unable to file their complaint at all.  In fact, the vast majority never report.718 
Therefore, conflating a delayed complaint of rape with a false allegation is a misconception. 
It is another manifestation of the myth that women are prone to making false rape 
allegations, discussed in Chapter 3. The requirement of prompt complaint underpinned by 
this assumption is consequently unfounded.  
2. The requirement of prompt reporting in the prosecution of rape in 
Rwanda 
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Although Rwandan law does not require prompt complaint of rape, analysis of the elite 
interviews as well as the exploration of prosecutors’ and judges’ written decisions revealed 
a persistence of this requirement in practice. Many legal professionals expected a “genuine” 
rape victim to: (a) complain to the first person available; (b) report promptly to the 
authorities; and (c) attend forensic medical examination without delay. These conditions 
are respectively discussed in the following sections.  
a. Complaint to the first person accessible  
The study revealed a disturbing tendency to require rape victims to report to people 
immediately available after the rape, irrespective of who they are. For example, in the case 
of T.J.719 the prosecutor questionably decided as follows: 
She [the complainant] never complained to the suspect’s neighbour who 
saw her entering the house. She did not tell him what happened to her but 
she told other people after a certain time. All this creates doubts whether 
the rape happened, especially as the accused said that they were used to 
having consensual sex. Therefore, we decided to close this case for lack of 
evidence.720  
In another case721 the following conclusion was drawn:   
 
She [the complainant] stated that she screamed and no one came for help 
but she did not attempt to tell the people who came after the alleged 
abuse... This was an opportunity to explain to them that she had been 
raped if she had really been raped.722 
In PP v. Ndayisaba the judge declared that he did not understand why the woman did not 
complain to the defendant’s neighbours:  
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The most confusing fact is that Ndayisaba Augustin may have raped M.J. at 
night and that she did not scream but went to tell U. [the complainant’s 
brother] without telling Ndayisaba’s neighbours who were closer.723 
These passages show prosecutors’ and judges’ misapprehension of victims’ condition in 
the aftermath of rape. They failed to understand that it may be uncertain, shameful or 
unsafe for a rape victim still in a state of shock to complain to unknown people; especially 
persons likely to be related to the accused. Previous studies have shown that victims are 
very conscious regarding to whom they are or are not comfortable disclosing their 
victimisation.724 So, it is not unusual that the complainants did not disclose to the persons 
cited as expected by the legal professionals. 
The failure to understand victims’ situations may sometimes raise a suspicion of 
insensibility on the part of the legal professionals. For example, in a gang rape case725 the 
victim stated that she did not report immediately to her employer because he used to say 
that an adult person cannot be raped.  In spite of this, the judge noted: 
 
Now that it [the rape] happened she [the complainant] should have told M. 
[the employer] that it happened, and see if he would not respond…  
 
This misunderstanding (or insensibility) had serious implications on the outcome of the 
trial because it contributed to the acquittal of the defendant; the judge having concluded: 
 
The court finds that if the complainant was raped, she would have 
informed her employer or other neighbours. She would not have kept 
silent while it is clear that this is an adult and bright twenty-three year 
young woman who would not be victimised and then go to sleep without 
telling anyone.726 
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This expectation to tell the first person available after rape is aggravated by the 
requirement to swiftly bring the case to police. 
 
b. Prompt complaint to official authorities 
 
The next aspect of the requirement revealed in this study is the expectation of immediate 
report to police or other official authorities.  The vast majority of the elite participants 
believed that a genuine rape victim must swiftly report the assault to the authorities and 
that a delayed reporting was indicative of a false accusation. For example, PROSEC3 
claimed that late reports suppose that “some conspiracy to make a false accusation” must 
have been taking place meanwhile. Other elites such as JUDGE6 and 8 also believed that a 
delayed report is an indication that the alleged rape did not take place: 
 
When the accusation is not made immediately we generally conclude that 
the sexual intercourse was consensual. (JUDGE6) 
When the complainant delays to report the first idea that comes to our 
mind is that the offence did not take place because the natural reaction of 
a person affected is to act upon the problem immediately. (JUDGE8) 
The words used by JUDGE8 show a striking similarity with the statement of the common 
law authorities mentioned above. In his original statement this judge used the French word 
“naturel”, meaning “natural” in English, to express his belief that a prompt report is the 
expected normal victim behaviour after rape. This is the same word used by Wigmore as 
well as the Utah Supreme Court in early 20th century (see above). Note that JUDGE8 did 
not quote them. This continues to show the similarities of beliefs about rape victims in the 
two contexts despite cultural differences.  
 
In addition to the elites’ declarations, the study of the cases confirmed the same trend. 
Many prosecution cases were dropped because of delayed reporting. For example, in the 
case of N.E.727 the prosecutor closed the file on the following ground: 
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There is doubt that I.G. [the complainant] was raped by N.E. [the accused] 
because she did not immediately complain to police. Instead, she returned 
home and went to police only after she met her parents. We believe that 
the sexual intercourse was consensual.728 
Similarly, another prosecutor dropped a case729 for the following reason among others:  
 
The fact that she accused him only after she discovered she was pregnant 
and that it was no longer possible to find evidence shows that the rape did 
not take place.730  
 
These cases continue to show a lack of understanding of the victim’s situation after rape 
on the part of the legal practitioners. They require immediate complaint while the victim’s 
condition may not always allow this, as shown above. Paradoxically, while many cases have 
been dropped for not meeting this requirement, analysis of the files did not show any 
significant advantage in most instances where the victims complained to the first person 
met after the rape, or promptly reported to the police.  
The flaws in the requirement of prompt complaint create a need for change in Rwanda. As 
has been demonstrated above, it does not take into account the real experience of most 
victims in the aftermath of rape. It is also based on an incorrect assumption: equating a 
delayed report with a false accusation has proved to be a misconception. Moreover, it is 
prejudicial for the victims whose complaints are unjustly dismissed. In addition, this 
requirement lacks legal basis. In Rwandan law the period of prescription for felonies, 
including rape, is ten years.731 Consequently, requiring rape victims to report immediately 
amounts to a violation of their rights. Clearly, this requirement is unjustifiable in many 
respects. As the practice is based on fallacious beliefs rather than law, there is a need 
primarily for change of attitudes within the legal profession. 
 
c. Requirement to attend forensic medical examination without delay 
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In the previous chapter it was revealed that most legal professionals considered medical 
evidence as superior to other forms of evidence in rape cases. As a result, rape victims 
were required to consult forensic medical examiners without delay. However, whilst it is 
true that medico-legal examination is essential in the investigation of rape, there is no legal 
requirement for victims to be examined. Despite this, the prosecutors sometimes 
penalised them for not attending such examination.  For example, in the case of N.A. and 
S.732 the prosecutor decided that: 
It is not necessary to prosecute this case because although the 
complainant stated that she was raped there is no evidence especially that 
she never attended medical examination.733 
This was a gang rape case where a local leader intervened and managed to arrest one of 
the three suspects. This suspect attempted to escape twice but he was again arrested. 
Clearly, the file contained preliminary evidence that could be built upon to continue 
investigations and possibly to prosecute the case in court. Therefore, the decision that it 
was “not necessary” to prosecute this case was unjustified. This lack of justification 
combined with the wording of the decision raises a suspicion that the closure of the file 
was a reaction to the victim’s non-attendance of medical examination. 
In another similar case of a school-girl complaining of being raped by the school 
headmaster,734 the prosecutor noted:  
...Afterwards she [the complainant] went home and revealed the incident 
long after: eight days later... They even asked her to go for medical 
examination but she did not do so promptly and went there after three 
days, showing that she was not affected.735 
This is another case that betrays not only misconceptions about the victim’s condition after 
rape but also a possible insensitivity on the part of the prosecutor. This prosecutor should 
not have so lightly concluded that the complainant was “not affected” because she 
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complained of severe emotional trauma after the incident736 and the case file also contains 
a report disclosing trauma experienced by the young schoolgirl during the “late” medical 
examination.737 The report mentions that as she was being examined she heard a 
motorcycle running outside the medical centre and immediately lost consciousness. 
According to the report, this happened because the motorcycle reminded her of the 
alleged rapist who usually rode a motorcycle.  This incident could be part of other 
circumstantial evidence corroborating the complainant’s account but it was not considered 
by the prosecutor.  
The problem here may be a combination of the disregard of victim testimony and 
circumstantial evidence (see Chapter 4) and a lack of sensitivity because this incident 
shows that the school girl had a serious emotional condition which should not warrant the 
statement that she “was not affected.” An alternative explanation is that the prosecutor 
did not read the complainant’s statement and the report, which would be equally 
problematic. This prosecutor’s conclusion was uninformed because he failed to realise that 
victims are often worried about seeking treatment or attending forensic examination.738 
This causes some victims to delay in consulting medical examiners.739 
d. Understanding other victim behaviour after rape  
The discussions above reflect a lack of understanding of victim behaviour in the aftermath 
of rape. It was noted that this failure was not limited to the issue of reporting. The study 
identified other types of victim conduct which were also misinterpreted but which could 
be comprehensible if the complainant’s circumstances and the social context of the 
offence were appropriately considered. For example, one victim stayed at the alleged 
rapist’s home for two days after the rape and wanted to marry the accused.740 Another 
stayed with the accused in his home after the assault and continued to have sexual 
intercourse with him until she became pregnant.741 In these and other similar cases the 
prosecutors concluded that such behaviour was indicative of the absence of rape so they 
instantly closed the files.  
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Nevertheless, a close examination of the cases and a careful consideration of the context 
of the offence suggested that these victims were possibly conditioned by their 
circumstances to behave that way and that their conduct was not necessarily incompatible 
with rape. For example, in the case where the victim stayed two days with the alleged 
rapist, a cautious reading of her statement in light of the social context suggested that her 
conduct was plausible. She explained: “I was a virgin before the rape…he had raped me 
and I had no other choice.”742 She then expressed her wish to marry the alleged rapist. This 
complainant may have anticipated blame by her family, friends and the community, 
especially that the alleged rape took place at the assailant’s home (see the effects of 
“kwijyana” in the first section of this chapter). In stating that she “had no other choice”, 
she may have felt “despoiled”743 or rendered a “damaged good”744 in the eyes of society, 
and believed that she had lost her chances of marriage. In such circumstances, she may 
have preferred to become the rapist’s wife instead of being a “social leper.”745 The conduct 
she displayed is therefore plausible and it should not be automatically considered as 
incompatible with rape. 
Victim reactions such as this must be assessed, taking into account the individual 
circumstances of the victim as well as the social context of the offence. In evaluating such 
cases it is important to be conscious of many factors that may influence the victim’s 
conduct in the aftermath of rape such as the fear of social stigma, shame, lack of family 
and institutional support and lack of resources (see Chapter 6). This approach may help to 
explain seemingly unusual behaviour such as a victim’s wish to stay with her rapist and 
become his wife.  
In sum, the study revealed a lack of understanding of the victim’s situation after rape, 
among many prosecutors and judges. These professionals continued to expect of victims 
some pre-conceived behaviour which does not conform to reality. As a result, they took 
many biased decisions to the detriment of the complainants when these expectations 
were not met.  
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The issues revealed here aggravate the problems of evidence analysed in the previous 
chapter. In that chapter, it was revealed that there is a tendency to favour medical 
evidence and disregard victim and circumstantial evidence, which resulted in important 
evidence being discarded in many cases. Here it has been revealed that on top of this, the 
legal professionals often focus on victim behaviour to dismiss their complaints, sometimes 
regardless of the evidence available in the files. The combination of these two trends 
significantly affects attrition in rape cases in Rwanda. 
As in many other jurisdictions, the problem of attrition for rape is critical in Rwanda and 
yet it is absent from academic or public discourse. Many prosecutors were satisfied that 
despite the supposed extreme difficulty of proving rape, they succeeded to win the 
majority of the cases prosecuted. In fact, a quick calculation based on the sample of the 
cases studied shows 79.5 per cent of prosecutions were successful in the first instance. 
This finding is consistent with the figures provided by the public prosecution office which 
reported an average conviction rate of 81.7 per cent for the same period (2012-2016).746 
This figure is apparently not alarming; it may even be judged relatively satisfactory. If one 
relies on these statistics alone, the prosecutors’ satisfaction may be justified to some 
extent. Nevertheless, consideration of the nature of the cases prosecuted and the attrition 
rate before trial prompts reservations about the positivity of these rates.  
The nature and the numbers of rape cases selected for prosecution are deeply problematic. 
It has been revealed in the previous and the present chapters that the vast majority of the 
files transmitted to courts or successfully prosecuted are those containing medical 
evidence of genital or physical injury where the victim did not have a “bad” sexual 
reputation before the attack, had strongly resisted the assault and had reported promptly 
after it. Clearly, these are cases conforming to the “real rape” stereotype. The majority of 
other cases of rape outside these expectations were dropped or the defendants were 
acquitted.  The average attrition rate (complaints dropped) at the stage of prosecution was 
52.9 per cent during the period from 2013 to 2016.747 The rates and causes of attrition at 
police level are unknown, but the number of unreported rapes is estimated at 92.3 per 
cent.748 Based on these figures, it is likely that less than three per cent of all rape suspects 
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are being punished. These realities suggest that there are serious issues of attrition in rape 
cases and under-reporting of this offence which need to be acknowledged and addressed.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter analysed the tendency of justice professionals to hold false beliefs about the 
characteristics and conduct of rape victims and the practice of focussing on the victim’s 
behaviour instead of the defendant’s actions. The chapter revealed that similar to many 
other jurisdictions, particularly before the rape law reforms, Rwandan prosecutors and 
judges continue to hold pre-conceived beliefs about how a rape victim is supposed to 
behave before, during and after a sexual assault for the accusation of rape to be 
considered genuine. Before an assault, victims are expected not to show familiarity with an 
accused and to have a “good” sexual reputation. This results in a practice I called the 
“defence of prostitution”, a specific manifestation of the focus on victim behaviour 
identified in the Rwandan context. During an assault, victims are supposed to resist 
physically or at least to scream in order to show their lack of consent.  After rape, they are 
expected to disclose to the first person accessible, report the incident immediately to the 
authorities and attend forensic medical examination without delay. Victim behaviour 
contrary to these standards tends to prompt the conclusion that an allegation of rape is 
false.  
Relying on previous research, the chapter demonstrates that in real-life many genuine 
victims of rape do not conform to these expectations. First, it explained that the 
assumption that sexually experienced women are necessarily not credible witnesses or are 
supposed to give sexual consent to the defendant is a misconception. Second, the chapter 
showed that in reality many rape victims do not scream or physically resist the assault due 
to various genuine reasons. Third, it provided evidence that most women do not report 
rape immediately for a number of understandable reasons. It was clarified that the pre-
conceived beliefs about “genuine” victims’ behaviour are mostly misconceptions 
connected essentially to the “real rape” myth and the myth of false allegations. 
The chapter also revealed that the tendency to base the evaluation of rape cases on flawed 
assumptions about victim conduct proved very damaging for the victims. It results in unjust 
disqualification of many complaints and release of many accused. This is essentially 
because the focus of investigations is mostly on the conduct of the victims rather than the 
176 
 
actions of the defendants. Moreover, victim characteristics or conduct have a greater 
influence on prosecutors’ and judges’ decisions than the evidence of rape itself in many 
cases. The chapter provided some examples where despite the presence of the type of 
evidence normally accepted according to the prosecutors’ and judges’ own standards, the 
complaints were dismissed and the evidence was overlooked because of victim 
characteristics. This revealed a fundamental problem of attitude towards rape victims 
which should be addressed through education and legal reform.   
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Chapter 6 
EXPLORING THE OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENTS OF RAPE CASES 
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE LEGAL PROCESS 
 
An out of court settlement is an agreement made between parties to a conflict, aimed at 
resolving the dispute outside the legal process.749 It normally implies negotiation and a 
degree of autonomous decision-making. The terminology “out of court settlement” used 
throughout this chapter does not necessarily conform to the definition above, because the 
chapter will reveal that the freedom of negotiation required in out of court settlements 
was often absent in this context. The terminology is used to reflect that people do make 
arrangements outside the legal system. 
This thesis has thus far revealed that rape is infrequently resolved via the courts as few 
cases make it to trial. However, this may not be the end of the matter for some victims. 
The analysis of case files revealed that in some cases, the parties will attempt an “out of 
court settlement” as a method of resolving an accusation of rape. It was clear from the 
case files that such settlements directly impact the legal process for rape in Rwanda. In the 
sample of cases reviewed, seventeen files containing evidence of out of court settlement 
were identified. This number looks relatively low and does not reflect the real incidence of 
the “out of court settlements” of rape. Based on interview data, which revealed that such 
arrangements are made frequently but are not always recorded, it is likely that the 
prevalence of these settlements is high. The figure does not include undocumented 
settlements and other settlements that occurred prior to prosecution. 
This chapter aims to examine the validity and usefulness of these alternative processes, as 
well as their impact on the outcome of the legal process in Rwanda.  The chapter will 
analyse the nature of the “out of court settlements” to find out how they work and what 
outcomes they typically give rise to. It will then examine the criminal justice system’s 
response to these settlements. 
6.1. THE NATURE AND OPERATION OF THE “OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENTS” OF RAPE 
CASES  
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To comprehend the nature of the processes of out of court settlements of rape cases, the 
study relied on the interviews with victims and the elites as well as the analysis of 
documents related to “out of court settlements” contained in the files identified. Other 
“out of court settlements” that possibly took place before the cases reached the 
prosecution service are not part of the following discussion.  
The practice of “out of court settlement” of rape cases is that the offender and/or his 
relatives or friends approach the victim or her family members to seek an amicable 
solution through informal negotiations. For example, in the case of U.F.,750 the victim was 
invited to a meeting where the offender was present and six other people who “helped” in 
solving the matter out of court. At the end of the meeting, they drafted a document 
entitled: “Reconciliation between M.B. [the victim] and U.F. [the accused].”751 These 
processes are not regulated by any written or customary law. The absence of a legal basis 
implies that there is no specific procedure for the negotiations. The setup and conduct of 
the negotiations depend on the participants. Sometimes the negotiations were informally 
“facilitated” by police, prosecutors or local authorities,752 but in most cases it is the 
families of the offenders that played an important role in the processes. The study 
revealed that the victims played a passive role in the “out of court settlements” and that 
the outcome of these processes was the withdrawal of victims from the legal process in 
most cases. These two findings are discussed in the following sections.  
1. The passive role played by victims in the processes: pressures on victims  
Rape victims were mostly submissive in the “out of court settlements” and were often 
used to facilitate the release of offenders. This was rendered possible by pressure placed 
on them to participate in the negotiations or simply to withdraw their cases and/or recant.  
Many victims submitted to pressure due to their vulnerability but some resisted. The 
research study revealed that many victims found themselves in a state of vulnerability 
after the rape. This was caused by various factors, including hostile social attitudes, the 
fear of retaliation, a lack of financial resources and the absence of support from the justice 
system. The interviews revealed that many victim-survivors were marginalised in their 
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community and blamed for their rape. The victims were also in fear of being attacked 
again by their assailants. HAGURUKA files753 further revealed a number of rape victim-
survivors complaining of death threats. In addition, many experienced a lack of financial 
resources to follow up their cases. All this combined with the absence of support from the 
criminal justice system (see Chapter 3), and other emotional effects of rape, put many 
victim-survivors in an additional state of vulnerability that facilitated the pressure put on 
them during the “out of court settlements.” 
The pressure was mostly exerted by families and, in some instances, by prosecutors and 
local authorities who also intervened in the processes, directly or indirectly. The research 
revealed many instances of family pressures on victims to withdraw their complaint. 
Victims were subjected to pressure from offenders’ relatives and friends, or their own 
relatives (acting in complicity with offenders’ families). A number of elite interviewees 
acknowledged the passivity of victims in the “out of court settlements.” For example, 
PROSEC5 noted that: 
…Families meet and make an agreement of reconciliation, and the woman 
writes a letter of forgiveness… it starts with close friends in both families, who 
influence other family members to do everything possible to avoid prosecution.  
The following exchange with SURVIVOR1 shows her own passivity in the settlement of her 
case: 
 After it happened... his parents came home to ask for forgiveness. My parents 
agreed and forgave them, then asked them to use parental authority so that 
their child never again does such a thing. His parents said that they would 
discipline him. Afterwards, they comforted me. His mother asked for 
forgiveness and I forgave her. 
Question: If your parents had not forgiven them, what would you have done?  
Answer: I would not have forgiven him. I wish the judicial authorities 
continued the case and called me for follow up.  
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This exchange shows that SURVIVOR1 only acquiesced to her family’s decision, but it was 
not her choice to “forgive” the assailant.  
Family pressure on victims can be particularly compelling in cases of domestic sexual 
violence. LAWYER6 gave an instance of rape by a stepfather where the victim was obliged 
by her mother to withdraw and recant: 
In one case I remember, the complainant’s mother told her daughter not to 
continue accusing her husband otherwise she would expel her from home. 
When we went to court, the daughter changed her version and the court 
acquitted the defendant.  
 
Pressures on victims may sometimes come from multiple sources and be very difficult to 
resist. For instance, SURVIVOR10 testified that she was pressured by both her own family, 
the offender’s family and other people in the community, to the point that she escaped 
her home and her neighbourhood: 
After the incident, my father harassed me because I caused the arrest of the 
offender who was influential in the local community. He told me: ‘How do you 
dare cause the arrest of such an important person?’ He wanted to force me to 
withdraw the complaint and to say that the rape did not take place...I did not 
do it.  I left home and stayed with the neighbours until I fled to Kigali...  
The offender’s relatives told me to go to the police to testify that he did not 
rape me. I replied: ‘If I change, it is me who will be arrested. Is that what you 
want?’ That day I said yes. Soon after, I decided to leave the neighbourhood 
and went to Kigali to find a job. I escaped. Even my family did not know that I 
left. I was wanted by the offender’s family and I was very scared, which is the 
reason why I escaped. A local authority told me that if I did not prompt the 
release of the suspect I would never have peace…  
He was in jail and people were criticising me in the neighbourhood.  
This survivor was able to resist the pressures but the price was very high because she left 
school and her home and escaped to the capital city. Luckily, she was found by a 
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government institution754 which has been supporting and protecting her. Further evidence 
of pressure on victims was found in a number of other case files (see examples given in 
the sections below). 
In addition to family pressure, the present study examined the role of neighbourhood 
leaders and local authorities in the out of court settlements. Analysis of a sample of files 
revealed that in many cases, they were the first to receive the victims, even before the 
police and medical examiners. They typically supported victims and helped them to reach 
the police station. They sometimes gave information to the police to assist investigations. 
Nevertheless, at a later stage, when the offender or his relatives approached them to 
request assistance in settling the matter out of court, they also sometimes cooperated. On 
the one hand, it is fair to appreciate that local authorities make efforts to reconcile people 
within the community. However, in matters of rape, they should be careful not to pre-
empt criminal proceedings. For example, in the case of N.M.,755 a local authority went as 
far as to write a “certificate to stop the accusation”756 containing the following statement:  
Considering the letter written by I.D [the complainant] on 1st August 2013, 
and after hearing her in person…I certify that I.D. withdraws her complaint of 
rape against N.M. and that she will never again accuse him for any reason.757 
The document was signed by the complainant, four other people and the local leader. It is 
unclear how the complainant was invited to sign this letter, whether she was summoned 
by the local authority, or brought there by the offender or his family members. Such 
intervention by local authorities presents the potential of intimidating complainants who 
may feel obliged to respect the authority.   
The interviews also uncovered allegations of pressure from prosecutors. Two survivors 
said that prosecutors pressured them to settle the matter out of court. SURVIVOR9 stated: 
After I filed the complaint, I waited to be called by the prosecutor or the 
court.  Once the prosecutor called me and asked if I forgave the offender. I 
answered that I never forgave him.  
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It is very dubious for the prosecutor to call the complainant only to ask her if she forgave 
the accused. It was revealed in Chapter 3 that rape victims are generally marginalised and 
that prosecutors almost never question them. This sudden interest in the complainant and 
the enquiry about forgiveness of the accused are questionable.  
SURVIVOR5 also denounced the prosecutor in charge of her case in these terms: 
There was pressure. Yes. From the prosecutor’s side. The prosecutor strongly 
asked me if I wanted to settle the case out of court. It was not best for me to 
accept the offer. It was humiliating.  
 
In addition to interview data, there were a few case files where the victims complained 
that they had been influenced by criminal justice authorities to withdraw their 
complaint.758 It is concerning that some criminal justice personnel may contribute to 
influencing victims to settle their issue out of court. This is an indication of a limited 
understanding of the problem, given that the outcome of these settlements is often to 
serve the interests of the offenders to the detriment of the victims (see below). For this 
reason, prosecutors should not encourage the practice.  
2. The outcome of “out of court settlements” of rape cases  
a. Outcome for offenders: victims’ withdrawal from the criminal justice process 
The study found that the “out of court settlements” of rape cases generally aimed to avoid 
criminal repression of the accused, and rarely redressed the harm caused to victims. A 
possible outcome from settlements is for the victims to withdraw or recant their allegation. 
To withdraw means to “retract” or to “take back”, while to recant means to “disavow a 
statement.”759 In the following discussion, the former will be used when the victim 
retracts her complaint from the criminal justice process and the latter when the victim 
states that her rape complaint was false.  
Data from the interviews revealed that victims’ withdrawals and recantations are a 
frequent outcome of the out of court settlements: 
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Out of court settlements of rape cases are frequent. They are negotiated 
within families and generally after agreement, the victim withdraws her 
complaint and informs the prosecution that the rape in question never took 
place. (LAWYER3) 
I also noted cases where victims, defendants and their families agreed to 
settle the cases out of court... and when [the victims] come to court, they 
change their version. They simply say that they have never been raped. 
(JUDGE4) 
 Sometimes it is clear that the rape was committed and yet the victim writes 
saying that it did not occur. (JUDGE3)   
The high rates of withdrawal and recantations were confirmed by the study of the files 
which revealed many cases where the victims withdrew and sometimes stated expressly 
that their accusations of rape were false. In total, the study identified seventeen cases of 
withdrawal including eight recantations or “confessions” of a false accusation. Out of the 
101 files studied dropped by prosecutors, thirteen cases of victims’ withdrawal were 
identified, including six where the victim recanted. Among the 175 cases transmitted to 
courts for trial, there were four withdrawals, including two cases of recantation.  
The cases of victim recantation were mostly treated by the legal practitioners as false 
allegations. This study scrutinised the contents of the files to explore whether beyond the 
recantations, there was further cogent evidence of fabrication in the files.  Analysis of the 
eight cases of recantation showed that the facts documented in the case files did not 
support the recantations. The case of Shumbusho760 is a tangible example of this situation. 
In this case, W.K. (the complainant), a 19-year-old domestic servant, lived in the same house 
with Shumbusho, the employer, his wife and another person (Witness D.I.). According to the 
prosecution indictment, the night of 27 March 2014 while the wife was absent, Shumbusho 
returned home and forced W.K. to enter his room then raped her. Shumbusho was arrested 
and prosecuted. He pleaded not guilty and stated that the sexual intercourse in question 
was consensual. During the process, the complainant sent a letter to the prosecutor, stating 
the following: “I, W.K., forgive Shumbusho Alphonse. We had sexual intercourse by mutual 
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consent; it was not by force…”761 Based on this recantation, the court dismissed the victim’s 
complaint of rape and acquitted the defendant for the following reason: 
On the evidence W.K. [the complainant] gave during investigations 
accusing Shumbusho Alphonse of rape, it cannot be relied upon because 
she contradicted those statements in her letter of 3 April 2014.762 
Analysis of the case file revealed that, apart from the complainant’s letter of recantation, 
the criminal file did not contain any evidence that suggested a false rape accusation. On the 
contrary, there was direct and circumstantial evidence in the file pointing to the occurrence 
of the rape.  The case file contained a statement of a witness (D.I.) who was present in the 
house at the moment of the rape and personally witnessed the entire rape scene:  
What I personally heard is that W.K. [the complainant] was fighting and crying. 
As all the doors were open, I went near the bedroom and saw everything that 
the boss [the defendant] did. He was on top of W.K., and was restraining her 
hands while W.K. was screaming and crying so loudly that she could be heard 
from outside. I feared to call for help because the boss was very violent and 
would hurt me.763 
In the file, there are also testimonies that Shumbusho previously attempted to rape another 
girl. His wife who was disappointed by the rape of W.K., had accused Shumbusho of rape 
and adultery and given other information about the previous attempted rape and other 
domestic violence she was herself subjected to.764  
Besides these facts which are far from confirming the victim’s recantation, there is in the 
case file strong indication that the victim was pressured to withdraw and recant. Before the 
trial, the wife herself withdrew the complaint of adultery,765 which automatically stopped 
the proceedings for this charge, according to the law. The victim also withdrew but in the 
file, there is a statement of the victim complaining that she had been pressured to withdraw 
and recant. In an (unusual) interrogation subsequent to the letter of withdrawal, the 
prosecutor asked the victim about the recantation. She replied as follows:  
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 Shumbusho’s wife told me to forgive him so that he may be released. I 
refused, cried, and told her that I could not write such thing; that she should 
herself write it if she wished. She wrote a letter and signed on my behalf but 
they refused the letter, then they called me so that I write myself. They came 
to pick me up, then I wrote it, afterwards she told me that he would be 
released immediately. The following day he was released. After his release, I 
left that home.766 
In short, although the victim recanted in this case, analysis of the file contents does not 
suggest the possibility of a false accusation. On the contrary, the facts of the case provide 
reasonable grounds to believe that the rape occurred. Clearly, the victim’s recantation in 
this case is not conclusive evidence of a false allegation. The court should have heard the 
victim to understand why she retracted, but she never appeared in court (see Chapter 3 for 
more detail about the issue of victims’ lack of participation in the legal process).  
A review of the remaining seven cases of recantation also revealed that none of them 
contained any facts suggesting that the rape accusation was false. All the cases contained 
evidence pointing to the occurrence of the rapes, except one which was incomplete and 
could not warrant adequate assessment. In one of the cases, the court convicted the 
defendant despite the victim’s recantation as the case contained overwhelming evidence of 
rape. 767  This suggests that victims’ recantations should not be conflated with false 
accusations. Recantations must be taken with caution as qualitative evidence from this 
study showed that they can often result from pressure.  
The cases of victim withdrawal without recantation were also analysed. The analysis 
revealed that most of them contained persuasive evidence of rape. Some files included 
offenders’ confessions given during the settlements. For example, in the case of U.F.768 
there is a “letter of reconciliation” stating that:  
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A problem of sexual abuse/rape happened between M.B. [the victim] and U.F. 
[the accused]. U.F. confesses the offence and the victim forgives him because 
U.F apologised.769  
The letter was signed by the accused, the victim and six other people who “helped” in the 
negotiations. This case was dropped, one of the reasons being that the victim “forgave” 
the offender.770 
Clearly, the “out of court settlements” of rape cases are mostly centred on offenders’ 
interests. Instead of rendering justice to victims, these processes facilitate rapists to 
escape liability and put victims in a more vulnerable situation, especially when they falsely 
“confess” that they lied about the rape complaint. This makes them criminally liable 
because false testimony is an offence under Rwandan law.771  
b. Outcome for victims: Re-victimisation  
An out of court settlement logically supposes that both sides of the dispute should make 
some concessions, but also benefit from the process. However, what appears to be most 
common is that victims are simply persuaded to withdraw from the criminal justice 
process. This is an illegal but significant gain for alleged perpetrators as it increases their 
chances of release or acquittal in court. There was little evidence to support victims 
gaining anything that met their needs from the settlements. On the contrary, interview 
data and file analyses indicated that the process serves as another form of secondary 
victimisation that further enhances victim vulnerability. 
Despite this reality for many victims of rape, some legal professionals including PROSEC3 
and LAWYER3 still believed that victims withdraw their cases and sometimes recant in 
exchange for money. However, analysis of the amounts of money given to victims during 
the “out of court settlements” and the conditions in which it was offered does not support 
the possibility that victims withdrew their complaints in exchange for financial gain. 
Scrutiny of eight case files containing information about money offered to victims reveals 
that the offers were so menial that it is unreasonable to believe that the victims would 
withdraw for such amounts of money. In four of the eight cases, the victims were offered 
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10,000 Frw or less (equivalent of twelve US dollars).772 In one of these, this small amount 
of money was supposed “to restore the dignity” of the victim.773 In another case, the 
complainant was offered 50,000 Frw (the equivalent of sixty US dollars) to pay medical 
fees related to the rape.774 This was the maximum amount, except for one case in which 
the victim received 700,000 Frw (the equivalent of 840 US dollars).775 This is a very large 
amount compared to the previous offers but it is still below the average compensation 
granted by courts in the cases studied, which is 1,000,000 Frw (equivalent of 1,200 US 
dollars). The highest amount of compensation in the sample of cases was 2,700,000 Frw 
(equivalent of 3,440 US dollars), granted in a military judgment.776  Whether these 
amounts are sufficient to compensate rape is difficult to evaluate, but it is evident that the 
sums given to victims in the “out of court settlements” are, in most cases, so low as to be 
insignificant. 
Why then do victims of rape accept compensations as low as twelve US dollars to “forgive” 
their assailants and sometimes to write a formal letter stating that they lied about the 
rape? The research data suggested that money paid little role in the outcome of cases. 
Instead the decision to resolve cases out of court were the result of a combination of the 
vulnerabilities explained above, the lack of support and lack of alternative options, and 
perhaps most significantly the pressures exerted on victims during the “negotiations.” As 
demonstrated above, many victims were coerced by family or other community members 
to withdraw their complaints and/or recant. 
In some cases, the victims mentioned (apparently without being noticed by prosecutors) 
that they were not willing to take the money and that they accepted out of pressure.  See 
the example of the case below where the victim was forced to accept 30,000 Frw 
(equivalent of thirty-six US dollars). Another example is the case of S.S.,777 where the 
victim was offered 15,000 Frw (equivalent of eighteen US dollars). She expressly stated 
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that she would never accept that money but she was threatened and this was the reason 
why she accepted the money.778   
In other cases where victims took menial sums of money, pressure was not mentioned but 
the facts of the cases indicated that the likelihood of pressure was very high and that the 
victims could not withstand the pressure when it was exerted. For example, in the case of 
R.G.,779 the victim was only eighteen and the accused was sixty-one. On top of that, the 
accused was her employer. She was a domestic worker and lived in the accused’s home. 
She was given 5,000 Frw (equivalent of six US dollars), money that he already owed her, 
and she left the home and her job, leaving a letter “begging forgiveness for having lied.”780 
This letter was signed by the victim, the accused and one other person. There was nothing 
else in the case file to create suspicion that she had lied but this letter was used to 
exonerate the accused.781  The power imbalance in such a case is likely to have been great 
and the victim may have faced immense pressure in the absence of external support.  
There were some instances where the victims refused financial offers. For example, 
SURVIVOR5 who said above that she resisted the prosecutor’s pressures, also refused 
money from the offender’s family: 
 He [the offender’s brother] offered to pay me money if I would say that it was 
a lovers’ quarrel that went bad. For me, it was adding insult to injury.  
 
SURVIVOR5 explained that she found strength to resist pressure, in her family support and 
her own standing. This survivor’s resistance reinforces the finding that it is victims’ 
vulnerability combined with pressures exerted on them that results in withdrawals and 
recantations.  
 
Besides the offers of small amounts of money, in some settlements the victims were 
proposed other forms of “redress.” Nevertheless, some of these still reflected the 
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imbalance and the position of vulnerability in which the victims were. For example, the 
offer to marry the rapist is unacceptably frequent: 
…Families meet and make an agreement of reconciliation, and the girl writes 
a letter of forgiveness. … And they request the release of their son so that he 
can marry the girl. Two such cases happened in the area of Bigogwe. 
(PROSEC5) 
 
Sometimes they tell the victim that he will marry her and therefore remove 
her shame. (JUDGE3) 
 
In the case of R.J.B.,782 the victim agreed to marry the offender.783  Whether such 
marriages are ever in the interest of the victim is profoundly doubtful. Rather, the 
marriage of victim and rapist is likely to cause immense trauma and is in direct opposition 
to the needs of victim-survivors.  
In summary, the study found that victims gain nothing or very little in the “out of court 
settlements” of rape cases. Although there are sometimes agreements reached and 
declarations of “forgiveness” by victims, the conduct and outcome of the processes show 
that the victims are simply used as objects to facilitate offenders to escape justice. What 
then is the response of the criminal justice system to this often grossly unfair and 
potentially criminal practice. Note that in Rwandan law, it is a criminal offence to threaten 
or intimidate a person with intent to influence them “to lodge or withdraw” a 
complaint.784 Yet, this study found evidence that this is the primary objective and outcome 
of most “out of court settlements” in rape cases. 
6.2. RWANDAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO “OUT OF COURT 
SETTLEMENTS” OF RAPE CASES  
As it has been established that the “out of court settlements” of rape cases often 
constitute a re-victimisation of victims and an obstruction to justice, there is a reasonable 
expectation that the criminal justice system should discourage this unfair practice.  
However, the study revealed that prosecutors and judges mostly paid very little attention 
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to these processes and often reacted to victims’ withdrawal or recantation without 
enquiring about the causes. This amounts to a serious failure in the legal process. As 
pointed out earlier, it is important to note that Rwandan law assigns prosecutors the 
responsibility to complete cases that need further investigation. Judges can also take an 
active, inquisitorial role in trials. This means that they are not bound by victims’ 
withdrawals or recantations so they can investigate these and take appropriate decisions. 
Instead, the majority of the justice professionals (mostly prosecutors) tended to 
automatically dismiss cases where victims withdrew their complaints. A minority (mostly 
judges) handled such cases on merit of the evidence available, regardless of victims’ 
withdrawal or recantation.  
1. The majority tendency: Automatic discharge of the accused 
Among the seventeen cases of victim withdrawal identified, thirteen were automatically 
dropped regardless of the evidence contained in the files. Analysis of these cases suggests 
two main reasons influenced such decisions: The suspicion of false accusations and 
concerns about the weakening of the cases. 
Some prosecutors believed that victims’ withdrawals, especially where victims recanted 
their earlier statements, was indicative of a false accusation. Therefore, they tended to 
discharge the accused, without further effort to make any verification. For example, in the 
case of J.P.N.,785 the families of both the accused and the victim reached an agreement 
and requested that prosecution of the case be stopped. The victim became pregnant 
following the alleged rape and the accused agreed to assume parental responsibilities. 
They subsequently wrote the following to judicial authorities: 
We, representatives of the families of H.F. [the victim], and J.P.N. [the 
accused], after hearing their agreement that J.P.N. recognises to have 
impregnated F.N. and that he accepts to take care of the expected child, we 
request that the accusation be cancelled.786 
The letter was signed by ten people from both families but the victim did not sign it. 
Although the letter mentioned that the victim agreed, there is no indication as to whether 
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she actively and freely participated in the negotiations or whether the agreement was in 
her best interest. Instead of investigating the role the victim played in this withdrawal, the 
prosecutor simply dropped the case, concluding that the rape did not take place: 
The fact that the two families agreed shows that the complainant was not 
forced to have sexual intercourse.787 
This case illustrates the prosecutor’s lack of interest in the complainant’s situation. It also 
shows how some prosecutors easily conclude that an allegation is false. Although there is 
no ground to suspect fabrication of the rape in this case, the prosecutor came to this 
conclusion as if it was obvious. Regrettably, this is typical of prosecutors’ attitude in this 
situation.  
Another example of a lack of concern about the complainant’s condition and a superficial 
response of prosecutors to cases of withdrawal and recantation is the case of N.P.788 It is 
alleged in this case that on 31 January 2014, N.P. (the accused) went to visit N.M.R. (the 
complainant). They stayed outside the house, then the complainant entered the house to 
answer a phone call. Immediately the accused followed her into the house and attempted 
to rape her but the complainant successfully escaped, locked him inside the house, and 
called for help. The accused was then arrested. Later, the complainant wrote a letter of 
recantation, entitled “settlement of the issue I have with N.P.” The letter reads: 
I, N.M.R. [the complainant], confirm that what happened between N.P. [the 
accused] and me was mutually consented to, though he went beyond in 
some respects, which I forgive on my consciousness. This letter invalidates 
my previous statements. I write this letter without any pressure.789 
Based on this letter, the prosecutor dropped the case, believing that “the letter is 
evidence that the offence did not take place.”790 
The prosecutor’s decision in this case is based on a superficial assessment of the case 
because behind the complainant’s letter of recantation is a process of forcible “out of 
court settlement” which should have been investigated thoroughly before taking the 
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decision, but it was not. In fact, this complainant’s letter was insufficient to conclude the 
attempted rape did not occur. Starting with the letter itself, it raised important questions 
that remained unanswered: What did the complainant consent to? What did the suspect 
do that was “beyond” the complainant’s consent? What exactly was forgiven by the 
complainant? 
Further, the case file contains a strong indication of pressures on the complainant which 
was not acted upon by the prosecutor. This complainant’s letter was written three days 
after she complained to the police that she was being pressured by the suspect’s relatives 
to withdraw her complaint. At the end of her statement, she clearly showed that she had 
no intention to “forgive” the accused: “Given the gravity of what he did to me, I do not 
forgive him otherwise I would not have accused him to the authorities.” 791  The 
complainant made this statement subsequent to a previous “letter of forgiveness” she 
wrote the day before. In fact, she specifically went to police to clarify that this letter was 
written under coercion. The first letter reads: 
I, N.M.R. [the complainant], forgive N.P. [the accused] for the mistakes he 
inadvertently committed because he did not do what we agreed. Because of 
my consciousness, I forgive him.792 
Three other people signed the letter. In her statement of 3 February 2014, the 
complainant explained the conditions in which the letter was written. She declared that 
she was invited to a meeting in a bar to settle the matter out of court, in the presence of 
the offender’s sister, the offender’s uncle and one other individual they called “afande.”793 
She stated that during that meeting, they forced her to write the letter. The second letter 
was probably needed to secure the release of the accused who was then still in custody. 
The main difference between the two letters is that the second added the element of 
mutual consent. The legal implications of this element are evident.  
This case shows how the victim was used as an object to facilitate the release of the 
accused and how the prosecutor’s response was superficial. The complainant in this case 
was clearly in need of protection. Her situation reasonably dictated the prosecutor to take 
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measures to protect her and investigate the likely obstruction of justice but he failed to do 
this, relying only on the complainant’s letter of recantation to drop the case. The case also 
illustrates why, as I argued in Chapter 3, prosecutors and judges should be obliged by law 
to hear rape complainants before taking decisions on their cases as they have the 
obligation to hear the persons accused of rape. Had the complainant been heard by the 
prosecutor in this case, it is not certain that this prosecutor would have reacted as he did. 
The “out of court settlements” of rape cases and the subsequent complainant withdrawals 
should be a cause of further suspicion of wrongdoing rather than a cause of suspicion of a 
false accusation. Whilst it is possible that an innocent accused person may seek an “out of 
court settlement” for fear of the implications of the legal process, as suggested by 
Hubbard,794 an “out of court settlement” logically indicates the possibility that some 
wrong happened. Therefore, it should not be considered as an indication that the rape 
accusation was false, unless there are strong reasons to suspect so. This means that 
prosecutors should normally be more inquisitive about the rape when an “out of court 
settlement” has taken place, rather than dropping the case. 
A number of prosecutors have defended the choice to drop cases when complainants 
withdraw or recant. Their main argument is that the case is weakened in this situation, 
although there is no obligation on them to drop weaker cases. It may be conceded that 
cases where complainants withdrew become more delicate, but this fact must be put into 
context to understand the limited impact of complainants’ withdrawal. It is argued that 
complainants’ withdrawal should not lead to automatic closure of the case or acquittal of 
the defendant, for a number of reasons. First, it has been shown that rape complainants 
are routinely pressured to withdraw, meaning that the judicial authorities should be 
mindful of this possibility and therefore be more active in finding the truth in such cases. 
Second, the legal practice in rape cases has shown little interest in complainants’ 
testimony, as the tendency is to give more value to medical evidence and direct evidence 
(see Chapter 4). It is questionable why victims’ testimony would regain interest only when 
the victims withdraw. It was also revealed that prosecutors sought victims’ cooperation 
very rarely. Why are they now concerned with a lack of victims’ cooperation? The concern 
expressed by prosecutors about “essential” victims’ collaboration seems to be an 
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intellectual explanation of the practice of dropping cases in which the victim withdraws, 
rather than a statement of facts. I have argued that victims’ cooperation is undeniably 
essential, however given that rape victims are routinely excluded from the legal process in 
Rwanda, the recognition of their importance only when they withdraw is highly 
questionable. Although Chapter 3 criticised the marginalisation of victims from the legal 
process, the option to proceed with the cases despite victims’ withdrawal appears more 
consistent, logical and useful. 
2. The minority tendency: Proceed despite victims’ withdrawal 
Within this minority tendency, it is worth noting that some judges seem more inclined to 
rely on available evidence despite victims’ withdrawal than prosecutors do. In their 
interviews, more judges defended the option to rely on available evidence in cases of 
victim withdrawal or recantation while the majority of prosecutors supported the decision 
to drop the cases. In practice, out of the seventeen cases of victim withdrawal, 
prosecutors dropped thirteen cases and sent to court three cases. One complaint was 
withdrawn while already in court. The judges convicted three defendants out of four. This 
suggests that prosecutors should not necessarily anticipate more difficulties in court in 
cases of victim withdrawal, and contradicts their belief that a victim’s withdrawal 
necessarily weakens a case. 
A few prosecutors and many judges acknowledged the possibility of pressures put on 
victims to withdraw, so they were more inquisitive. Speaking of victims’ recantations, 
some judges said: 
When a complainant changes her account of the rape, the judge must be 
cautious regarding complainant interrogation; they must verify other evidence 
and ensure if the complainant is saying the truth or not... (JUDGE5)  
 ...When the complainant does not convince us, we do not accept such 
changes. (JUDGE3)  
Many judges opted to ignore victim withdrawal or recantation. For example, JUDGE9 was 
categorical: “In such cases we rely on the evidence produced by the prosecution...and 
ignore her statement.” As stated above, this tendency was verified in a number of 
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judgments. For example, in Habiyaremye795  the complainant wrote a letter stating that 
her rape complaint was false. The defendant was convicted at first instance despite that 
letter. He appealed on the ground that the first judge ignored the complainant’s letter. 
The High Court simply decided that it could not rely on the complainant’s letter of 
recantation because the case contained sufficient evidence of rape.796 In two other cases 
of withdrawal without recantation, the courts convicted the defendants, despite the “out 
of court settlements.” In total three out of four defendants were convicted in cases of 
victim withdrawal. 
However, although this looks like an appropriate way of handling cases of withdrawal or 
recantation, the underlying drive of this tendency is dubious. In fact, one of the reasons 
why victim withdrawal or recantation has less effect on judges’ opinions may be the 
disregard of victim evidence and the requirement of particularly strong evidence in cases 
of rape, to the extent that it may be clear that the rape happened although the victim 
recanted.  Judges are only seeing a narrow subset of victim withdrawal cases which 
contain overwhelming evidence of rape. Chapter 4 denounced these practices so they are 
not proposed as permanent solutions to the issue of victim withdrawal.  
A sustainable solution may be found in the following. The first priority is to adopt 
mechanisms to protect rape victims and to ensure that they are safe and free from 
pressure. In addition, prosecutors should start pursuing those who attempt to coerce 
victims to withdraw or recant because their actions amount to an offence, as noted above. 
This may discourage the “out of court settlements” that use victims to exonerate 
offenders. Also, instead of dropping such cases, prosecutors should pursue them to avoid 
unwanted exoneration of the alleged rapists. All this requires education and sensitisation, 
to change the attitudes towards rape. In fact, education will be the cornerstone of the 
change because the issue is fundamentally about attitude.  
3. The fate of rape complainants who “confessed” to have lied  
Interestingly, there was no tendency to prosecute the complainants who “confessed” that 
they lied. Neither the persons presumably falsely accused nor the prosecutors showed an 
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interest in prosecuting them. Perhaps the satisfaction of the accused and their absence of 
complaint de-motivated prosecutors to hold accountable the women supposed to have 
lied. In fact, if the accused is aware that the victim was pressured to recant, he is unlikely 
to push for her prosecution because his interest is only to escape criminal liability for the 
rape. Prosecution of the recanting victim may backfire on the accused as it may expose 
the truth about the pressure on the victim and the rape itself.  
It is unclear why those who believed that the rape allegations were truly false did not 
prosecute the complainants while they had what could be perceived as evidence of a false 
accusation. Surely their prosecution should be a natural response, given the fear caused 
by the perception of widespread false rape allegations and the potential grave damages 
caused to innocent men falsely accused of rape. Strangely enough, this research did not 
come across information about a single case of prosecution of a false rape allegation. The 
interviewees who commented on this said that they “never” prosecute such cases. Some 
prosecutors said that it would be “useless.”  This inaction against women who “confess” 
rape fabrications seems to be inconsistent with the fear of false rape allegations expressed 
by many legal professionals as well as lawmakers. It tends to reinforce the finding that the 
fear of false allegations is very much exaggerated compared to the reality. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the “out of court settlements” of rape cases in Rwanda. It 
revealed that these settlements are largely centred on offenders’ interests and disregard 
the needs of the victims as they are mostly used to facilitate offenders’ escape from 
criminal liability. The study found that many victims are in a state of vulnerability caused 
by a hostile social attitude, fear, a lack of financial resources, the lack of support from the 
justice system, and other emotional effects of rape, which put them in a weak position of 
negotiation during the settlements. Taking advantage of this weakness, the offenders and 
their families exert pressure on victims to withdraw their complaints from the criminal 
justice system and state that they were never raped, in order to facilitate the defendants’ 
release. The study reviewed the cases of withdrawals and recantations and found that the 
files contain no information of any fact supporting the possibility of a false allegation. On 
the contrary, most include strong indications of the occurrence of the assault. In brief, 
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rape victims are used in the “out of court settlements” as objects to facilitate the release 
of the accused.  
The victims are passive subjects and they gain almost nothing in the “settlements”, 
contrary to the belief of many Rwandan legal professionals that the withdrawals resulting 
from the settlements may be driven by financial gain. The study examined the cases 
containing financial offers and found that in most of them the amounts of money given to 
victims are so insignificant that it would be unreasonable to believe that the victims 
withdraw their complaints and/or recant for such menial offers. The study found that it is 
the combination of victims’ vulnerability and pressure exerted on them which result in the 
withdrawals and recantations.  
The chapter also analysed other forms of “redress” proposed to victims and revealed that 
these offers are a reflection of gender imbalance and exploitation of victims’ vulnerability. 
A most unfair example is the agreement to marry the rapist, which is clearly a 
manifestation of victims’ great vulnerability and powerlessness as well as societal failure 
to protect them. In brief, rather than obtaining redress from the “out of court 
settlements”, most victims are severely re-victimised in these processes. 
Analysis of the criminal justice system’s response to these settlements showed that 
prosecutors and judges tend to react to the victims’ withdrawals or recantations resulting 
from the “out of court settlements” without investigating the causes, although the law 
allows them to be inquisitive in such cases. The majority tendency of the legal 
professionals is to automatically dismiss the complaints. Only a minority of the cases of 
withdrawals result in prosecution and conviction, based on other strong evidence 
contained in the files. This is a serious failure because, by remaining superficial and 
abstaining to enquire about the causes of these withdrawals and recantations, the 
criminal justice system is failing to protect the victims against threats and other pressures. 
On the contrary, the accused are being discharged in the majority of cases, while victims’ 
withdrawals are wrongly reinforcing the myth that women tend to make false accusations 
of rape. Paradoxically, the system tends not to prosecute the victims who “confess” to 
have lied about the rape, despite the common perception about the gravity and the 
widespread character of false rape accusations. This suggests that the fear of false 
accusations is artificial.   
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis contributes to academic knowledge on the impacts of rape myths and gender 
bias on the legal process for rape in Rwanda. Rwanda has resolved to end the gender 
imbalance that has traditionally characterised society, but sexual violence remains a major 
obstacle to this effort. The high probability that rape myths are undermining the criminal 
justice system’s response to sexual violence in Rwanda prompted this research which 
investigated, identified and revealed rape myths present in the legal process, and in doing 
so the thesis provides new knowledge that may serve to improve the system’s response to 
rape in the future.  
The thesis sought to answer the main question of whether the legal process for rape in 
Rwanda is influenced by rape myths.  To address this key question, I adopted a socio-legal 
qualitative approach which triangulated three methods: interviews, observations and 
document analysis. I interviewed forty persons who have experience of the legal process 
for rape including judges, prosecutors, defence lawyers and rape victim-survivors. I also 
conducted ten court observations and analysed 276 files including 101 cases dropped by 
prosecutors and 175 tried in courts.  
The empirical research provided a resounding answer to this research question.  The study 
found that the legal process for rape in Rwanda is directly influenced by multiple rape 
myths. Similar rape myths, as identified in many Western jurisdictions, are present 
throughout the legal process for rape in Rwanda. Prosecutors and judges are influenced by 
myths about rape when handling rape cases and there are no special procedures as exist 
in other jurisdictions, that may limit the effects of rape myths in the legal process. 
Below I summarise my key findings again and reflect further on how these findings are 
situated in the extant literature. Finally, I offer a number of recommendations to the 
relevant justice institutions tasked with responding to rape. 
7.1. THE MAIN RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Before presenting the empirical findings, the thesis begins with the analysis of Rwandan 
rape laws in Chapter 2, which reveals that after the genocide of Tutsi people in 1994, 
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sexual violence has been given a particular importance, which is reflected in the resolve to 
repress genocide rape and the reform of gender-based violence laws. Thousands of 
genocide rape offenders have been punished in the most severe way, using gacaca courts, 
despite the enormous difficulties experienced by rape victims in testifying before these 
courts due to their popular character. This is an unprecedented achievement of gacaca, as 
wartime and genocide rapes have historically remained unpunished across the world.   
While addressing genocide crimes, Rwanda undertook the legal reform of gender-based 
violence laws in 2008, which introduced a number of positive changes. However, analysis 
of these amendments reveals some legal issues and the persistence of tolerance of 
violence against women within the law. The chapter further notes a number of 
foreseeable issues likely to result from the legal loopholes, such as the absence of special 
procedures that may limit the influence of rape myths on the legal process and the 
existence of a definition of rape which is not adequate to appropriately protect women 
against sexual violence. The effects of these were also investigated in the empirical 
research, which reveals the following main findings.  
Finding 1. Rape complainants are not believed by most justice practitioners and are 
marginalised from the legal process. They play a minor role in the process while they 
should have an important place as both victims and witnesses. 
The thesis presents in Chapter 3 the finding that most of the judges, prosecutors and 
lawyers interviewed believe that rape complainants tend to make false accusations. They 
express a profound distrust of rape victims, which leads them to dismiss many complaints, 
regardless of the contents of the criminal files which include strong indicators of rape in 
many cases. This confirms findings in other jurisdictions about the existence within the 
criminal justice system, of a myth that women are prone to making false allegations of 
rape although there is no evidence supporting this.  
The thesis attempts to address a methodological issue existing in the literature on false 
accusations. Most studies rely only on perceptions of the legal professionals to analyse the 
belief about the existence of widespread false rape allegations. This research transcended 
such perceptions and scrutinised the contents of individual case files classified as false 
accusations by the legal professionals, in order to verify if these files contain evidence of 
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fabrication. The research further challenged the legal practitioners to give tangible 
examples of false reports, based on their experience. This provided greater understanding 
of the reasons why they believe a complaint is false, and to verify whether their beliefs 
could be supported with tangible evidence.  
This approach provided extensive evidence of rape complaints that had been classified as 
“false” but where the case files did not provide any reasonable basis for such a conclusion. 
The thesis reveals that in most cases, the legal professionals mistakenly rely on 
stereotypical indicators of a false accusation, such as a late reporting, the victim’s sexual 
experience, victim withdrawal, or the absence of victim injury, to conclude a complaint is 
false. Rather than finding evidence of fabrication in the cases declared false, the scrutiny 
of case files mostly showed strong indicators of rape such as victim and witness 
testimonies, other circumstantial evidence and sometimes confessions by the accused 
themselves. More importantly, the thesis reveals that in all the cases reviewed, no prior 
deliberate investigation was conducted by the professionals to verify the falsity of the 
accusation before ascertaining this. The examples given by the legal practitioners during 
the interviews also confirm that prosecutors and judges usually rely on stereotypical 
indicators of a false accusation to classify specific reports as false, without supporting 
evidence. 
The research approach proved instrumental in distinguishing perceptions from reality. In 
this way, the thesis contributes to the debate on widespread false allegations of rape. It 
provides strong evidence that, at least in Rwanda, the real (but unknown) prevalence rate 
of false rape allegations must be much lower than it is believed by the legal professionals. 
This is because of the exaggerated conflation of false allegations with other allegations 
which are erroneously classified as false. The distrust of victims has multiple implications 
as is demonstrated again in the next three findings.  
In addition to this distrust, the thesis reveals that rape complainants are marginalised from 
the legal process. Their role is limited to reporting the crime to the police as they are 
almost entirely excluded from the remaining phases of the justice process. They appear 
very rarely before prosecutors or in court, as victims or witnesses of crime.  
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In most jurisdictions, victims of crime generally have a marginal place in the criminal 
justice process as their role is mostly limited to reporting the incident and providing 
testimony in court. This is due to the asymmetric nature of the criminal justice process, 
which is mostly concerned with criminal wrongs committed against the state and ensuring 
safe conviction of defendants. In the context of Rwanda, the situation is significantly 
exaggerated because the victims are usually excluded from the process after they report 
the crime to the police.  
This practice has negative implications for justice for rape victims. It increases chances for 
offenders to escape liability because it deprives prosecutors and judges of substantial 
input that can improve the evaluation of cases. The practice also results in victims’ 
dissatisfaction and deep distrust of the legal system. Some victims are frustrated despite 
their rapists being convicted, due to the lack of participation in the process. Moreover, 
many victims feel unsupported by the criminal justice system. This makes them more 
vulnerable and facilitates pressures to withdraw their complaints, as is explained again in 
finding 4. 
Finding 2. Due to the distrust of rape complainants, prosecutors and judges have created 
biased evidential rules which are contrary to the law and negatively affect the outcome 
of cases. 
This thesis revealed in Chapter 4 that the disbelief of rape complainants has been 
translated into biased rules of evidence. The judges, prosecutors and lawyers interviewed 
repeatedly insisted that victims’ testimony is not reliable and that it must be corroborated 
by other evidence, in particular medical evidence, considered by most of them as superior 
and reliable. The legal professionals give more value to medical evidence due to the belief 
that rape is proved by genital injuries which can best be documented by a forensic medical 
doctor, despite previous research showing that genital (and bodily) injuries are not a 
necessary outcome of rape. This resulted in the relegation of victims’ testimony, the 
requirement of medical evidence and the requirement of direct evidence, or testimony of 
witnesses who “saw the rape” being committed.  
These rules of practice have been established by the justice professionals in spite of the 
law specifying the contrary. Evidence law and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of 
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Rwanda are clear that victim testimony, expert testimony and circumstantial evidence are 
all admissible forms of evidence and that there is no hierarchy among them. Moreover, 
there is no corroboration requirement or obligation to provide direct evidence in the law. 
While in many Western jurisdictions rape myths have influenced the creation of legal rules 
such as the corroboration requirement, in Rwanda the same myths have prompted similar 
practices, but which are contrary to the law. This shows the extent to which rape myths 
are powerful and affect different legal systems in different ways but with similar results.  
Although there are many similarities between Western and Rwandan legal systems, the 
thesis reveals a specificity in the context of Rwanda regarding medical evidence.  This is 
the exaggerated and biased role played by medical examiners in rape cases. They tend to 
provide excessive information and disproportionately influence the legal professionals. 
The research enriches the existing literature on medical evidence by demonstrating the 
influence of rape myths on forensic doctors and its immediate impact on the outcome of 
rape cases. The thesis reveals that many medical examiners are themselves influenced by 
the “real rape” myth and, in turn, they directly influence prosecutors and judges. In many 
instances, the doctors advise that there is no rape when they do not find genital or bodily 
injuries on the victims examined.  Prosecutors and judges often adopt the doctors’ views, 
and automatically dismiss rape complaints which do not provide evidence of victim injury. 
This inappropriate and erroneous use of medical evidence aggravates the effects of the 
relegation of victim evidence in rape cases.  
Another form of evidence that can potentially assist in the prosecution of rape cases is 
circumstantial evidence, yet it is also regularly disregarded.  The thesis demonstrates the 
importance of circumstantial evidence in rape cases and shows that this type of evidence 
can legitimately and effectively help prove rape if it is carefully gathered and evaluated. 
Instead, circumstantial evidence is disregarded in most cases, the prosecutors and judges 
requiring only direct evidence.  
These biased, unwritten, rules created by the legal practitioners in Rwanda have very 
detrimental effects on the legal process because many cases which do not include the 
types of evidence unfairly required, are simply dismissed despite other legally admissible 
evidence contained in the files. This is affecting justice for the victims of rape in Rwanda 
and is potentially facilitating many rape offenders to escape punishment. 
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Finding 3. While handling rape cases, prosecutors and judges focus on victim 
characteristics and behaviour rather than the defendant’s actions. These justice 
practitioners erroneously expect the victims to behave in a pre-conceived way so that 
they can accept that the rape was committed. When the victim’s conduct does not 
conform to these expectations, the accused are generally released. Many of these cases 
contain strong indicators of rape but they are overlooked. This results in many rape 
defendants being released or acquitted in an unjustified way. 
The thesis reveals in Chapter 5 that Rwandan legal professionals, in many respects, react in 
a similar way to many Western jurisdictions, particularly reflecting pre-1970s practices. 
They continue to hold pre-conceived beliefs about a “genuine” rape victim’s conduct 
before, during and after the assault. Before rape, victims are expected to have a “good” 
sexual reputation and not to have shown any form of familiarity with the assailant. During 
the attack, they are expected to express their non-consent by physical resistance or at 
least by screaming. After the assault, they must disclose to the first person available, 
promptly complain to the police and attend medical examination. A victim’s behaviour 
contrary to these expectations tends to lead to the conclusion that she made a false 
allegation, despite previous research showing that these pre-conceived ideas about a 
“genuine” rape victim are a misconception. In many cases reviewed, the prosecutors and 
judges openly declared that the accusations were false, based only on the absence of the 
above expectations and despite strong indicators that the rape was committed.  
This finding presents similarities with the chastity requirement, the resistance requirement 
and the requirement of prompt complaint caused by the influence of rape myths in many 
Western jurisdictions. Some of these requirements have been part of the law in other 
jurisdictions, such as the requirement of prompt complaint in the United States. In Rwanda, 
none of them is integrated in the law, but they prevail in the prosecutorial and judicial 
practice.  
It is worth noting that these practices in Rwanda are unlikely to have been influenced by 
Western laws. This is because Rwandan law does not adopt them and there is no sign of 
such an influence. Moreover, the Rwandan legal practitioners never cite Western laws to 
support their practice. Clearly, it is the influence of rape myths that results in these biased 
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practices, not the influence of Western laws. This continues to demonstrate that rape 
myths similarly influenced both Western and Rwandan systems sometimes through 
different mechanisms. 
 Nevertheless, this research study reveals specific types of myths in Rwanda such as 
“kwijyana,” which is an inference of sexual consent from a victim’s visit to someone’s 
home. Another specific manifestation of the focus on victim behaviour identified in the 
Rwandan context is what I termed the “defence of prostitution”, a very prejudicial practice 
allowing defendants and their lawyers to routinely argue without evidence, that the victim 
is a prostitute, in order to show that the rape did not take place.  
This practice is comparable to the admission of sexual history evidence in many Western 
jurisdictions but it is more exaggerated in Rwanda. Some scholars have attributed the 
negative effects of the admission of sexual history evidence to the adversarial system of 
criminal proceedings, but a more pronounced malpractice which is the “defence of 
prostitution” is found in Rwanda, a traditionally inquisitorial system. This is another 
indicator that rape myths may similarly influence the justice system across different legal 
systems. 
The malpractices summarised in finding 3 aggravate those explained in the previous two 
findings, resulting in a system where only “real rape” cases are likely to go through the 
legal process and to secure conviction. But this is not the end of the matter for many 
victims, as explained in finding 4. 
Finding 4. Many cases of rape are resolved out of court but during these processes many 
victims are pressured to recant and/or withdraw their complaints from the criminal 
justice process in order to facilitate the release of the accused. These withdrawals and 
recantations are interpreted by most prosecutors and some judges as evidence of false 
rape allegations. This results in the majority of the cases of withdrawal being dropped 
even when these contain tangible signs of rape. 
This finding reported in Chapter 6 reveals the existence of the practice of out of court 
settlement of rape cases which is based on a cynical exploitation of victims’ vulnerability 
whereby the complainants are simply used to facilitate the release of the accused. Many 
victims are pressured to withdraw their complaints from the justice system and 
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sometimes to change their initial report and state that they were not raped, in order to 
allow the defendants to escape criminal liability. The pressure is mostly exerted by 
members of the accused’s family, sometimes in connivance with the victim’s family. They 
take advantage of the situation of vulnerability in which many victims find themselves 
after rape. This vulnerability stems from many factors including community stigmatisation, 
the lack of financial resources, the fear of retaliation by the assailant, the lack of support 
by the criminal justice system, and other emotional condition resulting from the assault. 
The thesis reveals that it is the combination of this vulnerability with the pressure exerted 
on the victims which cause many to withdraw their complaints from the legal process and 
to recant.  
This unacceptable situation is often misinterpreted by most legal professionals who tend 
to believe that these withdrawals and recantations are conclusive evidence of false 
accusations. Yet, the study reveals that this is not the case. Analysis of the cases of 
withdrawal demonstrates that they do not contain any information supporting the 
possibility of a false accusation but, on the contrary, most include evidence that the rapes 
took place. Despite this, most of these cases are dropped and no measure is taken to 
prevent or stop pressures on victims.  Clearly, this is a failure by the justice system to 
protect rape victims and to give them justice.  
This finding seems unique to the context of Rwanda as the broader literature does not 
reveal its existence in other jurisdictions. Perhaps the same situation may be prevailing in 
societies with a similar socio-economic situation but, to my knowledge, this is not yet 
revealed by research.  The thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing 
concrete evidence that a victim’s withdrawal or recantation is not a sure indicator of a 
false accusation.  
7.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
All the biased practices revealed in this thesis combined result in a justice gap for female 
victims of rape. Although the conviction rate for rape is apparently high at approximately 
80 per cent, the figure is misleading as this thesis reveals that successful prosecutions are 
mostly composed of cases conforming to the “real rape” myth, and many defendants are 
unjustly acquitted. Moreover, the cases dropped by prosecutors are 52.9 per cent, most of 
which are erroneously dismissed as demonstrated in this research. Previous research also 
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reveals that the figures of unreported rape cases are alarming: they are estimated at 92.7 
per cent. Based on these statistics, it is likely that less than three per cent of potential rape 
suspects are being punished in Rwanda. Although this failure cannot be entirely imputed to 
the legal system alone, the justice system has an important role to play in addressing the 
problem. 
In summary, this thesis reveals fundamental issues in the prosecution and trial of rape 
cases in Rwanda. The four key findings presented in the thesis are evidence that justice in 
rape cases is beyond the reach of most victims, despite many efforts made by the 
government to repress sexual violence. There is a profound influence of rape myths on the 
legal process in Rwanda, which is seriously undermining the prevention of rape by the 
prosecution service and the courts. Due to these misconceptions, many rape offenders are 
unjustly escaping criminal liability as the cases that secure conviction are mostly those 
which conform to the “real rape” myth. This ineffective tackling of rape constitutes a 
hindrance to Rwanda’s campaign against gender-based violence and the promotion of 
gender equality. Therefore, these efforts need to include strategies that are designed to 
counteract rape myths within the public and the criminal justice system. 
The thesis confirms that similar rape myths identified in many Western jurisdictions exist 
in the legal process for rape in Rwanda despite different cultural and socio-economic 
contexts. This is an indication that patriarchal societies may share common beliefs about 
rape and rape victims in spite of cultural differences. The thesis also reveals that the 
influence of rape myths may result in the creation of unwritten rules of evidence that are 
similar despite different legal systems. Indeed, there are findings specific to the local 
context, which were not revealed in other jurisdictions. The thesis found evidence of rape 
myths playing out in often unique and more exaggerated ways in the Rwandan context. 
This thesis demonstrates that rape myths still appear to persist in Rwanda’s legal system 
which is traditionally inquisitorial as in the adversarial system, despite this significant 
system difference. The issue is, therefore, not the type of the legal system in place but the 
influence of rape myths on the legal process. This is a warning that the tendency 
mentioned above to embrace adversarial system in Rwanda may not necessarily improve 
the system, particularly concerning prosecution and trial of sexual offences. 
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The findings of this research may be of interest for other countries, especially African 
societies, which are likely to experience similar phenomena due to similar socio-economic 
situations. The study findings are surely of particular interest for Rwanda. To my 
knowledge, this thesis is the first research study that exposes the effects of the influence 
of rape myths on the legal process for rape in Rwanda. Therefore, the research study can 
be an inspiration for policy change and a key reference point for further research in 
Rwanda.   
The following recommendations are made specifically to Rwandan institutions that can act 
upon the issues revealed in the study, and to researchers. 
Challenging social attitudes 
A sustainable solution to the problems caused by the influence of rape myths on the legal 
process lies in the change of attitudes because the issue is fundamentally about attitudes 
towards women, rape victims and rape. Government institutions, including the Ministry of 
Gender, which have already started an awareness campaign against gender-based 
violence more than a decade ago, may need to readjust public education strategies 
accordingly, by including themes and methods aimed at eradicating rape myths from 
public perceptions.  
The need for legal reform  
Although the problem of rape myths is primarily about beliefs, the study reveals many 
issues that need to be addressed by a legal reform. The biased prosecutorial and judicial 
practices revealed in the thesis including the corroboration requirement, the chastity 
requirement, the resistance requirement, and the requirement of prompt complaint can 
be curtailed by legislation. Other practices such as the marginalisation of victims from the 
legal process and the unfair “out of court settlements” can also be corrected by law.    
A new reform of rape laws is therefore needed to protect women against sexual violence 
in a more effective way. The change would include the following four aspects: a new 
definition of rape that adequately protects women’s (and men’s) sexual autonomy, the 
enactment of a law allowing greater participation of rape victims in the legal process, the 
adoption of special procedures which limit the effects of rape myths on the legal process, 
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and the regulation of out of courts settlements with the view to protecting the interests of 
both the victims and the defendants. 
Changes to strategy and public policy  
Before any further legal reform and based on the current law, justice institutions can take 
significant steps in response to the issues revealed in the thesis. These steps would include: 
taking immediate measures to protect victims of rape from pressure; adopting a long term 
sensitisation strategy that is designed to change the justice practitioners’ attitudes 
towards rape victims; developing a specific training program for the legal professionals, 
focused on pre-emption of the influence of rape myths; adopting directives aimed at 
encouraging victims’ participation in the legal process and discouraging the “defence of 
prostitution”; providing guidelines on thorough investigation of cases of victims’ 
withdrawals and recantations.  
Remaining gaps in knowledge  
Many important questions can be raised from this thesis and be of interest for further 
research. They include the following: 
(1) What education strategies can be adopted to change the attitude of the public towards 
rape victims? 
(2) What types of “rape-shield” laws are appropriate to the context of Rwanda? 
(3) How to eradicate rape myths among legal practitioners? 
(4) What is the extent of the influence of rape myths at the level of judicial police 
investigation? 
(5) How the “out of court settlements” of rape cases can be channelled to protect the 
interests of both the accused and the victims? 
Research to answer these questions among others, is needed in order to inform Rwanda’s 
continuous endeavour to eradicate violence against women and achieve gender equality. 
Actually, the lack of adequate knowledge is one of the “major challenges” to this effort.797  
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Prosecutors and judges are working hard to provide justice, without knowing that the 
influence of rape myths negatively affects the outcome of their work. Indeed, there are 
fundamental issues of justice for rape victims. Borrowing a term used by Kelly et al. (2005), 
it is not an exaggeration to state that this thesis reveals an invisible “chasm” in the 
prosecution of rape in Rwanda. The legal system is failing rape victims while the country is 
making significant achievements in the promotion of gender equality and has resolved to 
end sexual violence. If this grave issue is to be eradicated, it is crucial to limit the effects of 
rape myths on the legal process. I hope that the knowledge acquired in the present thesis 
will contribute to this national campaign. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
University of Sussex 
STUDY TITLE: “Are Rwandan Rape Trials Influenced by Rape Myths?” 
INVITATION  
You are being invited to participate in this research. Before you decide whether or not 
to take part, it is important that you understand the rationale for this research, the 
objective behind doing the research and indeed what this research will involve for you. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY? 
This study is conducted as part of a PhD program at the University of Sussex. The aim of 
the study is to investigate how rape trials are conducted in Rwanda and what are the 
factors that influence the trial process and outcomes. It is hoped that the findings of the 
study will be used by policy makers and legal professionals to improve the quality of 
rape trials in Rwanda. The study started in September 2014 and is scheduled to end in 
September 2017. 
WHY HAVE I BEEN INVITED TO PARTICIPATE? 
You have been invited to participate because you have an experience of a rape trial. 
Twenty-four other people will take part in the research. Your views and opinions are 
very important for this study. 
DO I HAVE TO TAKE PART? 
It is your full discretion whether or not to take part in this research. If you do decide to 
take part, you will be given a consent form for you to sign. You are at liberty to withdraw 
from participating in this research at any time and without giving a reason. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO ME IF I TAKE PART? 
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Taking part will involve an interview with you which will be audio taped or by note 
taking. The interview will last approximately one hour at a time convenient to you. It will 
be conducted in a safe place agreed upon with the researcher.  
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF TAKING PART? (WHERE 
APPROPRIATE) 
It is expected that this research work will not have any risk or disadvantage on you. In 
every circumstance, care will be taken not to do anything that may be detrimental to 
you. However, during the interview, it is possible for you to revive past experience 
which may cause distress to you. You can stop at any stage the interview if you feel 
uncomfortable and you can refuse to answer any questions that you feel are too 
distressing. The researcher will make arrangements to ensure that appropriate support 
may be obtained promptly if needed.  
You will incur some costs such as transport fare to reach the place of interview. You will 
also give your time to travel and participate in the research. Nevertheless, this cost will 
be reimbursed by the researcher. 
At the end of the interview you will have a chance to tell what your experience of 
participating in the research was like, and this will be taken into consideration for this 
and future studies.  
WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF TAKING PART? 
Your participation to this study will be an opportunity to express your views and 
opinions on this very important topic. It will contribute to improving the understanding 
of rape trials in Rwanda.   
WILL MY INFORMATION IN THIS STUDY BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL? 
All the information collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential. The data you will give will be anonymised. This means that your 
proper name will never appear in any draft or in my thesis. Starting from data 
transcription, your name will be replaced by a pseudonym and during text drafting, 
anything that could link data to you will be avoided. You will also have the right to 
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withdraw your data if it is linked to you but withdraw will no longer be possible once 
data has been included in the final draft of the thesis, which is scheduled in August 2017. 
The only limits to this confidentiality would be if you were to tell something that 
suggested that there would be a reason to be worried about harm to yourself, or to 
someone else. In these circumstances it would be important to share this information 
appropriately. Please note that this is likely to be a very rare occurrence.  
It is intended that the interview will be audio-recorded, transcribed and used exclusively 
during the analysis of data. If you wish, you will be given a transcript of data concerning 
you for approval before being included in the write-up of the research. Recorded data 
shall be kept on a secure computer and will not be shared with any other person or for 
any other purpose but this study; and such information will be completely deleted from 
any storage by the end of the project.  
WHAT ABOUT MY SAFETY? 
In the course of this study, nothing will be done directly or indirectly which is capable of 
putting your name, family, community, work, contact, discussions, recordings, and 
opinion in jeopardy. Likewise, nothing will be included in this study which will affect 
your job, your integrity or your safety. 
WHAT SHOULD I DO IF I WANT TO TAKE PART? 
If you intend to take part, you can email, call or text me, or inform me via any means of 
communication. You will keep this information sheet and sign a consent form. 
Afterwards will shall agree on how and where you shall participate. 
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO THE RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH STUDY? 
The result of this research will be submitted as a PhD thesis to the School of Law, Politics 
and Sociology of the University of Sussex. Subject to academic information 
dissemination of the University of Sussex, the findings of the research will be published 
by the School and will be available in the school’s data base subject to regulation on 
access of information. I am also willing to provide you with a copy of my thesis when I 
finish, if you wish. Well after completion of the PhD program, the findings of this 
research will be published in Rwanda. 
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WHO IS ORGANISING AND FUNDING THE RESEARCH? 
I am conducting this research as a PhD candidate in the School of Law at University of 
Sussex in the United Kingdom. This research is funded by the Government of Rwanda.  
WHO HAS APPROVED THIS STUDY? 
The research has been approved through the School of Law, Politics and Sociology 
ethical review process. 
 
CONTACTS FOR FURTHER INFORMATION 
Below are my contact details as well as the contact details for my supervisors. If you 
have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you may 
contact my supervisors in the first instance. 
My contact details: 
Christophe Bizimungu 
Email chrisbizimungu@gmail.com 
Tel number (UK) +44 7553653321 
Tel number (Rwanda) +250 788301798 
My supervisors’ contact details 
Dr Mark Walters 
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Appendix 2: CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
University of Sussex 
PROJECT TITLE: 
“Are Rwandan Rape Trials Influenced by Rape Myths?” 
 
Project Approval                                                                                                                                          
Reference:               CB/HC/21412375 
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the 
project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet. I 
understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to: 
- Be interviewed by the researcher  
- Allow the interview to be audio taped and transcribed  
I understand that the researcher will keep my identity anonymous and will not mention 
either my name or any other thing that will directly disclose my identity as the 
respondent. I also understand that, all records will be kept safely by the researcher and 
will be used strictly and reasonably for the purpose of this research and that all voice 
records or document emanating from me will neither be transferred to other persons or 
bodies outside the purpose of this research. 
AND 
I understand that, if I make a request, I will be given a transcript of data concerning me 
for my approval before being included in the write up of the research. 
I also understand that I can withdraw at any time from participating in this research and 
I can as well request that all information I have given to be excluded from any part of 
this research, and be destroyed. 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in 
the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project until August 2017 
without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. 
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I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research 
study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and 
handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. 
 
Name__________________________________________________________________ 
Signature_______________________________________________________________ 
Date___________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 3: INTERVIEW GUIDES 
 
A. Questions (and some follow-up questions) for prosecutors, defence lawyers and 
judges 
 
1. Can you tell me what experience you have as a judge/prosecutor/defence counsel 
presiding over/working on rape trials? 
 
2. Can you describe to me the process of cross-examination during rape cases? 
 
a. What types of question are commonly asked of the complainant during cross-
examination? 
b. Do defence lawyers ever question complainants about their prior sexual history? 
 i. Does this include the sexual history between the complainant and defendant and/or 
the sexual history between the complainant and other individuals not party to the case? 
c. Do defence lawyers ever enquire into what clothing the complainant was wearing 
during the incident? 
d. How often does the issue of intoxication of the complainant come into cross-
examination?  
i. How are questions regarding intoxication usually framed during such questioning? 
e. Are there any other common types of questions asked during this phrase of the trial 
process that we have not discussed? 
i. perhaps relating to whether women have the propensity to lie or not about rape? 
ii. the failure of the victim to report the incident to the police immediately? 
f. In your experience how do prosecution lawyers usually respond to defence lawyers’ 
line of questioning? 
 
3. If you have ever experienced a case where a complainant became upset during 
court proceedings, can you explain to me what happened? 
 
a. Why do you believe the complainant became upset? 
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b. Was anything said by the prosecutor/defence lawyer or judge that particularly upset 
the complainant?  
c. How was the incident dealt with by the court? 
 i. was there a break in proceedings 
 ii. did the judge provide any guidance?  
 
4. Can you tell me a little more about the most common types of cases that result in a 
conviction of rape defendants? 
 
a. What are the common features in these cases? 
i. Is the complainant known or unknown to the defendant? 
ii. Is physical violence used? 
iii. Are intoxicants ever used? 
iv. Are there any common features amongst victims? Such as their age, social 
background etc…? 
b. What are the most common forms of evidence present when a judge convicts a 
defendant of rape? 
 
5. What factors influence the penalties imposed on convicted rapists? 
 
a. What are the most commonly accepted mitigating factors in rape cases and how they 
influence sentencing decisions? 
b. What are the most common aggravating factors and how do they influence 
sentencing decisions? 
 
6. Based on your experience what are the most common reasons why a defendant is 
acquitted of rape? 
 
a. What are the common features in these cases? 
i. Is the complainant known or unknown to the defendant? 
ii. Is physical violence used? 
iii. Are intoxicants ever used? 
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iv. Are there any common features amongst victims? Such as their age, social 
background etc…? 
v. What are the forms of evidence often missing when a judge acquits a 
defendant of rape?  
 
7. Can you explain to me your experience about the provision of evidence used to 
show that the victim did not consent to sexual intercourse? 
 
a. How important is the use of physical violence to the issue of consent? 
b. How does the court deal with cases where the victim did not physically resist to the 
assailant? 
c. What happens in cases where the victim said NO but the defendant nevertheless 
proceeded with the sexual intercourse? 
 
8. What is your general opinion about how well the legal process works in rape trials? 
 
a. What are the processes that you think have proved useful to the good conduct of 
rape trials? 
b. Do you think that there is any legal procedure in rape trials which needs amendment? 
c. Is there any practices in rape trials that you believe should be changed to improve 
their effectiveness? 
 
 
Thank you for all that valuable information.  
 
Is there anything else you would like to add before we end? 
 
 
Questions added during fieldwork based on initial findings  
1. How often do rape victim-survivors appear in court to give testimony? 
a. In which circumstances are the victims generally invited to give testimony? 
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b. When victims do not appear in court, what are the reasons for this? 
c. What are the advantages of victims’ lack of participation in the trial? 
d. What are the disadvantages of victims’ lack of participation in the trial? 
e. What does the law say about victims’ testimony in court? 
 
2. Have you ever experienced cases where a rape victim solved “amicably” the offence 
with her family or the defendant’s family member(s)? 
a. How often does it happen? 
b. In which form did the matter come to your attention? 
c. How did you handle the issue as lawyer, prosecutor or judge? 
d. Do such agreements have any impact on the legal/trial process and its outcome? 
 
B. Questions (and some follow-up questions) for rape survivors who participated in 
the trial 
 
1. Can you tell me a little bit of background information about your case? Where did 
the incident occur? How long did it take before it went to court?  
 
2. Can you tell me about the testimony you gave in court? 
 
3. What type of questions did the prosecutor and judge ask you during the trial? 
 
4. What questions were you asked during cross-examined by the defence lawyer? 
 
5. How did you feel about the way you were cross-examined? 
 
a. Were there any questions you felt uncomfortable answering? 
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b. Were there any questions that you felt were not relevant to the incident? Can you 
recall what these questions were?  
c. Can you remember whether the prosecutor and/or the judge reacted to any of the 
questions posed by the defence lawyer? 
 
6. How did you find the attitude and behaviour of prosecutors, defence lawyers and 
judges towards you during the trial? 
 
a. Did you feel that the defence lawyer was polite to you during the case? 
b. Did you feel that the prosecutor was supportive to what had happened to you? 
c. Did you feel that the judge dealt with your evidence sensitively? 
 
7. Were there any particular events that happened during the trial which you found 
especially comforting or discomforting?  
 
a. Can you explain what happened? What caused this experience? How did the 
judge/prosecutor/defence lawyer deal with the situation?  
b. At any point during the trial process did anyone ask any question or make any gesture 
towards you that you felt was unfair and/or offensive?  
 
8. What expectations did you have about how you would be treated by the court 
during the trial?  
 
a. Were your expectations met?  
b. Do you think that the lawyers, prosecutors or judges treated you respectfully? 
c. Were you given an adequate opportunity to express what you wanted them to know 
about the offence committed against you? 
d. Was there anything about the trial that you felt could have been done better? 
 
 
Thank you for all that valuable information.  
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Is there anything else you would like to add before we end? 
 
C. Questions for rape survivors who did not participate in the trial (questions 
formulated during fieldwork based on initial findings) 
 
1. Can you tell me a little bit of background information about your case?  
 
2. Have you been informed about the trial of your case? 
a. Did the police/prosecution inform you that the case was transmitted to court? 
b. Did the prosecution/court invite you to give testimony in court? 
c. If you were invited to attend court, why did you decide not to? 
d. Were you informed about the outcome of the trial? 
 
3. Your case has been tried without your participation. What do you think about your 
absence in court? 
a. Did you want to attend the court to give your testimony? 
b. Do you think that beyond your statement made in the police/prosecution, the court 
could have benefited from hearing your testimony?  
In what ways do you think your testimony would have been useful for the court? 
b. Is there any other personal reason why you would like to appear in court? 
c. Do you think you would have been supported to give testimony in court? 
4. Did you seek damages in a lawsuit? If not, why did you abstain from doing so? 
a. Are you informed about your right to seek damages? 
 
5. Have you ever been approached by either the offender, his family member(s) or 
your own family member(s) asking you to solve the issue? 
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a. If so, who approached you and what was their offer? 
b. How did you react to the offer? 
c. Did anyone put any pressure on you to accept the offer? 
d. What was the stand of your parents/family members? 
e. Did you reach any agreement on the amicable settlement of the issue? 
 
6 If there has been no agreement. Why did it fail? 
a. Who refused the settlement? 
b. What have been the reasons for refusal? 
c. Have you been personally affected by the failure to reach the agreement? If so, how? 
d. Have you been threatened? If so, what was the nature of the threat and how did you 
manage the threat? 
 
6(bis). If there is any agreement between you or your family and the offender’s family, 
how did it work? 
a. How did you reach the agreement? 
b. What are the terms of the agreement? 
c. Has any damages been given?  
d. If so, who received the damages and what was the value of the damages? 
e. What personal commitments have you taken due to the amicable settlement? 
 
7. Do you know whether the agreement has been used to influence the trial process? 
a. Have you informed the prosecution/court about the agreement? In which way? 
b. What has been the reaction of the prosecution/court? 
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c. Did you withdraw your case or change your original statement to influence the course 
of the legal process? 
d. Has the intervention had any effect on the outcome of the trial? 
 
8. What is your situation now? 
a. Are you personally satisfied with the solution of the offence? 
b. Do you feel safe now? 
c. What is the state of relations between you and your family or the offender’s family 
now? 
 
Thank you for all that valuable information.  
 
Is there anything else you would like to add before we end? 
 
 
